IAEA/GC: GENERAL DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

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Summary 
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its cooperation with the IAEA would not be at the expense of

military or national security.



3. (U) In addition to these specific issues, member state

interventions in the General Debate addressed broad themes and IAEA

programmatic areas: strengthening safeguards with emphasis on the

Additional Protocol and nuclear disarmament; funding and support to

nuclear security; the Agency's role in the expansion of nuclear

power; the importance of technical cooperation and nuclear safety.

Japan and South Africa used their interventions to promote

respective candidates for IAEA Director General. Notably, on the

issue of upgrading the Agency's laboratories, the Czech Republic

announced that it had offered the IAEA "premises and capacities" for

safeguards analysis. Several member states, including some

potential recipients, also expressed support for Reliable Access to

Nuclear Fuel (RANF). End Summary.



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DG's Introductory Remarks

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4. (U) Opening the GC on a cautionary note, DG ElBaradei warned in

address entitled "The IAEA at a Crossroads," that "all is not well

with the IAEA" and cited a lack of resources and legal authority to

meet member state expectations. IAEA-FAO cooperation was the first

programmatic area he mentioned, urging continued member state

support. Among growing demands was the significant expansion of

nuclear power, projected to double by 2030, and safeguards

challenges with respect to undeclared activities by state and

non-state actors. Regarding the latter, ElBaradei regretted that

only about half of NPT states have Additional Protocols (AP) in

force and 30 states lack required comprehensive safeguards

agreements (CSA). The DG also highlighted Agency contributions to

nuclear safety standards and nuclear security. The aging

infrastructure at the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory merited

particular mention, as did the need for an overhaul of the Incident

and Emergency Center so that it may respond to large-scale

emergencies.



5. (U) ElBaradei commented on the DPRK's intention, at that

juncture, to restrict inspector access, and noted "substantial

progress" in Iran's nuclear program. However, he stressed that the

Agency could not verify the absence of undeclared activities, and

urged Iran to implement the AP and transparency measures to build

confidence as "this would be good for Iran and good for the world."

The DG welcomed the resumption of routine verification in Libya but

reiterated concerns that electronic information on enrichment and

weapon design exists on the black market. He also reported the lack

of any progress on a Middle East NWFZ.



6. (U) Turning to the future, the DG noted that years of zero real

growth left the Agency overly reliant on voluntary contributions,

particularly for nuclear security and safety as well as safeguards.

He highlighted the Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) report's most

important recommendations, including multilateral nuclear fuel

supply arrangements; substantial increase for the Technical

Cooperation Fund, which should not be a "political bargaining chip";

binding nuclear security standards and a global safety network;

strengthening safeguards, and progress on nuclear disarmament, which

has been on the "back burner for too long." The cost of these

proposals, with a gradual doubling of the IAEA budget by 2020, was

modest, he claimed, weighed against the cost of a nuclear accident

or terrorist attack. ElBaradei concluded by encouraging member

states to "think big and think long-term."



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U.S. Statement

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7. (U) The first speaker in the General Debate, Secretary of Energy

Bodman delivered the U.S. statement and a message from President

Bush. The Presidential message pledged that the U.S. would do its

part to support the Agency's goals, including those outlined in the

CEP report, of strengthening safeguards, and promoting nuclear

safety, security and peaceful nuclear energy. Secretary Bodman

noted three challenges facing the expansion of nuclear power that

need to be addressed in quick order: cost, waste and proliferation.

He also highlighted the Convention on Supplemental Compensation

(CSC),the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the Next

Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI); and he supported the

establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank, noting the U.S.

contribution of nearly 50 million USD to that effort. Secretary

Bodman advised that the U.S. hoped to ratify the AP by year's end

and reported significant progress in nuclear disarmament, with the

U.S. strategic stockpile at levels equivalent to that of the

Eisenhower Administration. Full text of the U.S. statement

available at www.doe.gov and www.iaea.org.



