SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO VIENNA FOR A/S HILL AND

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000411 SINGAPORE, PLEASE PASS TO YKIM FOR A/S HILL; ISN FOR KANG AND MAHAFFEY FOR MCNERNEY; IO FOR VON BEHREN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2033 TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO VIENNA FOR A/S HILL AND ACTING A/S MCNERNEY REF: A. UNVIE 00395 ¶B. SECSTATE 77866 ¶C. UNVIE 00339 ¶D. UNVIE 00373 Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) -------------- Overview -------------- ¶1. (S) The forthcoming visits by A/S Hill on July 25 and Acting ISN A/S McNerney on July 27 provide an opportunity to lay to rest concerns expressed by Director General ElBaradei and the Secretariat on the IAEA's role in the upcoming verification work in the DPRK (ref A). The IAEA has a considerable body of historical knowledge on the DPRK nuclear program and sees its role in verification as essential to its institutional credibility. Other issues we expect to surface in these visits include funding for IAEA verification activities in DPRK, developments on the Syria issue in the Six-Party Talks, and possibly a discussion on the legal status of the DPRK with regard to the NPT. -------------- IAEA Role in Verification -------------- ¶2. (S) Your respective visits will provide an opportunity to plan for the IAEA's future role in the upcoming verification of DPRK's nuclear declaration and lay to rest the Secretariat's anxiety. Following the July 12 Six-Party Press Communique, DG ElBaradei twice insisted to Ambassador Schulte that the IAEA must have the lead role in verification or no role at all, and not be relegated to a mere "consultancy" (ref A). As he did in his July 14 meeting with the Ambassador, the DG may again point to the IAEA's leading role in verification of Libya's nuclear program as an example, although Mission notes that verification of dismantlement in Libya was a shared responsibility with the U.S. and the UK. As in the negotiations that John Bolton and the UK's William Ehrman conducted in early 2004, ElBaradei will expect clarification of the verification role envisaged for the IAEA in DPRK. ¶3. (SBU) A/S Hill's visit will also be an opportunity to communicate to key Missions and publicly our support for IAEA involvement in the verification process and to promote our continued close collaboration with the IAEA Secretariat. -------------- Financing the IAEA's Work -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Given the tight budget situation, ElBaradei and Secretariat officials may also raise financing the IAEA's role in DPRK verification. The regular IAEA budget is currently set through the end of 2009, and all extra-budgetary contributions for DPRK have already been expended or earmarked for the IAEA's ongoing work in monitoring the shutdown of facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. Funding for additional IAEA activities, such as verifying the declaration, must come from additional voluntary contributions. Per ref B, we note that Japan indicates it will make additional funds available to support IAEA activities in the DPRK. ¶5. (SBU) For your background, we have included the voluntary contributions provided to the Secretariat since the February 2007 Initial Actions Agreement to support IAEA monitoring and verification of the shutdown of nuclear facilities. The United States agreed to the IAEA use of USD 513,000 from IAEA's DPRK fund and provided the IAEA USD 1,800,000 in September 2007. In June 2008, we provided an additional USD 1,500,000 for continued IAEA monitoring work. Japan contributed USD 500,000 in September 2007, and the EU provided Euro 1,800,000 for DPRK monitoring and verification in March 2008. -------------- Syria -------------- ¶6. (S) With the Syria investigation ongoing, the Secretariat remains interested in what has been learned from the DPRK regarding any past assistance provided for construction of the nuclear reactor at Al Kibar. DDG Heinonen has cited the press reports that the DPRK addressed its proliferation activities with regard to Syria and uranium enrichment to the United States in a separate confidential declaration. We anticipate DG ElBaradei and DDG Heinonen will use the opportunity to request additional details on any admissions by the DPRK regarding proliferation-sensitive activities in Syria. -------------- Clarifying the Legal Status of DPRK -------------- ¶7. (S) In his opening remarks to the June Board of Governors meeting Director General ElBaradei cited the need for clarification of the DPRK's the legal status with regard to the NPT. He noted that if the DPRK is still considered a party to the NPT then its comprehensive safeguards agreement remains in force, and the IAEA should resume verification of DPRK's declarations. If the DPRK is no longer party to the NPT, then the IAEA would need to implement its INFCIRC/66 agreement with North Korea per ref C, as it does with other non-NPT parties. In a June 23 meeting, the DG confided to Ambassador Schulte that he agreed with the US position on DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT, saying that the European stance that the DPRK had not withdrawn was based on a political judgment rather than legal views, per ref D. He seemed comfortable at that time with a more informal, ad hoc role in North Korea, but we should be alert to future indications of the DG pressing for clarification on these legal issues. 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