IAEA/SYRIA: AS KAZAKHS DAWDLE, AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000445 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, IO, SCA, P AND T E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL AORC IAEA KZ AF SY SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: AS KAZAKHS DAWDLE, AFGHANISTAN ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR MESA BOARD SEAT REF: UNVIE 385 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Kazakhstan is still not prepared to challenge Syria's candidacy for the open MESA seat on the Board of Governors (2008-2010) absent a "100 percent" guarantee of victory, Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov told Ambassador Schulte August ¶6. He continued to stress Arab support for Syria, despite assurances from Mission to the contrary. Ambassador Schulte asked him to keep his options open, but Abdrakhmanov indicated that Kazakhstan would prefer to wait until next year to run for the Board. Also on August 6, Afghanistan formally presented its candidacy for the MESA Seat to the Indian Chair, who was less than enthusiastic. The Indian Chair advised that Syria called daily to confirm there was no other candidate. He also requested that the U.S. not campaign openly against Syria during MESA deliberations. India has now called a MESA meeting for August 14 to discuss the open seat. While Afghanistan may not be an important nuclear player, it is an alternative to Syria and is excited about the prospect of serving on the Board. Mission recommends approaches to sympathetic Arab states and other MESA group members to exert their influence within MESA to support Afghanistan and persuade Syria to withdraw. Department may also wish to consider a call by Undersecretary Burns to Foreign Secretary Menon to encourage more active engagement by the Indian Chair, who is clearly reluctant to play anything but a purely "neutral" role. It would be far better to settle this matter within MESA rather than the General Conference, where we already face a politically charged debate on Middle East safeguards with the Arab League. Director General ElBaradei downplayed the significance of Syria serving on the Board and privately warned Ambassador Schulte that the U.S. would lose a showdown in the GC on this issue. End Summary and Comment. Kazakhstan Still Dithering -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 6 meeting with Ambassador Schulte Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov reiterated essentially the same stance he had relayed on a prospective Board candidacy in their July 7 meeting (reftel). Syria was by all accounts not prepared to withdraw and Kazakhstan would not compete with Syria absent a "100 percent guarantee" that it would not suffer an embarrassing defeat. Abdrakhmanov continued to take for granted solid Arab League support for Syria, though Ambassador Schulte assured him that this was not the case. Ambassador Schulte noted that Kazakhstan would be "natural" for the Board and its candidacy would unnerve Syria; Syria would only potentially back down if another candidate presented itself and there was no "loss of face" in doing so. Sympathetic Arab states could persuade Syria to withdraw in the face of Kazakh candidacy. There were no guarantees, but Kazakhstan stood a good chance against Syria, he offered. ¶3. (C) Abdrakhmanov insisted that Kazakhstan could not risk its important and sensitive relations with the Arab World and OIC. He did not believe Kazakhstan had sufficient support in MESA -- the Indian Chair was neutral; Afghanistan, he mistakenly claimed, supported Syria; and even among the Central Asians, Uzbekistan could be a problem. Abdrakhmanov further cited Syria's engagement in the Euro-Med partnership and indirect talks with Israel as reasons unnamed others might not want to brook Syrian isolation by opposing its Board candidacy. Syria was an important player in the region, he concluded, and Kazakhstan was not inclined to take them on. ¶4. (C) Several times during the discussion, Abdrakhmanov noted that Kazakhstan would be in a much better starting position if it were to hold off until next year (Note: Two MESA Board seats will be vacated in 2009; one of which Pakistan will undoubtedly seek. End note.) Abdrakhmanov was discouraging but did not rule out a Kazakh bid this year, if for example, there was any indication Syria would withdraw. He noted that there was still time and no formal deadline in MESA though the Indian Chair would like to conclude this process. Ambassador Schulte urged Abdrakhmanov to keep his options open and to talk to the Indian Chair. However, Indian Chair Ambassador Kumar advised Ambassador