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20/20

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8. (U) Several countries commented on the CEP report and future

direction of the Agency with some expressing reservations about

outsourcing the 20/20 process. The EU advised it is willing to

enter a dialogue on CEP recommendations within the Statutory mandate

of the Agency, but also noted that the CEP does not replace the

Agency's policy bodies. Slovenia and the Netherlands observed that

member states should steer the 20/20 process. Slovenia also

recommended that the IAEA focus on its statutory role while Poland

cautioned against the trend toward politicization of the Agency's

work. Poland supported more emphasis on nuclear energy development

and reliance on the regular budget. The Netherlands attached great

importance to the Agency's future, and was ready to discuss

budgetary implications. The UK, Brazil, Chile, Philippines,

Algeria, Tunisia, Azerbaijan and others welcomed the CEP report as

timely, positive and a good basis for discussion. Norway urged that

we seize this opportunity to strengthen the Agency.



9. (U) Among the G-77, India was critical of the report as needing

"balance" and more of a focus on nuclear energy and practical ideas.

Indonesia also observed that the CEP report did not sufficiently

address issues of concern to developing countries, especially

Technical Cooperation (Note: The report calls for a substantial

increase in TC funding. End note.) Syria underlined that the CEP

report was a non-binding guidance document and that member states

and policy organs would determine the future direction of the

Agency.



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DG Candidates

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10. (U) Japan and South Africa used the General Debate to

enthusiastically support their respective candidates for the next

IAEA Director General, Governor Amano of Japan and Governor Minty of

South Africa. Mozambique also publicly endorsed Minty's candidacy;

the DG race was not otherwise raised in the General Debate.



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Nuclear Verification: Iran

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11. (U) Iranian Vice President and Atomic Energy Agency of Iran

(AEOI) Director Agazadeh cancelled his participation in the General

Conference, reportedly to protest the IAEA's toughening stance on

Iran's nuclear program. Iran's statement, delivered by Iranian

Ambassador Soltanieh, charged the IAEA with threatening Iran's

national security on the pretext of verification and at the behest

of a few Western nations. Soltanieh described Iran's nuclear energy

plan and encouraged potential suppliers to participate. He noted

that the fuel enrichment facility at Natanz was almost at the final

stage of construction. In statements widely quoted in the press,

Soltanieh claimed that multilateral fuel assurances failed to

address concerns of developing countries and include

non-discriminatory criteria. Soltanieh insisted that Iran acts in

accordance with its safeguards agreement, and cited negative

developments in the Board of Governors. He urgently called for UNSC

reform and concluded by affirming that sanctions do not deter Iran's

nuclear program and put constraints on negotiations.



12. (U) More than two dozen IAEA members referred to Iran in their

General Debate statements; most were critical with the exceptions of

Cuba and Venezuela. The EU, UK, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Belgium,

Greece, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Norway, Ireland,

Malta, the Philippines and Singapore variously urged Iran to

cooperate with the IAEA (or noted Iran's defiance),implement the

AP/transparency measures, comply with UNSCRs and change course.

Several countries also encouraged Iran to respond to the EU3+3

offer. (Note: Like the U.S., Russia and China did not focus on

verification issues in their GC statements. End note.) The EU

"could not accept Iran with nuclear weapons" and cited the adoption

of UNSCR 1835 that week, as did the UK, Denmark and Australia. The

EU affirmed that as the guarantor of international security the UNSC

was an important partner of the IAEA. Denmark's statement was

particularly strident with respect to the credibility of the UNSC.

The EU also called on Iran to accede to the Convention on Nuclear

Safety before Bushehr goes online. Several interventions supported

the IAEA investigation of weaponization. Germany noted remaining

questions on the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear

program, while Greece called on Iran to make full disclosure of

weapons development. Australia urged Iran to follow Libya's lead,

and Belgium contrasted Libya's case with those of Iran and DPRK.

Notably, Peru distanced itself from the Tehran NAM Ministerial

statement and supported UNSCRs on nonproliferation.



