IAEA/TC: STATUS UPDATE ON PROPOSED SYRIA NUCLEAR

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000604 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018 TAGS: KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY AORC SY SUBJECT: IAEA/TC: STATUS UPDATE ON PROPOSED SYRIA NUCLEAR POWER FEASIBILITY PROJECT REF: A. STATE 118652 ¶B. UNVIE VIENNA 000584 ¶C. UNVIE VIENNA 000569 ¶D. UNVIE VIENNA 000540 ¶E. STATE 097067 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- IAEA Safeguards Memo Raises Concerns -------------- ¶1. (S) The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently circulated a confidential internal memo (strictly protect) outlining Safeguards Department concerns with the Syrian technical cooperation (TC) project proposal entitled "Conducting a Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant" (reftels). In a November 13 meeting with IAEA TC Program Coordination Section Head Frederick Claps (please protect),Msnoff learned that a confidential memo from the Safeguards Department, circulated November 12 and addressed to the DDGs of both Safeguards and TC, specifically outlines several concerns over the Syria nuclear power feasibility project. Msnoff read the memo but did not receive a copy. Concerns outlined in the memo include the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the project's proposed training and fellowships; the Safeguards Department's determination that the procurement of a gamma spectrometer was unnecessary for the project; and the high level involvement of Ibrahim Othman, theDirector General of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, as the Syrian point of contact, which was described as "unusual" and "inappropriate." The memo concluded that the Safeguards Department could not exclude the possibility that aspects of the project could be diverted to undeclared activities. -------------- Project of Concern -------------- ¶2. (S) The new Safeguards Department memo should cause a reconsideration within Secretariat as to whether the project is entirely appropriate in substance and design. While it is possible the Secretariat could choose to modify the project, we do not anticipate the DG agreeing to remove it from the proposed TC program entirely at this juncture, despite the expressed Safeguards concerns. ¶3. (S) To buttress our arguments for disapproval in the TACC/Board, therefore, Mission has initiated a comparative analysis to previous Syrian projects that would provide basis for technical arguments for setting this project aside, at least for now. Unlike other similar feasibility studies, only the Syrian project includes significant sums of money for equipment procurement or includes aspects of nuclear power plant site selection and development. Mission has learned of four items earmarked by the Secretariat for possible procurement over two years under the study: equipment for safety of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) (USD 25,000); items for improvement of the MNSR facility (USD 25,000); a portable gamma spectrometer (USD 50,000); and micro earthquake monitoring equipment (USD 20,000). These items are not listed in the materials provided to member states by the Secretariat for evaluation of the proposed TC projects, nor are the types of fellowships or scientific visits envisioned for the project described in any detail in the project's supporting documents. ¶4. (S) The equipment planned for safety and improvement of the MNSR research facility appears to be only vaguely defined, but has been described by Nuclear Power Division officials with direct oversight of the project as possibly including a safety analysis report, instrumentation for reactor management training, or computer programs and simulations for human capacity development. Fellowships and scientific visits funded under the project are similarly ill defined, with Secretariat officials stating that details will only be decided on once the project has received Board approval. Nuclear Power Division officials conveyed that Syria has already made a political decision to pursue nuclear power, and defended the substance of the project as chiefly focusing on safety. They stressed the aim of the study was to help Syria make a knowledgeable decision on whether the pursuit of nuclear power was within Syria's current capabilities and interests. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (S) Despite the Safeguards objections, the project will likely receive strong support from the G-77/NAM as technically within the range of TC projects available to Syria in the absence of a relevant Board resolution to restrict such activities. At lunch hosted by Ambassador Schulte November 13, the ambassadors of Malaysia, Egypt, and to a lesser extent Spain, cautioned again "politicizing TC." Egypt also raised the prospect of questioning the TC program for Israel. ¶6. (S) Mission continues to coordinate with likeminded states and will present arguments for disapproval of the project during a planned likeminded experts meeting on November 18. The basis for the arguments are the inconsistencies in the project design versus other active feasibility studies, the pre-determined positive outcome of the project by including site selection and development, and the lack of convergence between the project and the IAEA Milestones document. We hope to demonstrate that this project appears to be an inappropriately structured "umbrella" project that is not consistent with the Secretariat's own guidelines for formulating TC projects. All of these points will be punctuated by a request of the Secretariat to tell member states whether the Safeguards Department has had any input/views on this project. We should have a better idea after the planned experts-level discussion on November 18 of whether we can present a strong multi-country front in the TACC the following week to kill, defer, or delay this project. SCHULTE