SUBJ: IAEA/BOG: SEEKING AN IRAN RESOLUTION IN

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000494 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2023 TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA IR CA SUBJECT: SUBJ: IAEA/BOG: SEEKING AN IRAN RESOLUTION IN SEPTEMBER Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d,h Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Another negative IAEA Director General's report on Iran, as expected in advance of the September Board, will strengthen the argument for further censure of Iran for its failure to cooperate with the ongoing IAEA investigation, in particular the IAEA effort to pursue evidence of military/weaponization linkages to Iran's "peaceful" nuclear program. Beyond soliciting strong Board member statements, a new Board resolution is well-justified and if successful could serve as springboard to further UNSC action. In considering whether to pursue a Board resolution, however, we must be prepared to countenance possible abstentions by Russia and China, which would signal an end to P5 1 unity. Especially if a resolution on Iran proves impossible in light of Russian resistance, we should seek to use a prospective Board resolution on Libya to highlight the stark contrast between the "Libya Model," and Iran's (and Syria's) lack of cooperation with the IAEA. While using a resolution closing out the Libyan case as a vehicle to draw contrasts with Iran would not be a substitute for an Iran resolution in the longer-term, it would still move our Iran objectives forward we cannot secure an Iran resolution at this Board meeting. End summary. Objectives -------------- ¶2. (S) The rationale for Board action has not changed since the March and June Board sessions when we envisaged a resolution, but will deepen in light of the DG's pending report detailing Iran's continued stonewalling, which EXPO Director Cserveny has characterized to us as "negative." A Board resolution would maintain pressure on Iran and buttress the Secretariat's investigation, while also reasserting the Board's ultimate authority over the Iran file. It would further reinforce Board/UNSC requirements for suspension and the Additional Protocol and the application of revised Code 3.1 (early declaration of nuclear facilities). Finally, Board action coming in the wake of the IAEA's August 2007 work plan would make clear again that the ultimate authority for final disposition of the Iranian case lies with the Board. ¶3. (C) This will also be our last opportunity to take advantage of the most favorable Board membership we have seen in recent years. As of October, the composition of the Board will change and include unhelpful members such as Cuba, Egypt and Malaysia. While the new Board composition is unlikely to be a key factor in whether or not a resolution can be adopted, additional abstentions will trend against the message we seek to send. No Backtracking This Time -------------- ¶4. (S) Soundings among the like-minded (EU3, Australia, Canada, Japan and Italy) confirm low expectations for Iranian cooperation and continued support in principle for the objectives of a Board resolution. However, there is also general agreement that any effort to pursue a Board resolution must be seen through to its conclusion this time. France, the UK, Australia and Canada all made the point in August 29 likeminded deliberations that we should not waste time, energy and political capital on a Board resolution unless we are prepared to see the resolution through to success. There was no indication, however, that the other like-mindeds were prepared to countenance adopting a resolution over unbending Russian and Chinese opposition. ¶5. (S) Even before the Georgian crisis, Russia prevented consensus on a Chairman's statement at the June Board, despite the DG's critical May report on Iran. We can now rule out any possibility of a Chairman's Statement (on which Russia would wield "veto" power) in lieu of a Board resolution. In the like-minded meeting, Germany argued that there would be "no worse outcome" for P5 1 unity than Russia and China voting against a Board resolution on Iran. While we do not expect Russia and China to vote against a resolution, an abstention would similarly imply an end to P5 1 unity. The Risks -------------- ¶6. (S) Our strategy for Vienna must take into account the longer term implications for the P5 1 as well as the broader context in New York. A Board resolution could serve as either a springboard for, or a fallback alternative to, a UNSCR if P5 1 agreement on a new UNSCR is not practicable. In considering a Board resolution, however, we will need to avoid any perception that the issue has "returned" from the UNSC to the IAEA Board and rather underline the fact that the Board and UNSC are in lockstep. The timeframe for considering the Board option is also very constricted. Mission understands that P5 1 PolDirs may meet on September 18, just days before the September 22-26 Board of Governors and that Ministers will meet during the UNGA the week of the Board meeting. If there is any chance for a substantive P5 1 discussion of a resolution text, the EU3 should be prepared to table a draft Board resolution at the September 18 discussion. Agreement at the Political Director level will be essential as the Russian and Chinese Missions in Vienna have demonstrated time and again that they have no margin for independent action. 7.(S) Perhaps the most compelling reason to seek a Board resolution is that inaction by the UNSC and the Board plays into Iran's hands. As viewed from Vienna, Iran is counting on preventing action on any "track" by both slow rolling the Solana process and stonewalling the IAEA investigation with impunity. Symbolic Contrast with Libya -------------- ¶8. (S) If, an Iran-specific resolution is not possible, another option would be to use a Board resolution endorsing the Secretariat's decision to return routine safeguards verification in Libya as a vehicle to draw contrasts with Iran (and Syria). While not a long-term substitute for an Iran resolution, a Board resolution endorsing the Secretariat's decision on Libya would set a potential precedent and server as a reminder of the Board's ultimate authority-should it choose to exercise it--in "closing out" cases of noncompliance. Explicit contrasts between Libya's cooperation and transparency and Iran's stonewalling can be drawn in national statements. Depending on what the market will bear, we could also envisage a reference to the Iranian case in preambular language of a Libya resolution. This would be a symbolic victory and possibly embarrass Iran, and at a minimum, the Board would be on record drawing these contrasts. PD Plan -------------- ¶9. (C) The anticipated tough DG report on Iran should serve as springboard for our Public Diplomacy efforts. We have already begun with a speech yesterday in Oslo. Target audiences should include NAM and Board member capitals that have been less than helpful in previous Board sessions, as well as incoming Board members such as Egypt and Malaysia. In addition to briefings in Vienna and suggested demarches in capitals, Mission will use our public diplomacy outreach to explain the implications of the DG's report and Iran's continued stonewalling. We will also background local international press on September 18. Our PD efforts can also draw contrasts with Libyan compliance and the benefits such compliance can accrue. In addition, Mission will be prepared with a "defensive" PD plan in case deliberations on a Board resolution or P5 1 disunity on this issue leaks. SCHULTE