13. (U) Other national statements, including by some current or

incoming UNSC members, were carefully balanced. Mexico welcomed

positive progress on the Iran work plan and urged Iran to intensify

cooperation and clarify outstanding issues. Thailand also urged

Iranian cooperation but defended NPT rights to peaceful use. Turkey

noted the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran while

sharing the DG's concern that the Agency is not able to verify the

full scope of Iran's program. Ukraine supported constructive

dialogue between Iran and the Agency. Sudan welcomed IAEA

activities in Iran and encouraged a peaceful conclusion. Libya

warned that "threats and confrontation" would not facilitate a

solution and argued against sanctions or use of force. Libya

stressed Iran's right to peaceful use, while calling for increased

cooperation. Indonesia hoped that Iran's program would remain

peaceful and cautioned that sanctions alone would not lead to a

solution. As would be expected, Cuba and Venezuela came to Iran's

defense. Venezuela rejected the UNSC "usurping" the IAEA's role and

argued that Iran should not be singled out, using pretexts to deny

NPT rights. Cuba also cited the IAEA as the only competent

authority to verify compliance without external interference.



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Nuclear Verification: Syria, Libya, DPRK

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14. (U) In a statement delivered by Atomic Energy Commission

Director Othman, Syria regretted calls by others for more

transparency with the Agency on the investigation. Othman recalled

statements made by the DG and DDG for Safeguards at the September

2008 Board of Governors meeting that Syria was "cooperative and

complied with the procedures agreed upon with the Agency." Othman

noted that Syria will continue to cooperate but not at the expense

of disclosing military positions or threatening national security.

The remainder of Syria's statement was devoted to the issues of a

Middle East NWFZ and "double standard" for Israel.



15. (U) A number of statements raised Syria's cooperation with the

IAEA. The EU urged Syria to answer the IAEA's questions and provide

access, asking that the Secretariat pursue the investigation "until

such time" that it can send a full report to the Board of Governors.

Denmark, Germany, Italy and Australia also called for Syrian

cooperation with the investigation. Australia and Canada expressed

concern about DPRK cooperation with Syria. By contrast, Switzerland

was pleased to see cooperation with Syria and awaited the

conclusions of the IAEA. Malaysia noted that there was no

indication of nuclear material at Al Kibar. Rallying to Syria's

defense, Venezuela described the attack on Al Kibar as a flagrant

violation of international law.



16. (U) Several statements took note of positive developments in

Libya. The EU applauded the "courageous steps" taken by Libya and

Italy expressed satisfaction with Libya's decision to renounce WMD.

Belgium, Italy and others noted Libyan-IAEA cooperation and

transparency and Greece hoped that other member states would follow

Libya's example. Libya expressed support for IAEA safeguards and

focused its statement on peaceful use, nuclear energy and technical

cooperation. Libya also thanked the U.S. and U.K. for the fruitful

work carried out in the days prior, i.e. on the Board of Governors

resolution on Libya's return to routine safeguards, and cited

U.S.-Libya cooperation on a nuclear medicine center.



17. (U) At least 20 General Debate statements, including those of

Japan, Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy,

Turkey, Malta, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, sounded

concern about the DPRK's announced halt to disablement activities at

Yongbyon and removal of IAEA seals and inspectors in late September.

The ROK, New Zealand, Singapore and several others called for the

DPRK's return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Denmark, Italy,

Ukraine, Thailand and Chile also supported the IAEA's role in DPRK.

The EU called on the DPRK to implement UNSCRs and dismantle nuclear

facilities in a verifiable manner so that the IAEA could be in a

position to assume its full role.



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India Nuclear Cooperation

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18. (U) India highlighted the Board of Governors' approval of its

safeguards agreement and subsequent NSG exception, which would allow

it to contribute to international civil nuclear cooperation, and

focused on the importance of nuclear energy for sustainable

development and climate change. Israel also welcomed the U.S.-India

civilian nuclear agreement. Germany expected that the India-IAEA

safeguards agreement would bring India closer to nonproliferation

efforts and that India would refrain from nuclear testing. Germany

clarified that its support of the NSG decision was predicated on the

safeguards agreement. The ROK specified that India should implement

its safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol at the earliest

possible date; Belgium also hoped India would move forward on the

AP. Japan called on India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state.

Others expressed continued reservations about the India safeguards

agreement and NSG exemption. Switzerland noted that this still

represented a challenge for universality and comprehensive

safeguards. Ireland had "reluctantly" agreed to India's exemption

from full safeguards only after India committed to a moratorium on

testing. Indonesia was the most critical in "deeply regretting" the

NSG decision, which would bring more harm than good to the global

nonproliferation regime.



