IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR SAFETY ISSUES; POSSIBLE DELAY

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000274 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2023 TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA USOSCE UNVIE RS IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR SAFETY ISSUES; POSSIBLE DELAY IN STARTUP; NORWAY WANTS TO PROVIDE SAFETY TRAINING Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (U) This cable contains recommendations and guidance requests. See paras 15 and 16. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶2. (S) IAEA safety officials have been reviewing the Russian-drafted Safety Analysis Report (SAR) on Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). Although they are being very tight-lipped about the results, indications are that the SAR and potentially the safety of the facility are problematic. IAEA safety and technical cooperation staff will continue to work with Iran and Russia on safety issues and will hold a meeting in Vienna in September. Iran has not accepted overtures by DDG Safety Taniguichi to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Iran has agreed to a pre-Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review before fuel is loaded in the reactor. Safety officials have stated that this pre-OSART will not occur until spring of 2009 indicating fuel will not be loaded this year. ¶3. (S) Norwegian Security Policy Director Aas told Ambassador Schulte on May 1 that Norway is developing a project to train Iranian regulators and BNPP operators in safety and asked for U.S. views. Mission recommends supporting Norway's proposal. We also recommend supporting their efforts by discreetly making our concerns about BNPP safety known to Russia, Czech Republic, China, and Finland. End Summary. -------------- Flawed Safety Analysis -------------- ¶4. (S) The Bushehr Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was written by the Russians and has been reviewed and commented on previously by both IAEA officials and the Iranian nuclear safety regulator. The Department of Nuclear Safety and Security (NSS) has been providing the technical experts to perform the review, while the Department of Technical Cooperation (TC) is the lead for the assistance project. The revised SAR is currently being re-reviewed by IAEA officials. This initial finding is that neither the IAEA nor the Iranian regulator recommendations were addressed. ¶5. (S) IAEA safety staff indicated to Msnoff that they were frustrated with the lack of quality of the report but would not be specific about their concerns. A meeting is planned for September, possibly in Vienna, with IAEA, Iran, and Russia to discuss IAEA's concerns and the next steps. -------------- No to Convention on Nuclear Safety -------------- ¶6. (S) Deputy Director General (DDG) Safety Taniguchi had planned to travel to Iran earlier this year to push Iran to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Convention stresses the importance of nuclear safety and requires signatories to come to Vienna every three years to discuss their safety programs in a peer-review forum. Sources in the Secretariat say that Iranian officials, although not objecting out right, are uncomfortable with the push to join the Convention on the grounds that it is just another non-proliferation tool. IAEA Director of the Nuclear Installation Safety, Philippe Jamet, told Msnoff he believes that Iran is not separating safety from safeguards because the world is not separating the two and that sanctions are preventing Iran from getting the safety support it needs (because it could be misused). (Comment: while UNSCR 1737 exempts safety from sanctions, the IAEA has refused TC projects related to more general nuclear power programs.) This makes the Iranians suspicious of any purely safety centered argument, according to Jamet. The DDG's trip has been postponed several times and is not currently scheduled. -------------- Start-up in Summer 09? -------------- ¶7. (S) Msnoff inquired about the status of possible start-up date for the BNPP. IAEA officials indicated that Iran was eager to start-up the facility this summer. However, TC staff recently visited the facility to outline their concerns with the SAR and found little progress in the completion of the facility in the last few months. The pre-OSART mission which had been scheduled for September has been delayed until spring 2009. Pre-OSARTs are typically scheduled 3-6 months before the fuel is to be loaded, indicating that fuel would not be loaded until summer 2009. One IAEA safety official believes that even if the facility is not ready to start, Iran could feel pressure to go ahead and load the fuel; however, Iran's agreement to a pre-OSART next spring is a reasonable indication that fuel loading will not happen until after that point. ¶8. (S) When asked about the quality of the staff running the BNPP, the general impression among Nuclear Installation Safety staff reviewing the SAR is that the Iranian workers are knowledgeable and