IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSIONS WITH DG AND

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000283 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/RA, IO/T E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2018 TAGS: PARM AORC KNPP IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSIONS WITH DG AND HEINONEN REF: UNVIE 240 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d,h Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Acting U/S for Arms Control and International Security John Rood discussed the state-of-play on Iran May 6 with IAEA Director General ElBaradei and Safeguards DDG Olli Heinonen. ElBaradei stressed the need for a face saving measure on suspension and said the P5 1, minus the U.S., should deliver the updated offer in Tehran, if it is to have any chance of success. He counseled against using Solana as the "mailman" because the Iranians do not want to deal with him. ElBaradei made his usual pitch for direct U.S. engagement with Iran as the only way to ultimately resolve the Iran issue. Turning to the Safeguards investigation, the DG did not expect Iran to be fully transparent on weaponization but the Secretariat would continue seeking to "clear the deck" of past issues. Acting U/S Rood underscored that Iran's ability to re-start weaponization efforts was a present concern and urged the DG to push for the AP, points which ElBaradei acknowledged. The DG expressed frustration with the opacity of the Iranian leadership and figuring out who was in charge of nuclear issues. ¶2. (S) Separately, DDG Heinonen recounted his most recent trip to Tehran during which the Iranians reviewed the "alleged studies" documents. He also posed questions related to procurements and "loose ends" on military involvement. Heinonen did not expect Iran would admit weapons-related work when it provided its "final assessment" this month. Although deployment of the new generation centrifuges was slow, and none had been connected to cascades, he acknowledged there was also no sign of suspension or readiness to implement the AP. Routine inspections were proceeding unobstructed and he did not see much of a practical problem with DIV information at Arak, though Iran was not complying with the revised Code 3.1. DG's Prognosis -------------- 3.(S) Acting U/S Rood solicited the DG's prognosis of recent developments on Iran. ElBaradei acknowledged a difference of "perception" on Iran, arguing that the P5 1 strategy should have been adjusted three years ago to prevent Iran from acquiring industrial-scale enrichment. Although this was now "water under the bridge," he remained of the view that a full, robust verification regime was more important than suspension. It was almost impossible for Iran to suspend enrichment, he offered, given that Iran sees this as a security issue and wants respect from the United States as a regional player. All sides of the Iranian political spectrum share this perspective, he added. ElBaradei remained convinced that UNSC sanctions only reinforce hard-liners in Iran as this had become an issue of national pride and sacrifice. The DG made his usual pitch for full U.S. engagement in direct negotiations with Iran. Rood pointed to Iran's complicated role in the region, and the unhappy experience of trilateral talks on Iraq. ¶4. (S) On the P5 1 package, the DG argued that the question was not the content but of offering Iran a "face saving" measure on suspension. As he had told German FM Steinmeier, it was a good package but "delivery" would be a problem if the P5 1 sent it "by mail" via Solana. Iran would "return to sender" saying they are "not for sale." The Iranians did not want to work with Solana. He advised that the best way to get a fair hearing would be for the "five" (P5 1 minus the U.S.) to engage in preliminary talks with Iran. Rood said that he would take this suggestion back to the P5 1. He noted that the Iranian leadership did not appear to be set up for making strategic decisions and pressure would be needed. ElBaradei agreed that pressure was necessary but so too was "an opening valve." ¶5. (S) Turning to the status of the Safeguards investigation, the DG saw the "alleged studies" as the major issue. He referred in passing to the recent agreement by Iran to address this issue in May, as a "work plan" or "timeline." The DG did not expect Iran would be completely transparent and answer all questions, and would only be prepared to do so as part of a "package" deal (presumably with the U.S.) in the future, at which time unresolved issues could be "grandfathered" in. ElBaradei clearly saw the "alleged studies" as a past issue, and referred to the NIE's conclusion that Iran had stopped weaponization work in 2003. It was now a matter of confidence building, he said, leaving future risk assessment to