INDIA/IAEA SAFEGUARDS - GETTING TO YES IN THE BOARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000392 STATE FOR P, T, ISN, SCA DOE FOR NA-20; NA-24 - SCHEINMAN; NA-243 GOOREVICH E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018 TAGS: IAEA ENRG ETTC KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY IN SUBJECT: INDIA/IAEA SAFEGUARDS - GETTING TO YES IN THE BOARD REF: STATE 072006 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) Mission has been seeking expeditious consideration of the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which we now expect to come before the Board on August 1 (reftel). Like-minded allies advise that successful Board approval and next steps to make the initiative a reality will require a multi-faceted approach with a reasonable timeline. Soundings this week indicate many (including our friends) need some time to digest the safeguards agreement, realize the net gain to the nonproliferation regime, and facilitate requisite legal and policy consideration. We have sought to focus Board members on the immediate goal of approving the safeguards agreement. Many interlocutors favor a strategy that seeks to focus the Board, on the routine technical approval of a safeguards agreement. Some note that while the safeguards agreement follows very closely INFCIRC/66.Rev 2, it does not list the facilities subject to the agreement. Unhelpful NGO analysis of the safeguards agreement, repeated in press reports, that characterize the preambular text on "corrective measures" and the lack of a reference to safeguards "in perpetuity" as major "loopholes" could also complicate matters if they gain currency among non-expert or skeptical Board members. Among the more problematic Board members are Austria and Ireland, and Pakistan is expected to be unhelpful. Furthermore, the Board Chair and several Board members are also concerned that negotiations on the IAEA technical cooperation fund (TCF) led by G-77 Chair Pakistan will muddy the waters. In addition to the India safeguards agreement, the Board agenda, which should be issued on July 14 or 15, will include budgetary items on TCF and the Agency-wide Information System for Program Support (AIPS). ¶2. (C) Visible Indian leadership will be key to Board approval; New Delhi must help raise the confidence level. We understand India is preparing a briefing in Vienna by Foreign Secretary Menon on July 18, which will be a critical opportunity to assuage Board member concerns. We recommend India consider supplementing the staff of its Mission in Vienna with a high-level expert who can help Board members 
understand its commitment to the separation plan and goal of placing civil nuclear program under IAEA verification -- in perpetuity. The fact that the agreement has the public blessing of IAEA Director General ElBaradei will be instrumental. Mission will continue to encourage the DG to defend the agreement as technically sound, and help frame the debate in the broader context as a net benefit to the nonproliferation regime. ¶3. (SBU) Mission's public diplomacy efforts will focus on the dissemination of factual information on the Safeguards Agreement to the media and member states, using third-party/NGO interlocutors where appropriate, and Ambassadorial-level interventions. A Department "fact sheet" on the non-proliferation benefits of the Safeguards Agreement and the deal would be very helpful to this effort. Mission will continue to coordinate closely with Embassy New Delhi and with the Department on all public outreach. End summary. August Board -------------- ¶4. (C) Board Chair Skoknik told Ambassador Schulte July 11 that he will announce early next week that the Board will take place on August 1. We expect DG ElBaradei to attend. The agenda will take up three topics sequentially: India, Technical Cooperation Funding and Agency-wide Information System for Program Support (AIPS). On India, he hopes to use his consultations to orchestrate a consensus decision in the Board. The Chair would prefer to reserve member state statements until AFTER the agreement is passed. Skoknik reported that he is hearing three main concerns in his consultations thus far, two of which come from NGO observer Daryl Kimball's critique of the "corrective measures loophole" and the lack of specificity on facilities covered by the agreement. G-77 members have also raised concern about the very large price tag (EURO 1.2 million for one reactor in year one),and make unhelpful linkages to the acerbic debate (led by Pakistan) over Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) targets. Safeguards Agreement -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Schulte held a meeting on July 10 with Ambassadors/Charges from Australia, France, Germany, Japan and South Africa; Canada, Italy, Russia, and the UK to exchange views on the way ahead now that the Secretariat has circulated India's safeguards agreement. Ambassador stressed the importance