understand the concepts. However, they are disorganized and are heavily reliant on Russian support. The NSS officials continue to be concerned about the quality of Iranian staff (at the regulator and at BNPP) and DDG Taniguchi and several members of his staff stated to Msnoff that training is the most valuable support that can be provided. -------------- Norway Safety Training Project -------------- ¶9. (S) Kare Aas, Director General for Security Policy at the Norwegian MFA told Ambassador Schulte May 1 that Norway has been working on an Iranian safety project with the IAEA. (Note: Msnoffs discussed this project with NSS staff and verified the specifics of the proposal.) Norway has been providing funds to the Department of Safety and Security for the past several years to support safety projects in various countries. Norway has now approached the Secretariat to develop a project for Iran using a Norwegian risk management company, Det Norske Veritas (DNV),see http://www.dnv.com. According to Christer Viktorsson from the Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, DNV has offices all over the world including Iran. The project would involve IAEA safety staff working with DNV to train Iranian regulators and BNPP operators in safety. Viktorsson also indicated that it is difficult to find experts that are willing to travel to Iran and this is a way to provide local experts year round. ¶10. (S) The Norwegian MFA and DNV have put together a concept for a three-year project. A "fact finding" mission to Iran organized by the Division of Nuclear Installation Safety to discuss this project with the Iranians is planned for late May or early June to determine the areas in which Iran needs the most assistance and the best scope of the project. The visit would include IAEA safety staff, and DNV and Norwegian experts and would be led by Christer Viktorsson who stated he will also use the opportunity to encourage Iran to join the CNS since DDG Taniguchi's trips have been postponed. ¶11. (S) The Director of Installation Safety, Philippe Jamet, stated that it is important for the Iranians to receive training from other regulatory bodies that have experience with these types of reactors. Therefore, they are also enlisting the help of the Czech Republic, China and Finland. ¶12. (S) Aas asked for U.S. comments on this proposed project. He said Norway is likely to also ask France for comments. Aas also asked the Ambassador to provide him U.S. views directly or through Norway's mission here in Vienna. That said, both Aas and the Nuclear Installation Safety officials indicated that this is a very sensitive topic. Aas asked that Mission not discuss the project with other Vienna-based missions. He also indicated that this is a safety issue for Norway, not a political one. However, DDG Taniguchi and his staff have indicated that the U.S. can help by having discrete discussions with Russia, Czech Republic, China, Finland and Norway highlighting our concerns with BNPP safety (without discussing safeguards) and the need for these countries to work to create a strong safety regulator, a strong safety culture, and ensure the facility is safe before it is allowed to operate. ¶13. (S) Installation Safety informed Msnoff that this project is not being run by the Technical Cooperation (TC) Department. Instead, the Norwegians are giving the money directly to the Department of Safety and Security; therefore, it is a safety project and not a TC project. (Comment: considering safety staff's reticence about the review of the SAR, it is not clear if DDG Taniguchi will inform the Board of his concerns about safety in Iran.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (S) The Department of Safety and Security is clearly concerned about the safety of BNPP, and is working with several countries, including Russia, Czech Republic, Finland and Norway to find ways to help increase the safety of the facility and train the regulating and operating staff. Mission agrees with IAEA safety staff, that it is vitally important for BNPP to be operated safety because "an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere." We also understand their concern that providing information to the U.S., could politicize the safety work and somehow connected to non-proliferation concerns. Mission agrees with need to maintain our distance from the safety aspects of Bushehr in order to avoid further politicizing the issue. Working through neutral entities like the IAEA and Norway we can engage in some delicate diplomacy to prevent a premature start-up of Bushehr. -------------- Recommendation and Guidance Requests -------------- ¶15. (S) Mission recommends that the U.S. support the Norwegian proposal. Mission requests guidance on responding to Mr. Aas' request for U.S. views on the Norwegian project. ¶16. (S) Mission also recommends that the U.S. discreetly discuss U.S. safety concerns with the BNPP with Russia, Czech Republic, China, Finland, and encourage to work with Iran to improve safety at the reactor. These discussions should not take place in Vienna. PYATT