IAEA/IRAN: TIME TO KILL THE WORK PLAN?

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000031 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 TAGS: IAEA KNPP PARM IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: TIME TO KILL THE WORK PLAN? REF: A) UNVIE 20 B) UNVIE 006 AND PREVIOUS C) LONDON 103 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for Reasons 1.4 b, d, h ¶1. (C) Summary: Like-minded Ambassadors and Charges (P3 1, Australia, Canada, Japan) took stock of the DG's weekend trip to Tehran and the status of the work plan in a January 15 Australian-hosted meeting. All agreed that the DG had not made any breakthrough on key issues (disclosure of the past weapons program, the Additional Protocol and suspension) despite his one-off visit to the new generation centrifuge facility (ref a). Given Supreme Leader Khamenei's continued denial that Iran had a past nuclear weapons program, no one expected a "confession" from Iran to be forthcoming within the slippery IAEA-announced deadline of four weeks. Many continued to complain about ElBaradei's "loose talk" to the press. Missions also attested to disgruntlement among the Secretariat staff on the way some work plan issues have been SIPDIS closed, and expressed concern that the February DG report will be even vaguer than the November report. The UK and Australia noted that too much emphasis had been placed on the work plan while the French worried that DG could close all the issues and declare the Iran file "normalized." Missions raised the possibility of various activities (joint demarches, coordinated press statements, etc.) to put the DG on notice that absent a confession and implementation of confidence-building measures nothing will be normalized. Most thought that the work plan's usefulness would soon run out and it may be time to reassert the Board's authority in March. Depending on the tone of the DG's report and action in New York, a Board resolution could lay down a marker that the work plan has failed to restore Board and UNSC confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. End Summary. Whither the Work Plan? -------------- ¶2. (C) At our suggestion, Australian Ambassador Shannon called a meeting of like-minded COMs (P3 1, Australia, Canada, Japan) to take stock of the Iran file and expectations for the March Board. Shannon had not received a readout of the DG's Tehran trip, but noted that ElBaradei seemed to have delivered familiar messages and set another in a "long string" of work plan deadlines. Australian Msnoff assessed that despite some limited cooperation on work plan issues to date, it was clear that Iran was not being proactive on remaining issues: there was no information beyond press reports that Iran had provided an explanation of contamination at the technical university; no access to the former PHRC director; and there was not yet any substantive discussion of the weaponization studies. He also reported that the Iran PIV at Natanz in December resulted in "unimpressive" enrichment amounts and levels, which the Secretariat staff now attributes to technical problems rather SIPDIS than politically motivated self-restraint on Iran's part. ¶3. (C) Shannon expressed concern that in the same way that P1/P2 issues were swept under the carpet, disgruntled Safeguards staff expected the February report to use even vaguer language than that deployed in November. Rather than "consistent" or "not inconsistent," the February DG report could resort to terms such as "plausible," "probable" or "likely" in assessing Iran's explanations. German Charge Kemmerling reported his understanding that Iran had provided extensive documentation on the contamination issue, which may give a "consistent" story but cannot be independently corroborated. He also reported Berlin's understanding that an IAEA team will go to Iran to discuss remaining issues January 19. DG Got Little and Talks Too Much -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Schulte provided a readout of his January 14 telcon with the DG on his Iran trip (ref a). The Ambassador noted that the DG had not achieved any of the three goals he had set at the outset: a "confession" of the past nuclear program; implementation of the AP; and suspension or a "freeze-for-a freeze" (ref b) and only secured an apparently one-off visit to the new generation centrifuge facility. UK Ambassador Smith reported that EXPO Director Cserveny downplayed the trip's accomplishments as: "if any, within the limited scope of the work plan." AccessQto the advance d centrifuge facility indicated a bit more transparency on Iran's part, according to Cserveny, but there was no engagement on suspension. Iran was ready to talk but with no preconditions on suspension or the AP and conditioned AP implementation on returning the nuclear file from the UNSC to the IAEA. Iran had made at least a minor concession in granting access to the advanced centrifuges, Shannon noted, and true to form, the DG achieved another prolongation of the process. ¶5. (C) On next steps, Shannon reported unconfirmed rumors that the NAM triumvirate would ask for a technical briefing before the February report, but none of the like-minded COMs expressed an interest in such a briefing at this point. Shannon also took issue with the DG's continued "loose language," noting in particular, misleading statements that there is no evidence Iran has a nuclear weapons program. He suggested that like-minded Missions raise this individually with ElBaradei. (Note: Speaking to "Al-Hayat," ElBaradei refers to DNI estimates on a timeframe for manufacturing fissionable material, were Iran to pursue a weapons program. In the same interview, the DG also cast himself as the intermediary between the P5 1 and Iran, rather than as Director General of the IAEA. End note.) Shannon was pessimistic about the prospects for P5 1 agreement on a UNSCR before the DG's report, which he cautioned could be a "dud." Ambassador Schulte confirmed that the goal was to adopt a UNSCR early in February before the report; it was a priority for the Security Council to reaffirm its engagement and the suspension requirement. The Germans also confirmed that FM Steinmeier would meet with ElBaradei on January 17 in order to report to his counterparts at the anticipated Berlin Ministerial next week. Not Guilty Verdict? -------------- ¶6. (C) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire queried why the DG had gone to Tehran in the first