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Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel

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19. (U) The General Debate further reflected considerable momentum

and support for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF),which was

also the subject of side events by the Nuclear Threat Initiative

(NTI) and others. The EU confirmed that it was examining the

possibility of making a contribution to the International Nuclear

Fuel Bank (INFB). Russia expected to have all the mechanisms in

place for the international fuel enrichment center at Angarsk by

year's end. However, Russia cautioned that making fuel supply

arrangements subject to political considerations would undermine

support. China also called for multilateral approaches to the

nuclear fuel cycle. The UK noted that it would host a major

conference by March 2009 on assurance of supply. Germany shared the

DG's view that any multilateral mechanism should be

non-discriminatory and in compliance with IAEA safeguards. Other EU

members, including Austria, Denmark and Greece, expressed strong

support for multilateralization of nuclear fuel supply, and Denmark

advocated a crucial role for the IAEA in such a mechanism.



20. (U) Among potential recipient countries, the Philippines viewed

"with interest" proposals on multilateral fuel centers with IAEA

involvement. Ecuador welcomed the rich debate about options for

guaranteeing supply of nuclear fuel, and was prepared to support

viable initiatives allowing countries to benefit from nuclear

energy. Indonesia was also forward leaning in viewing multilateral

mechanisms on fuel supply as a positive step so long as this does

not restrict the right of countries to develop nuclear technology.

Malaysia noted that the establishment of a RANF mechanism should be

based on consultation with all member states and by consensus. Only



Venezuela obliquely rejected "commercial" arrangements that limit

states' options with regard to nuclear power, while Iran portrayed

fuel supply mechanisms as discriminatory toward developing

countries.



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Middle East NWFZ

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21. (U) Once again the subject of a Middle East NWFZ would come to

dominate the General Conference. The former GC President (Lebanon)

opened the GC with a call for universal adherence to the NPT in the

Middle East and the establishment of a zone free of WMD. Upon

taking office, the 2008 GC President (Italy) expressed the hope that

a Middle East Forum on the establishment of a WMD-free zone could be

convened during the coming year. For its part, Israel noted that it

had supported establishment of a NWFZ since 1993 and had not lost

hope, but regretted the breakdown of consensus in the GC. This had

led Israel to wonder if the Middle East NWFZ was really the issue.



22. (U) The establishment of a Middle East NWFZ and the "double

standard" with respect to Israel's accession to the NPT/the

application of IAEA safeguards was the focus of interventions by

most Arab states in the General Debate (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia,

Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon and Sudan) and that of

Iran. Syria portrayed this as the "highest priority" on the agendas

of all international organizations, and Iran blamed the U.S., U.K

and France for Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. Libya also

pointedly warned that Israel's nuclear possibilities could trigger

an arms race in the region. NAM countries led by Cuba, Venezuela,

Indonesia, Malaysia and Ecuador voiced support for a Middle East

NWFZ and the Arab League position. Cuba condemned U.S. technology

transfer to Israel. The Palestinian Observer Mission spoke of

living in the shadow of the unsafeguarded Israeli reactor. Others

such as Afghanistan and Nigeria lent moral support to the concept of

NWFZs, including in the Middle East.



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Safeguards / AP/ SAL

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23. (U) The majority of countries underlined their commitment to

strengthening safeguards with particular emphasis on

universalization of the Additional Protocol. EU members, Russia,

China, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Kazakhstan,

Uganda, Albania and Croatia cited the importance of the AP. Spain

regretted that 11 years after the adoption of the Model AP, 104

states have yet to implement it. The UK, Austria and others cited

the failure of 30 countries to conclude safeguards agreements.

Several interventions (Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, ROK,

Latvia, Israel and others) stressed safeguards compliance, noting

that breaches of safeguards obligations/clandestine activities

necessitated strengthened safeguards. Australia saw safeguards as

the core mission of the IAEA, including with respect to

investigation of weaponization, and cited transparency measures

beyond the AP.



