TALIBAN TO BAN OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN??

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000504 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 TAGS: SNAR PREL NATO PTER AF UN SUBJECT: TALIBAN TO BAN OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN?? REF: A. STATE 97065 ¶B. STATE 97395 ¶C. STATE 96741 ¶D. UNVIE 478 ¶E. USNATO 321 ¶F. SMITH-NEVILLE EMAIL SEPTEMBER 2 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory Schulte, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador delivered Ref A talking points on eradication to UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa on September 11. He urged Costa to clarify publicly UNODC's continuing support for a balanced, comprehensive eradication policy in Afghanistan. Ambassador also highlighted USG support to amend the ISAF operating plan to interdict narcotics production and trafficking facilities (Refs B and C),a step that would coincide with Costa's recent advocacy for such action by NATO (Refs E and F). Costa also indicated privately that aerial spraying would be the most effective method to eradicate poppy fields that run for "miles and miles" in the south of Afghanistan, although he emphasized that he could not speak out on such support, as long as the Afghan government opposes it. He expressed great concern about the rumored Taliban plan to ban opium in the regions it controls, fearing that such a ban, if successful, would increase Taliban prestige, as well as the value of their opium stockpile, while encouraging the poppy-free north to return to opium cultivation. Costa expressed support for the informal Friends of Afghanistan group which will have its first meeting in Vienna on September 17 (Ref D),where Costa has been invited to speak. End Summary. -------------- Demarche -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador met with Costa on September 11 to deliver Ref A points. Ambassador urged him to find an opportunity to clarify publicly that, contrary to press reports, the UNODC had not changed its eradication policy and it continues to pursue a comprehensive and balanced strategy that includes manual eradication. Costa described the Financial Times article on this issue as containing a number of factual errors, misquoting the numbers he used, and including statements he did not make. He emphasized that he was merely pointing out the high financial and human cost of manual eradication. He said that a CNN interview (and also an El Pais interview) with him also cited him as supporting aerial eradication, when in fact he only compared Afghanistan's large, concentrated poppy fields today, covering "miles and miles," to Colombia's situation in 2001. While he privately believed aerial eradication was the most effective tool under such circumstances, he could not speak out publicly to support aerial spraying in Afghanistan. He said that he was being criticized from both sides, admitting that a European government had complained about his implicit support for aerial eradication in the two recent interviews. ¶3. (C) In a subsequent conversation, UNODC spokesperson Walter Kemp, who was at the meeting between Ambassador and Costa, told Counselor that Costa was quite explicit on aerial spraying in his CNN interview, which Kemp was still trying to track down. He said that two or three countries are also seeking to have Costa clarify his position publicly. Kemp believed that Costa could do this at the September 17 Friends of Afghanistan meeting. Counselor pointed out to him that that is a small, informal venue, and Costa's clarification should have as a wide, public reach as the Financial Times or the CNN and El Pais reports. Kemp took Counselor's point and agreed to talk to Costa about it. -------------- UNAMA, Karzai, UNODC -------------- ¶4. (C) Referring to his late August trip to Kabul, Costa mentioned his meetings with UNAMA chief Kai Eide and President Karzai. He was very pleased with Eide, who "got it right" on drugs. According to him, Eide has a very good relationship with Karzai who is sufficiently comfortable with him to seek his views on Afghan officials. He said UNODC was upgrading its presence in Afghanistan, and hoped that its future chief there could become a de facto advisor to Karzai on counternarcotics. -------------- ISAF and Counternarcotics -------------- ¶5. (C) Costa told Ambassador that his September 3 briefing to NATO in Brussels was the same as the one he gave ambassadors in Vienna on September 2 (Refs E and F). At both he proposed six steps for NATO engagement on counternarcotics, i.e., destroying labs, markets and convoys, seizing precursor chemicals, listing major traffickers under UNSCR 1735/1822, supporting ANA and ANP's CN efforts, regaining the west (Nimroz, Zabul and Day Kundi),and enhancing border security. Ambassador explained to Costa that the USG supports greater ISAF involvement in interdicting narcotics production and trafficking facilities, and that we understand that such efforts for a more active counternarcotics role for ISAF were being stymied by opposition from NATO's Military Committee, and from a number of member countries (Refs B and C). Referring to a conversation with the NATO SecGen, Costa insisted that the UK was supportive, and that the main opponents in NATO were Germany, Netherlands and France. He described France as a "surprise" to him, saying that he would take up this issue in Paris when he goes there next week for a EU-Central Asia conference. ¶6. (SBU) NOTE: Counselor earlier learned that Lt. General Karl Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, met Costa for the first time during the latter's late August visit to Kabul. On September 9, General Eikenberry visited UNODC in Vienna where he was briefed by UNODC staff on their Afghanistan activities. According to our UNODC contacts, General Eikenberry expressed specific interest in the location of the drug labs, the trafficking routes, the opium markets, and the entry and exit points of the drug traffic. END NOTE. -------------- A Taliban Ban on Opium? -------------- ¶7. (C) Costa repeated the concern he expressed in Brussels, and earlier in Vienna (Refs E and F),about a rumored Taliban ban on opium. He insisted on the reliability of his "rumors," saying that the information came from UNODC-affiliated sources, who saw flyers posted in Helmand and Nangarhar warning farmers against poppy cultivation. He speculated on the real motive behind such a ban, noting that it could be a way for the Taliban to increase the value of their existing opium stockpile, free up land for much needed wheat cultivation in the face of rising wheat prices and food shortage, and to win hearts and minds. In any case, he believed that the ban, if successful, would be a public relations coup for the Taliban and legitimize their status as a political power. The high price for opium a result of the ban could also tempt the now poppy-free north of Afghanistan to plant poppy again. He noted that whether the ban was rumor or truth would be known in the next six weeks, when farmers would have to make planting decisions for the next season. If it turned out to be the truth, he would have to involve UNAMA and Eide for the next steps. He said he had already discussed this with Eide in Kabul, who had heard the "rumor," but had not formed any ideas for next steps. Costa, mentioning his conversation with the World Bank, underscored the importance of "solidifying" the poppy-free gains in the north, i.e., through "very evident," "massive" development assistance to the region. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Part provocateur, part visionary, and part showman, Costa manages frequently to draw ire from member states on one issue or another. However, we are impressed by the information UNODC gathers in Afghanistan, including in areas that the USG would find hard to penetrate. Once he is in possession of any information, such as this "rumor" on the Taliban opium ban, he is already thinking of the next steps to be undertaken, if the "rumor" proves true. Neither the man nor his office is perfect, but he provides good value, and he shares our strategic objective for a stable, drug-free Afghanistan. We urge Washington and Kabul to think through the implications of a Taliban opium ban, and provide us any thoughts that we can share with Costa. End Comment. SCHULTE