IAEA/SYRIA: MULTIPLE SMOKING GUNS IN DG REPORT ON

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000612 SENSITIVE ISN FOR NEPHEW, DANIEL; IO FOR VON BEHREN, EAP FOR MONZ E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: MULTIPLE SMOKING GUNS IN DG REPORT ON SYRIAN REACTOR -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Director General's report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (GOV/2008/60),released on November 19, provides a compelling case for continued investigations into the existence of an undeclared reactor at Al Kibar (referred to in the report as Dair Alzour) and for pursuit of a Board of Governors resolution in support of that investigation. ¶2. (SBU) The report highlights 1) the continued Agency requests for information and access that largely remain unanswered, 2) technical analysis of the buildings and water pumping capacity, concluding that these features are consistent with a nuclear reactor "of the type alleged," despite Syria's claims to the contrary, 3) commercial imagery showing that, while Syria is denying the IAEA access to three additional sites, Syria has taken steps to sanitize the sites and 4) sampling results showing man-made uranium. The Secretariat notes that "While it cannot be excluded that the building in question was intended for non-nuclear use, the features of the building, as described above, along with the connectivity of the site to adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to what may be found in connection with a reactor site." -------------- Syria's Lack of Cooperation and Possible Concealment Activities -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The IAEA chronicles the correspondence between the Agency and Syria, demonstrating Syria's lack of responsiveness and transparency. The IAEA requested access to Al Kibar and three additional sites on May 2, 2008, as well as supporting documentation concerning the past and current use of the building at the Al Kibar sites and the three other locations. After not responding to four requests by the Agency for the documentation (June 24 - the second request, July 3, and August 15),Syria notifies the Agency in an August 24 letter that any further developments are contingent on the results of the sample analyses. (Note: The Director General informed the Board members of this at the September Board of Governors meeting. End Note.) ¶4. (SBU) With respect to the three additional locations, the report notes that the locations "are alleged to have been functionally related to the Dair Alzour site (Al Kibar)." The chronology of events cites four requests to visit Syria (2008: May 2, July 3, August 15, and October 22),two of which specifically request access to the three sites (May 2 and October 22). The report further notes that the Agency has not received a response to the latest, October 22, request, which is also the Agency's fifth request for documentation. ¶5. (SBU) In addition, the IAEA's analysis of satellite imagery taken of the three locations indicates that "landscaping activities and the removal of large containers took place" shortly after the Agency's request for access. The Agency carefully notes that these activities could be unrelated to the Al Kibar site, but nonetheless requests an explanation and access. The report notes that "Syria has not yet acceded to the Agency's request to provide any documentation relevant to the destroyed building, or any of the other buildings, to support its statements." -------------- Sampling Results -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The IAEA provided the results of the environmental sample analyses to Syria, as requested by Syria. The report identifies that a "significant number of natural uranium particles" were found by "a number of the Agency's Network of Analytic Laboratories." The particles were found to be anthropogenic (man-made). Syria's responded to the sampling results by noting that "the only explanation for the presence of these modified uranium particles is that they were contained in the missiles that were dropped from the Israeli planes onto the building to increase the destructive power." In addition, Syria called on the IAEA to verify the nature of the materials used in these missiles. Syria noted to the IAEA that the results "do not show any materials belonging to the construction of a nuclear reactor," although the DG report does not raise a similar concern or conclusion. -------------- If it Quacks Like a Duck... -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Syria claims to the Agency that the Al Kibar site was a military installation unrelated to any nuclear applications. Syria further explained that the destroyed building could not have been a nuclear facility because of the unreliable and insufficient electricity supplies in the area, the limited availability of human resources in Syria, and the unavailability of large quantities of treated water. ¶8. (SBU) The DG report reviews the Agency's analysis of the information it had available from its visit and from other sources such as commercial and other satellite imagery, open source photographs said to have been taken at the Al Kibar site before the building was destroyed, information regarding procurement and the results of the environment sampling analyses. (Note: In the instances where information is attributed to member states, the report makes clear the information comes from more than one member state. End Note.) ¶9. (SBU) In its review of imagery, the IAEA found that the "containment structure" visible after the destruction of the facility at the site, "appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that required for a biological shield for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the building was sufficient to house the equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged." ¶10. (SBU) The Agency also calculated the water pumping infrastructure at the Al Kibar site had a pumping capacity adequate for a reactor of the size referred to in the "allegation" (25 Megawatt-thermal). In addition, the IAEA notes that the Agency observed sufficient electrical capacity to operate the pumping system. -------------- Procurement -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Part of the Agency's investigation is focused on "efforts by Syrian entities to procure materials and equipment which could support the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor." The DG report notes the procurement of "such items" (not further identified) could be for a non-nuclear use. Again, Syria is noted as not responding to an Agency request for information related to procurements. -------------- Commercial Imagery -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The IAEA indicates it has acquired non-commercial imagery from "member states" covering the period immediately after the bombing. The Agency has been recently authorized to share this non-commercial imagery with Syria at its next meeting. -------------- Agency Conclusions -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The Director General predictably expresses concern about the unilateral use of force, although he does not express similar concern to the lack of transparency/cooperation, possible concealment activities, and the possibility of the existence of an undeclared nuclear reactor in Syria. The Director General does, however, call on Syria to provide the necessary transparency, including visits to the requested locations and access to all available information, for the Agency to complete its assessment. ElBaradei calls on other States that may possess relevant information, including satellite imagery, to make this available to the Agency and to authorize the Agency to share the information with Syria. The report also notes that the Agency plans to approach Israel to request "information pertaining to Syria's claims regarding the origin of the uranium particles." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Mission believes the DG's report helpfully establishes a multi-faceted basis for upping the ante in regard to the Agency's investigation in Syria, including via a possible resolution in support of the investigation at the upcoming November 27 Board meeting. While elements of the report are not helpful and will very likely be lifted as proposed countering text by NAM states in discussion of any Board resolution (e.g., the DG's emphasis on how the IAEA investigation was "severely hampered by the unilateral use of force and by the late provision of information"),the report will make it more difficult for Syria's blanket denials to be seen as credible by many Board members. On balance, the report reads as if written by someone who believes there was a reactor at Al Kibar, and initial press coverage of the (rapidly leaked) report reflects that tone. SCHULTE NNNN End Cable Text