24. (U) In a concrete contribution to Agency safeguards, the Czech

Republic announced during the General Debate that it had officially

offered the Agency premises and capacities for performing analysis

of safeguards samples. The Czech Republic advised that use of or

investment in adequate capacities of countries in the vicinity could

be a cost effective solution for the IAEA in its efforts to upgrade

the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.



25. (U) In other noteworthy interventions, Saudi Arabia cited

safeguards as one of the main pillars of the Agency but argued that

they be applied without exception (i.e. including Israel). Saudi

Arabia reported that it has met all the legal and constitutional

requirements for implementation of a safeguards agreement, and

Tunisia advised that it would soon ratify an AP. Pakistan also

noted that it would place a uranium conversion facility under Agency

safeguards.



26. (U) Only Egypt cast the AP as a voluntary measure that should

not be generalized and complained instead of the diminishing role of

the IAEA in disarmament. Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Indonesia

characterized nonproliferation and disarmament as mutually

reinforcing or inseparable, and the Philippines called for

substantial progress toward both. Nigeria also linked the

transparent and nondiscriminatory application of Agency safeguards

with commitment to disarmament on the part of nuclear weapons

states. Switzerland observed that the NPT Prepcom had demonstrated

this conflict between verification and disarmament. In an apt

rejoinder, Norway argued that concerns about the lack of progress on

disarmament should not be an excuse for or detract from

strengthening safeguards. Kazakhstan also advocated universal

disarmament and Venezuela rejected the existence of nuclear weapons.

In addition, Norway, Ireland, Italy, Armenia and others called for

the CTBT to enter into force.



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Nuclear Security

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27. (U) Nuclear security was also high on the agenda of the majority

of member states. The EU noted support for the Global Initiative to

Combat Nuclear Terrorism and encouraged participation in the IAEA's

illicit trafficking data base and nuclear security fund (NSF).

Russia announced that it would make a considerable contribution to

the NSF. The Netherlands saw the NSF as a "pivotal" function that

should be funded out of the regular budget, while Denmark, New

Zealand and others also noted contributions to the NSF.



28. (U) Countries from every region (Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan,

Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Latvia, Croatia, Macedonia, Armenia, Poland, Italy, Colombia, Kenya

among others) highlighted nuclear terrorism and trafficking as a

grave threat, and strongly supported the IAEA's efforts in

coordination with other bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

Pakistan saw verification of safety and security as the primary

objective of the Agency. Morocco called upon the IAEA to use all

the resources at its disposal against the acquisition of nuclear

technology by international terrorist networks. In a direct affront

to Pakistan, Afghanistan observed that AQ Khan and his government

must be accountable for their implication in nuclear proliferation,

and held nuclear states responsible if a terrorist attack should

occur. Libya noted its historic decision to dismantle nuclear

technology that could lead to nuclear terrorism.



29. (U) Denmark cited UNSCR 1540 as a fundamental step forward, and

Saudi Arabia and Ukraine commended the IAEA's role in UNSCR 1540 and

1763 implementation. Italy cited cooperation through the G-8

against nuclear terrorism and supported a ban on fissile material

production, as did Finland. A number of countries focused on

strengthening export controls and regional cooperation. Denmark

cited the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),and Latvia noted

its work with DOE on control of dual use technology. Ukraine

highlighted cooperation through GUUAM, as did Azerbaijan, and with

the U.S. and others in the Global Initiative to Prevent the

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, Russia noted removal

of HEU from Vietnam, Poland and the Czech Republic, while the Czech

Republic noted it would fund the transfer of spent fuel from Serbia

to Russia.



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Nuclear Safety

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30. (U) Many interventions strongly supported the IAEA's role in

nuclear safety, in addition to nuclear security. China called upon

the Agency to strengthen the global nuclear safety culture and

advised against complacency in view of several incidents at nuclear

facilities. The EU congratulated the IAEA's work on nuclear safety

standards. Austria expressed concern at efforts to "downgrade" IAEA

safety standards from "highest" to just "standard." Italy observed

that safety and security standards should be global legal

obligations. On the other hand, Finland and others opined that the

Agency's advisory role cannot be a substitute for national

regulatory infrastructure for those developing nuclear power. Many

countries underlined safety as a prerequisite for expansion of

nuclear power, including in the context of the 3Ss (safety,

security, safeguards). India also announced that it is hosting an

IAEA conference on nuclear installation safety in November 2008.