of this opportunity for the international community to bring more civil reactors under international safeguards. In general, like-minded states welcome and recognize the significance of Indian agreement to circulate its draft safeguards agreement. They share the goal of gaining Board approval by consensus, and to keep the discussion focused on a routine safeguards agreement. However, several participants were concerned about timing and allowing domestic processes time to make informed decisions. None had instructions at this juncture. South Africa and others are concerned about tensions between G-77 and major donors over financing the Technical Cooperation program spilling over into the India safeguards debate, particularly given the price tag on safeguards in India. ¶6. (C) While most of participants indicated they are in still examining the safeguards text which seems to track the model INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 text, they noted the lengthy preambular text and blank list of facilities subject to the agreement. Coupled with the lengthy political debate in India over the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative and this agreement, some fear there will be questions about India's commitment to safeguards and nonproliferation. Most understand the Operative text is applicable for safeguards implementation, but some are concerned about how others may view the significance of the Preamble. Germany questioned whether a technical briefing in advance of the Board meeting would be useful, but others suggested the Secretariat and Board Chair invest time with states individually to explain the agreement. ¶7. (C) Comment: The DG told the Ambassador he does not intend to call a technical briefing. Individual discussions will certainly be useful, and member states would benefit by hearing from trusted IAEA sources that this agreement meets their technical requirements. Ambassador Schulte encouraged the Board Chair to include Secretariat experts in his consultations with Board members. End comment. Give Us Time -------------- ¶8. (C) At the July 10 meeting, Canada explained it needs time for legal and policy review since it has reactors in India that are directly affected by this agreement, and may even decide to maintain in force safeguards under the existing trilateral agreement, rather than move to the new agreement. Canada noted there were high level discussions at the G-8 as well as in Washington, but stressed the importance of giving the Canadian Government adequate time to make an informed decision. Canada also pointed out that while it will not stand in the way of a Board meeting in late July, it cannot guarantee it would be able to join consensus until the first week of August. Russia also noted the need for a legal review, given its existing trilateral safeguards agreement with India. Russian MsnOff noted that with regard to the NSG, Russia needs a Presidential decree to amend current rules on nuclear cooperation. ¶9. (C) Some other states have asked us to help them be able to say yes -- in the Board as well as the NSG. They tell us they need adequate time for their legal and political bodies to consider the agreement and be prepared for the next steps. Concerned the safeguards agreement could set a bad precedent, New Zealand is examining the "India specificness" of the agreement. References to corrective measures and fuel assurance raise questions about India's commitment, New Zealand Ambassador Macmillan observed, despite the fact that they are in the Preamble. For New Zealand, the safeguards agreement is of lesser concern than the NSG exception, which will require a major change in policy and practice. ¶10. (C) Irish Ambassador Cogan told Ambassador Schulte on July 7 that Ireland would have preferred more time to review the safeguards agreement, especially since the new Foreign Minister, Michael Martin, took office only a few weeks ago and will need to become engaged. Cogan stressed Ireland needs to be sure the agreement is based on the model and does not deviate in the operative text, or it will be very difficult to join consensus. Cogan assured Ambassador Schulte he will reach out as soon as he receives instructions. Cogan mentioned that the French EU Presidency has called for an expert group level meeting to review the safeguards agreement. Cogan believes the French would like to coordinate positions among EU members, but he did not believe there would not be an EU position as such. ¶11. (C) In the July 10 meeting, South Africa Ambassador Gumbi warned that other states may complain that they need more time and raise concerns about the costs of an extraordinary Board meeting. He was also concerned about possible G-77 efforts to link the ongoing negotiation over an increase in the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) to Board approval of India safeguards. Since India safeguards would have cost implications (as agreed in the 2007 