FOLLOW-UP ON IAEA-NORWAY SAFETY TRAINING PROJECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000477 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018 TAGS: IAEA MNUC PARM PREL TRGY KNPP UNSC IR NO SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON IAEA-NORWAY SAFETY TRAINING PROJECT FOR IRAN'S BUSHEHR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REF: A) UNVIE 377 B) UNVIE 274 C) STATE 57469 D) STATE 84938 Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4(c) and (e) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Mission rep spoke to IAEA and delivered ref D talking points regarding safety concerns at Iran's Bushehr reactor on August 13. Norway has agreed to the training plan and IAEA is moving forward with plans. The IAEA recommends that the United States demarche Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Ukraine, encouraging them to support this project. Iran has formally asked the IAEA to perform an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission, which is scheduled for November 2009. Iran is also planning to host an international conference on nuclear development to be held on November 30, 2008; we will discourage senior-level IAEA participation. End summary. -------------- Training plan moving forward -------------- ¶2. (U) Mission rep delivered to IAEA's Christer Viktorsson the talking points contained in reftel D. Viktorsson indicated he was very pleased with U.S. support and that the project is moving forward. Norway has agreed to the draft training plan and is asking IAEA to submit the request to the GON formally. Viktorsson said this would occur in the next two weeks. Based on Norway's tentative approval, he is planning another trip to Iran to further discuss the plan, probably sometime in the next two months. -------------- CZ says no -------------- ¶3. (U) So far Viktorsson has approached Finland and the Czech Republic to assist in the on-the-job portions of the training program. Finland has agreed. However, the Czech Republic has declined and stated that it is legally not allowed to grant Iranians access to Czech nuclear facilities. The Czechs indicated they would be willing to send instructors or trainers to Vienna and/or Oslo to support class room training, however. Viktorsson is concerned that other countries will respond similarly, thus leaving the IAEA short of sites at which to implement on-the-job training under the IAEA plan. -------------- Encouraging others to support the project -------------- ¶4. (C) The IAEA has yet to approach formally Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia or the Ukraine. However, these countries are aware of the program and Viktorsson lobbied for the U.S. to encourage these countries to support the project. Viktorsson suggested it would be helpful if the U.S. could tell these states that the safe operation of nuclear plants worldwide is important to the United States and therefore the U.S. supports the IAEA's safety program, including in Iran. In particular, the U.S. supports the IAEA's program to train the nuclear regulators in Iran and would not object to these states participating in a project that will provide much needed training and support to the Iranian regulatory body; training that will help improve the safety knowledge of the regulatory staff. MsnOff told Viktorsson that she would report his request to Washington. ¶5. (C) Mission Comment: Mission recognizes there are additional points the U.S. might want to present should we agree to signal our support for this safety program. Mission assumes we would want also to explain our willingness to support this training despite our paramount desire to isolate Iran so long as it is not meeting its nonproliferation and Security Council obligations. For example, in addition to noting the fact that these safety activities are exempt from UN Security Council sanctions, U.S. points might also note that such assistance will tangibly demonstrate that Iran cannot really have a fully "independent" civil nuclear program if it wants that program to be safe, as Iran cannot create the safety/regulatory approach it needs without the guidance and support of the IAEA and others. Should the above states choose to help provide safety training, their participation might provide an opportunity to underline again to Tehran why it should respond favorably to the P5 1 offer. Such training would also provide an occassion for EU states to raise again their desire for Iran to join in the international nuclear safety convention, a step Iran has continued to reject. End comment. -------------- Fellowships -------------- ¶6. (U) With regard to the fellowships mentioned in the IAEA training plan, Viktorsson clarified this as a request to expand a current program. There is an existing TC project to help the Iranian regulator review the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) written by the Russian operators. Through this project, the IAEA is assisting in the review of specific portions of the report, as well as providing some fellowship training opportunities to help the Iranians review the SAR in more detail. There are currently Iranian fellows working with Bulgaria and Italy. In the proposed Norwegian training program, the Iranians asked to expand this fellowship program to allow more people to be trained in safety assessments. -------------- Regulatory Review -------------- ¶7. (U) Iran has formally submitted, via e-mail, a request for IAEA to perform an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in Iran. An IRRS is a peer review mission focused on the county's regulatory body. It is organized by the IAEA and consists of a group of approximately 20 high-ranking regulators from around the world. The mission has two parts. The first part is a self assessment, where the country itself answers a set of written questions to determine how well the country meets the IAEA safety standards. This is followed by the peer review mission during which the team of 20 experts visits the regulatory body for approximately two weeks to review the program. The result is a list of recommendations and areas of improvement. Iran has asked for the IRRS mission to occur in November ¶2009. IAEA is setting up an IRRS planning meeting in Iran set tenatively for November 22-26 2008. -------------- Conference on Nuclear Development -------------- ¶8. (C) Viktorsson also stated that Iran is organizing an international conference on nuclear development which is set for November 30, 2008, presumably in Tehran. IAEA Deputy Director General Taniguchi and Deputy Director General Sokolov were both invited. However, Viktorson indicated that Director General ElBaradei has told them not to go. DDG Taniguchi is appealing this decision and, if he cannot attend, would like one of his staff to attend. Viktorsson did not have any information about other possible attendees or topics for discussion at the planned Iranian conference. Comment: Mission strongly supports the DG's decision against senior IAEA participation at the Iranian conference and will monitor Taniguchi's appeal with an eye to minimizing the risk that the IAEA lend credence to a likely Iranian propaganda event. End comment. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶9. (U) Request Washington guidance on responding to the IAEA regarding possible U.S. approaches to the above-mentioned states to encourage them to take part in the IAEA-sponsored safety training of Iranians, which ideally could occur parallel in Vienna and capitals. PYATT