WORKING GROUP REFORMS UNICTRAL MODEL ARBITRATION LAW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000533 DEPT FOR IO/T, EB/IFT/ODF AND L/PIL EMBASSIES FOR ECON/POL SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ABUD AORC EAID EINV ETRD KCRM KUNR UNCITRAL AU UN SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP REFORMS UNICTRAL MODEL ARBITRATION LAW -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group II on Arbitration met September 15-19, 2008 in Vienna to continue discussing proposed reforms to the UNCITRAL model arbitration law. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are considered one of the most successful UNCITRAL texts, having been adopted by many arbitration centers and used in many different instances, for example in investor-State disputes. At its fortieth session, in 2007, the Commission noted that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules had not been amended since their adoption in 1976 and the Rules should be modernized to promote greater efficiency in arbitral proceedings, without altering the original structure and spirit of the text. The Commission expressed the hope, at its forty-first session in 2008, that the Working Group would complete the second reading of its revisions to the UNCITRAL rules and that the revised rules would be adopted at the forty-second session of the Commission in July 2009. The Commission also agreed at its last session that the issue of transparency in investor state dispute resolution as a desirable objective was a separate topic that should be considered as a matter of priority after the adoption of the generic revisions of the UNCITRAL rules. [Note: Further information on this initiative is available through the UNCITRAL website, at http://www.uncitral.org.] The U.S. delegation was led by Michael Dennis from L/PIL. -------------- Role of Permanent Court of Arbitration -------------- ¶2. (U) A key issue that arose during the Working Group session was whether to expand the role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in arbitrations conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules. Under Articles 6 & 7 of the existing Rules, when any party fails to appoint -- or the parties cannot agree upon appointment of -- an arbitrator, this role is to be performed by an appointing authority, which may be a person or institution chosen for this role by the parties. If the parties cannot agree on an appointing authority, any party may ask the Secretary-General of the PCA to designate one. It has been said that this two-step procedure of having the PCA designate an appointing authority that, in turn, appoints one or �A;more arbitrators is inefficient. Accordingly, at the Working Session in February 2007, it was proposed that the Rules should officially designate the Secretary-General of the PCA as the default appointing authority in any arbitration under the Rules in which the parties did not otherwise choose an appointing authority. There was broad opposition to that proposal at the time, including by the U.S. delegation, on several grounds. It was objected, inter alia, that the UNCITRAL Rules were meant to be international in scope and this was not compatible with designation of one institution in Europe to be responsible for appointing arbitrators from every region in the world, that the PCA did not have detailed knowledge of arbitrators in every region (especially inasmuch as the Secretary-General is by tradition a Dutch diplomat with no particular expertise in arbitration),and that the delays in the current two-step process had been minimized by increasing efficiency in the PCA's performance of its designation role. ¶3. (U) A number of delegations remain dissatisfied with that result and sought to revisit the issue during this Working Group session, arguing that the previous debate had been cut short by time constraints when discussion of a compromise approach was still under way. In the debate during the current session, the U.S. opposed reopening this issue, given that the record of the Working Group's prior discussion was far more extensive than some delegates admitted and because the severe time pressures on the Working Group to complete its revision work by the end of the next Working Group session in early 2009 left little time for reconsideration of issues that had been resolved. However, several delegations stated that they had reassessed their former opposition to expanding the role of the PCA, and thus the session concluded with an understanding that, time permitting, the issue could be re-examined at the next Working Group meeting, once the second reading of the Rules had been completed. -------------- Discretion of Appointing Authority to Appoint Substitute Arbitrator or Establish Truncated Tribunal -------------- ¶4. (U). Another unresolved issue concerns the discretion of the appointing authority to appoint substitute arbitrators or establish UNVIE VIEN 00000533 002 OF 002 a truncated tribunal. Some support was expressed for adopting a generic approach granting the appointing authority broad discretion in its decision whether to proceed itself with the replacement of the arbitrator, or order a truncated tribunal subject to clarification that such discretion would only exist in exceptional circumstances. The prevailing view (generally supported by the USDEL),however, was that a provision allowing an appointing authority to proceed with the direct appointment of an arbitrator should not extend beyond the cases of improper conduct and should remain generic so as to cover all possible instances. It was further agreed (again with the general support of the USDEL) that a provision allowing the appointing authority to opt for a truncated tribunal should include sufficient limitations so as to ensure that it might only happen in exceptional circumstances, and taking account of the stage of the proceedings. ¶5. (U). After extended debate, a number of states suggested that the new rule might read: "If, on the application of a party, the appointing authority determines that the need for replacement of an arbitrator was caused by improper conduct in circumstances that justify a party's not having the right to appoint the substitute arbitrator, then the appointing authority may, after giving an opportunity to the parties, the arbitrators, and the arbitrator being replaced to express their views: (a) proceed itself to make the appointment of the substitute arbitrator; or (b) if the same occurs at the late stage of the proceedings, authorize the other arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration and make any decision or award." The proposal received broad support, but delegations continued to propose changes to the text. For example, some argued that the general reference to improper conduct did not clarify whose conduct was at stake (i.e. the arbitrators only or the parties as well). Other delegations suggested that a general reference to "exceptional circumstances" should be added to better qualify the conditions under which the sanctions might be triggered. It was also stated that the notion of a "late stage in the proceedings" was ambiguous for establishing a truncated tribunal and should be replaced with "closure of the proceedings," consistent with a parallel provision in the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration rules. ¶6. (U). At the close of the debate, the Working Group requested that the Secretariat provide a revised draft of the proposal for consideration at a later stage. -------------- Future Work -------------- ¶7. (U) The next session of the Working Group will be held February 8-13 in New York. The Working Group will continue with its second reading of the generic revisions to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. However, it is not clear that the Working Group will complete the second reading of the revisions at the next working group session, given the substantial amount of work that remains. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the Commission will be in a position to adopt the revisions to the Rules at its forty-second session. SCHULTE