budget negotiations as a contingency),G-77 will add the need for "balance" to their litany of complaints, the most important of which is the TCF's loss of purchasing power due to the weakening dollar. India Needs to be Seen and Heard -------------- ¶12. (C) Visible Indian leadership will be key to Board approval; New Delhi must help raise the confidence level. Russia and other Board members have mentioned the importance of India reassuring Board members of its commitment to non-proliferation, including providing additional more specific information on when the agreement would be brought into force, and a schedule for the reactors to be brought under safeguards. A planned briefing by Indian Foreign Secretary Menon of Board members on July 18 will be a critical opportunity to address member state concerns. We recommend India consider supplementing the staff of its Mission in Vienna with a high-level expert who could invest time with key states and help them understand India's commitment to the separation plan and goal of placing its civil nuclear program under IAEA verification -- in perpetuity. Public Diplomacy -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Mission's main public diplomacy objective is to gain expeditious consensus approval of the IAEA Board of Governors on the India Safeguards agreement. We plan to focus our efforts primarily on disseminating factual information on the Safeguards Agreement to member states and the media, using third-party interlocutors where appropriate to refute the criticisms that some will known NGO's have circulated. For example, we plan to facilitate a DVC for journalists with credible think-tanker experts who can provide an independent, informed endorsement of the agreement. Mission is coordinating closely with Embassy New Delhi and with the Department on all public outreach. ¶14. (SBU) To aid us in focusing the discussion on the technical business of implementing safeguards, it would be helpful for the Department to consider a fact sheet to educate less informed Board members and underline the point that the India safeguards agreement is a net gain for all. It should focus not on the benefits to the U.S.-India relationship, but to the global nonproliferation regime. Many states are not familiar with INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreements, and are susceptible to NGO claims that this agreement will weaken the regime; they do not understand the significance of what India is offering prepared to do -- bring a substantial majority of its reactors under safeguards in a way that strengthens the nonproliferation system. NSG and Beyond -------------- ¶15. (C) Some states have begun to look ahead to next steps such as the NSG exception and U.S. Congressional timelines. Eventual cooperation with India will require governments to change long standing NPT preference and full-scope safeguards policies, and many expect to see "substantial progress" toward an Additional Protocol. In some states, approval of an NSG exception will require a Presidential decree and Parliamentary action, which they claim could take four to five weeks. Although they understand that Board and NSG processes are separate processes, they argue the steps to success are linked. ¶16. (C) Irish Ambassador Cogan in particular said the NSG issue would have to be handled delicately and he anticipates much discussion. He did not express a preference for CG or Plenary discussion, but said additional assurances may be needed in the NSG context for countries to feel comfortable. New Zealand Ambassador MacMillan has cautioned that "the default setting is no" -- governments must have enough time to understand and agree to change. According to Ambassador MacMillan, New Zealand needs 4-5 weeks between the Board decision and NSG consideration. The Netherlands, Canada and Norway have previously indicated they have similar time requirements. More hopefully, Swedish Ambassador Lundberg told Ambassador July 11 that his political leadership had decided not to place any obstacles to the deal. The China Card -------------- ¶17. (C) New Zealand, Russia, the UK and others are concerned that we invest time with China. China has expressed concerns in the past, and recently in Berlin about not taking NSG action until "all information is considered." To reach consensus, China cannot be overlooked. Even under the best of circumstances the Chinese government requires time -- Chinese officials preoccupied with the Olympics and other problems -- may complicate matters. On the other hand, we tend to share the Indian assumption that China will not block consensus, preferring to work through Pakistan to cause difficulty. Both Board Chair Skoknik and Indian Ambassador Kumar have identified Pakistan to us as the most likely potential spoiler of our efforts in Vienna. Ambassador will engage the Pakistanis here in the days ahead, and will encourage DG ElBaradei to do the same. SCHULTE NNNN End Cable Text