Schulte on August 7 that Abdrakhmanov had told him that Kazakhstan decided against presenting its candidacy. (Note: The Indians have also not been enthusiastic about the prospect of a Kazakh candidacy. Separately, Indian DCM cautioned Acting Counselor that Arab states could challenge Kazakhstan's bona fides as a MESA group member. End note). Afghanistan Throws Its Hat in the Ring -------------- ¶5. (C) Afghanistan formally submitted to the Indian MESA Chairman its candidacy for the Board of Governors (2008-2010) MESA seat sought by Syria on August 6. Afghan CDA Wahid Manowar advised Ambassador Schulte on August 5 that he had received instructions to do so after consulting with his National Security Advisor. Manowar was excited about the prospect of serving on the Board, which Afghanistan has not done since 1963-1965. (Note: Afghanistan is not a major player in the IAEA but participates in an array of national and regional technical cooperation projects primarily on human health and development. End note.) Manowar was optimistic about Afghanistan's support in the MESA group and planned to approach friendly Arab states including Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. He would also reach out to Central Asians states and expected that only Pakistan and Iran not to be supportive. (Note: We have also heard that Japan has offered to help Afghanistan with its Board duties should it secure a seat. End note.) ¶6. (C) Ambassador Schulte observed that the Arab League decision to back Syria had been taken before Syria's clandestine nuclear activities had come to light and a number of Arab states had qualms about Syria's candidacy. He hoped that they could influence Syria to withdraw now that there would be an alternative. Ambassador Schulte also hoped that the issue would be solved within the MESA group, in which the Indian Chair would play a key role, but left open the possibility of a GC vote if Syria persisted. Manowar asked if he should meet with the Syrian Ambassador. Ambassador Schulte advised that Afghanistan not portray its candidacy as anti-Syrian but as a matter of equity since Syria had served on the Board as recently as 2005-2007. Indians Studiously Neutral -------------- ¶7. (C) Manowar called Acting Counselor on August 6 to provide a readout of his meeting with the Indian Chair. He was disappointed by Kumar's lukewarm reaction to Afghanistan's candidacy. Kumar cautioned him that Syria was not prepared to withdraw and had been calling every day to ensure that no other country had put forward its candidacy. Kumar expected that the MESA group would be unable to come to consensus and anticipated a GC vote. Manowar saw Kumar as hiding behind his mantle of neutrality as MESA Chair, and in that capacity, not wanting to see the group torn in too many directions. Manowar was riled by this reaction and affirmed that it was Afghanistan's sovereign right to put itself forward. ¶8. (C) Kumar told Ambassador Schulte on August 7 that he would call a MESA meeting next week (now confirmed for August 14) to discuss the Board seat. Kumar was not pleased that the Afghan CDA "sprung" the Board candidacy on him while meeting on other business. He also confirmed that the Syrian Ambassador was calling every day for a status report. Kumar asked that as long as the issue was before MESA that the U.S. not openly campaign against Syria. He sought to maintain his neutrality as Chair and did not want to seem as beholden to the U.S. just after Board approval of the India Safeguards Agreement. Ambassador Schulte noted that the U.S. would not openly intervene in MESA matters, but urged Kumar to play a more active role in getting Syria to withdraw and suggested that he speak to the Saudis. Ambassador Schulte noted that Kumar, as Chairman, could approach this as an equity issue giving a MESA country that had not been on the Board for decades a chance to serve. DG Unhelpful -------------- 9.(C) Ambassador Schulte also raised Syria's MESA candidacy in an August 1 meeting with DG ElBaradei. He advised that having Syria on the Board while under investigation would undermine the credibility of the IAEA. ElBaradei was unreceptive and downplayed Syria's influence as one of 35 countries on the Board. He enjoined the U.S. to "forget this issue" as it would lead to an embarrassing defeat in the General Conference if we called a vote. ElBaradei agreed that a country such as Kazakhstan, which had never served on the Board, would be a better candidate, but rejected Ambassador Schulte's suggestion that he privately encourage Syria to step down. He warned that a public U.S. campaign against Syria's Board candidacy would backfire. SCHULTE