31. (U) A number of countries, including Lithuania, Belgium, the UK,

Finland, Spain and China, drew attention to waste management. The

UK supported deep geological disposal of nuclear waste, and Finland

noted that it is constr]I[:Q-QQ

QYp> power and the

promotion of innovative approaches. The EU announced that it has

developed a global plan on energy and is producing a strategic

report by November 2008. The EU also supported IAEA activities on

INPRO. Russia expected to double its nuclear capacity by 2060 with

the addition of 36 power plants. The UK, Canada and many others

noted the vital and expanding role of nuclear energy. Germany

believed the IAEA's mandate was sufficiently broad and flexible to

support this demand. Only traditional nuclear power opponents such

as New Zealand and Ireland raised reservations about the risks of

nuclear power and the role of the Agency in its promotion.



34. (U) Developing countries such as India and Morocco saw nuclear

energy as integral to meet growing energy needs and for sustainable

development. Countries ranging from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and

Bangladesh to Romania advocated increased Agency support for nuclear

power development. Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Libya

stressed unconditional and transparent support and

non-discrimination in furtherance of NPT rights to nuclear energy.

Several of 50 or so states considering nuclear power addressed their

plans. Kuwait referred to a Gulf Summit declaration on a joint

program among GCC countries for peaceful use of nuclear energy,

noted satisfaction with preliminary feasibility studies, and looked

forward to further IAEA-GCC cooperation. Libya had invited a number

of companies to offer expertise on nuclear reactor technology and

had signed agreements with France, Russia and South Korea. Morocco

noted that it had launched its first reactor in 2007 and supported

technical cooperation with brotherly countries. Turkey planned for

nuclear power to become a major component of its energy mix. Jordan

would like to use nuclear power and is developing a nuclear energy

infrastructure. Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda and Mongolia were

exploring or considering nuclear power; Namibia saw it as a prospect

and Ghana as a long term option (Ghana is holding its first workshop

in early 2009.) The Dominican Republic sought IAEA assistance on

nuclear power and noted an agreement with Cuba on training staff.



35. (U) Bulgaria, Armenia and Kazakhstan noted their participation

in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). OECD countries were

also more vigorously pursuing nuclear power. Italy noted the

adoption of legislation to allow the production of nuclear energy.

Lithuania noted it is expanding nuclear power with a new plant

expected by 2016, and supported TC for nuclear power development.

Finland is building a new plant and considering others. Canada

expressed renewed interest in a thorium-fueled reactor. Spain was

completing a study on its nuclear power needs through 2030.



36. (U) States were cognizant of the proliferation risks associated

with nuclear energy expansion. In addition to Japan, Nigeria

advocated adherence to international legal and regulatory

requirements for 3s (safety, security and safeguards). Saudi

Arabia, Romania, Brazil and several others underlined the role of

Agency safeguards in this expansion. Russia noted that it was

important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology, and

China supported the right to nuclear power for those in compliance

with nonproliferation obligations.



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Technical Cooperation

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37. (U) Noting that it was the leading contributor to technical

cooperation (TC),the EU called for a substantial debate to ensure

its effectiveness and efficiency of TC and equitable geographic

distribution, including to LDCs. Other donor nations such as Canada

also voiced strong support for TC. Many national statements

(Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bosnia, Croatia, Ghana,

Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Mongolia, Vietnam

and others) focused on the importance of TC in general or TC

projects in respective countries. The Program of Action for Cancer

Therapy (PACT) drew universal praise, and the African Regional

Cooperative Agreement for Research (AFRA),cooperation with the

African Union on tsetse fly eradication (AU-PATTEC),and the Sterile

Insect Technique (SIT) received accolades from African countries.

Ethiopia gave the highest priority to the SIT program, which was at

a decisive stage, and thanked the U.S., China and Japan for their

support. Continuation of IAEA-FAO cooperation in the Joint Division

also drew support from Poland, Norway and Ethiopia, among others.