place? He could not hold out any hope on suspension and heard nothing new, so it was apparent that his sole focus was the work plan, she surmised. The DG had put his credibility on the line, having described the work plan as a "final chance" and a "litmus test," and now faced a critical moment at the March Board. He needed a conclusion to this, and if the work plan fails, he's fresh out of ideas. Kemmerling shared this assessment, noting that it would have been a "miracle" if the DG had made any headway on suspension. In light of the Supreme Leader's denial that Iran ever had a nuclear weapons program, he doubted that lower levels of the Iranian bureaucracy would be likely to proffer a "confession" under the work plan. ¶7. (C) Japanese Ambassador Amano agreed that the DG had failed on all three of his objectives for the trip, and seemed to place his hopes in a future "confession" within four weeks. Amano considered the prospect that the DG could pronounce Iran "confessed to being not guilty" at the conclusion of the work plan. Ambassador Schulte observed that the DG must be reminded of our expectations that Iran be held to a high standard and that his credibility is at stake. Regarding the key issue of weaponization studies, Iran must admit and explain the genesis and purpose of the studies; thus any pronouncement of "not guilty" cannot be adequate, he opined. Moving Beyond the Work Plan -------------- ¶8. (C) Shannon underscored the need to expand the rhetoric beyond the work plan in order to reassert Chapter VII UNSCRs and to restore the confidence of the international community by addressing present, not just past, issues. He argued that the usefulness of the work plan would soon run out. UK Ambassador Smith agreed that the Board must re-shift the focus to the wider context, including suspension and the AP. He cautioned against loading too much on the work plan as the "litmus test" given an inherent risk that the DG could present the work plan as "done." It was not clear whether the DG would report the same level of dissatisfaction with Iranian cooperation as in previous reports. Smith recalled the DG's tone and lack of conviction in his London meetings last week (ref c); the DG lectured on how the P5 1 had gone wrong and how we "must be kidding ourselves" on suspension. Smith also suggested that we could leverage disgruntlement within the Secretariat and express our unhappiness with Iran's responses. Shannon suggested that we should encourage the DG to repeat his admonition that the IAEA's knowledge of Iran's nuclear program is diminishing. Reasserting Board Authority -------------- ¶9. (C) French Charge Gross was even more skeptical of the Secretariat's intentions. He recalled the P3 1 demarches on SIPDIS the DG in August warned that the work plan could not result in the "normalization" of the Iran file. He saw a failure of credibility and duplicity on the part of the Secretariat in the letters sent to Iran after the November Board that so diverged from the language in the DG report. Gross recounted that Cserveny had warned him "you cannot challenge what we say, or you will break the machine." He advised a demarche in Board member capitals prior to the Board that "normalization" via the work plan is not acceptable and asserting the importance of suspension, Code 3.1, the AP and the nine Board resolutions on Iran. Gross also suggest coordinating public statements regarding our concerns and offered to develop language. Smith expressed concern about NAM activism on the Iran file and pressure for normalization. UK Msnoff observed Iran could not be considered a "routine" case because its implementation of Code 3.1. is a clear breach of its safeguards obligations. ¶10. (C) Gross suggested that if developments in New York allow it may be time for a Board resolution. Shannon noted that "normalization" would mean no more special reports to the Board and that a resolution should set a requirement for DG reports. Amano responded that since the Board reported the Iran file to the UNSC, the DG must report to the Board and Iran must remain on the agenda so long as it remains under a UNSCR. He advised that only the UNSC could return Iran's file to the Board. Absent this, the Board cannot declare Iran a "routine" matter. ¶11. (C) Gervais-Vidricaire advised that the Board will need to pronounce itself on the results of the work plan and she fully expected a nuanced report. Shannon questioned whether it was time to pressure the DG to put an end to the work plan process. DCM recalled that the work plan had been nothing but trouble since August, buying Iran time, and it may well be time to put an end to it. Ambassador Schulte agreed that the Board must reassert its authority over the DG who needs to be reminded that he represents the Board. He did not rule out a resolution noting that in March it will be over two years since the last Board resolution and that the composition of the Board is more auspicious than in the past. ¶12. (S) Comment: Very clearly, none of our like minded friends, not even the Germans, had any expectation that Iran would comply with the terms on the UNSCRs or the work plan before the March Board. There was also fear that ElBaradei will report to the Board that there are no more outstanding issues with little justification. We and the UK find it hard to believe he could close the weaponization issues without a confession, but do not discount it. Counterbalancing ElBaradei's clear desire to "normalize" the Iranian issue, his credibility is at stake, and he knows it, particularly if inspectors are grumbling about his closing issues for political reasons; therefore, neither can we discount a statement from him that while the deadlines have not been met, the work plan remains unfinished and open questions remain on the list. Given Iranian statements that the new deadline to finish the work plan is not "four weeks" but "40 days" or "March" sometime, another likely outcome is simply another new deadline, sometime after the March 3-7 Board. That would make it extremely difficult to garner broad support for a BOG resolution declaring the work plan dead. As further information emerges from the Secretariat on the handling of the contamination issue and on the Iranian responses to the weaponization issues, we will firm up our coordinated activities with this group, while focusing on steps to keep pressure on the DG, including to comply with his self-imposed "four-week" deadline. SCHULTE