the UN Security Council. For its part, the IAEA would push to "clear the deck," of past issues. Rood underlined the critical importance of the weaponization investigation and the need for Iran to proffer convincing explanations. He reminded the DG that the NIE could not conclude with confidence that that Iran had not re-started weaponization efforts, and that this was a matter not just of the past but of the present. He also noted the need to press for more tools, including the Additional Protocol. The DG said that he pushes the AP at every opportunity and acknowledged that these issues were past and present concerns. ¶6. (S) The DG also expressed frustration with the difficulty of figuring out who was "in charge" in Iran given the many divisions in the Iranian leadership. He noted that even the Supreme Leader had to work to build consensus among factions. In the nuclear field, it was not clear whether the AEOI or the Foreign Ministry was in charge at different junctures, and the ball seems to have been passed from former nuclear negotiator Larijiani to Jalili back to AEOI head Aghazadeh. ElBaradei observed that when he met with the Supreme Leader in January, only Aghazadeh and Velayati (advisor to Khamenei) were present. They seem to have emerged as significant players while nuclear negotiator Jalili is not a player in the DG's view. Although Aghazadeh seemed to be on the ascendant, it was still not clear to the DG who had the policy lead on nuclear issues. Olli's Diagnosis -------------- ¶7. (S) In a separate briefing with EXPO, Safeguards DDG Heinonen (who was also present in the DG meeting) provided a status report of his discussions with Iran on the so-called "alleged studies." He said he presented the "studies" along with information from multiple sources in Tehran during his last trip. The Iranians spent two and a half days reading the information and offered to provide their "final assessment" in May. In addition to the "studies," there were quite a few unanswered questions which Heinonen posed on procurement efforts with possible nuclear ties, as well as loose ends on military ties to the centrifuge program. It was too early to predict what Iran's "final" answers would be, he said. The mid-May timeframe for assessing the military nature of Iran's program was short, he added, not sounding optimistic. Rood inquired whether there was any indication of departure from the "baseless fabrications" party-line. Heinonen noted that the Iranians were at least studying the information but said he would be surprised if they completely changed tune. The Iranians knew they had to provide substantive explanations for these activities. However, it was unclear whether they would acknowledge that they were nuclear-related or even conducted in Iran. Asked about providing access to people, Heinonen explained that requests for interviews would happen in the "next phase," in clarifying the answers Iran provided, and observed that there were others in the Iranian nuclear establishment equally or more important than Fakhrizadeh. 8.(S) Heinonen commented on Iran's April 8 "Nuclear Day" announcement of centrifuge expansion and reported that the goal of an additional 3,000 or 6,000 centrifuges had not yet happened with IR-1 (formerly known as P1) centrifuges. He also said Iran had not provided inspectors with a firm time schedule for their deployment. A few IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges had been installed at the pilot facility Natanz, mainly he surmised "for demonstration purposes." (Note: The IR-3, in addition to the IR-2, is one of the four versions of the "new generation centrifuges" that were reported in the February DG's report. End note) Heinonen clarified that only a small number, maybe one or two, of the IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges were running on UF6 gas and that these were all single machines not connected to a cascade. He underlined that there was no sign of suspension and Iran had not agreed to implement the AP. Meanwhile, routine inspection activities continued unobstructed, including timely unannounced inspections, as the Iranians seemed to be doing their utmost to appear cooperative on that score. By his estimation, the Uranium Conversion Facility had produced roughly 400 tons of UF6. Construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor continued slowly, he noted. Asked by Rood about DIV issues at Arak, Heinonen noted that Iran was not adhering to the early DIV requirements of the revised Code 3.1 but had reverted to an earlier version. From a practical standpoint, this was not a problem as the IAEA already had seals and surveillance measures in place at Arak, yet Iran was not complying with the letter of its agreement. ¶9. (U) Acting U/S Rood did not have an opportunity to clear this message. SCHULTE