38. (U) Egypt, Indonesia and Guatemala made traditional calls for

"balance" between safeguards and TC and among the Agency's three

pillars. Others such as Malaysia called for predictable and assured

funding for TC, incorporation of TC in the regular budget, and the

establishment of criteria for TC fund targets. Cuba once again

lambasted the U.S. blockade, which it blamed for difficulties in

implementing TC projects.



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Scientific Forum

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39. (U) The two-day Scientific Forum on the margins of the General

Conference was devoted this year to the "Future Role of the IAEA and

chaired by former Dutch PM Ruud Lubbers. Four panels considered the

IAEA's role in nuclear energy; development; safety and security; and

non-proliferation. Among the 21 panelists, including government

officials, NGOs and academics, was U/S of Energy and NNSA Deputy

Administer William Tobey, who addressed the Next Generation

Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Opening the Forum, DG ElBaradei

related these topics to the 20/20 exercise and the Commission of

Eminent Persons report, reiterating many of the points from his

introductory remarks to the GC. The first session on nuclear energy

included calls for increased IAEA budget and legal authority and

focused on the Agency's support role in nuclear power development.

Thailand presented an excellent case study on infrastructure and

capacity building, and other participants addressed fuel cycle

approaches and waste management. The only distraction was an

intervention from an Iran during the Q&A in defense of its nuclear

program, which was finally cut off. The second panel on development

and technical assistance was the most "scientific" of the four,

including talks on cancer treatment and water resources. During the

panel on safety and security, some participants proposed that the

IAEA play the role of an international regulator; most however,

favored harmonization of safety and security standards. In the

final panel on safeguards, Chairman Lubbers pushed for international

acceptance of the AP and criticized U.S.-India nuclear cooperation

as a possible failure of the NPT. Other speakers also suggested the

expansion of the IAEA role to include verification of disarmament.



40. (U) Taking on the DG's challenge to "think big and think

long-term," the Scientific Forum Chairman's report to the GC sought

to inform and enrich the views of member states with inputs from a

variety of stake-holders on the Agency's future. The Director

General's 20/20 report and the Commission of Eminent Persons report

provided a starting point for the discussion. The Forum report

focused on the Agency's role as the global leading actor on

non-proliferation; its important role on nuclear energy, safety and

security; and the IAEA's strategic but more modest contribution to

development assistance. The Forum took note of greater demands on

the safeguards system with the expansion of nuclear energy and fuel

cycle activities, and nuclear security challenges. This

necessitated greater efficiency and effectiveness of Agency

safeguards and other innovations, including multilateral approaches

to the fuel cycle. Although the Forum report recognizes that the

IAEA is not the lead forum on disarmament, it recommends that the

Agency be prepared to respond to the technical needs of verification

in this domain. The second part of the report on meeting energy

needs in a safe and secure manner focuses on the challenges

accompanying the nuclear renaissance, including Agency support for

"newcomer" countries as well as solutions for waste management, the

back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and innovation. The report

recommends a stringent approach to safety and security to enable

this renaissance, and sees the Agency as playing a leading, expanded

role in harmonization of standards. The final section on

development assistance highlights the Program of Action for Cancer

Therapy (PACT),the contribution of the FAO-IAEA Joint Division to

food security, and Agency research on isotope hydrology. The report

recommends enhanced technical cooperation in partnership with other

organizations.



41. (SBU) In conclusion, the Chairman's report recommends

consideration of greater resources to meet the Agency's dual mission

for development and security so that it may remain "ahead of the

curve." The "vital messages" from the Forum focus the need for more

technical assistance to member states and enhancement of nuclear

technology for development, and the Agency's role in ensuring that

all nuclear facilities meet the 3S (safety, security and safeguards)

requirements. (Comment: As has become increasingly the case, the

Scientific Forum was less "scientific" and more "political"; this

year's focus on the future of the Agency only reinforced the trend.

The DG used the Forum as yet another platform for the 20/20 process

in the hopes of advancing his agenda. We expect to see some of the

Scientific Forum's recommendations creep into discussions of the way

forward in the 20/20 process. End Comment.)



PYATT