IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSES A POSSIBLE

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000271 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2018 TAGS: PARM AORC KNPP IAEA IR SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: ACTING U/S ROOD DISCUSSES A POSSIBLE BOARD RESOLUTION WITH P5+1 AMBASSADORS REF: UNVIE 240 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Over lunch with P5 1 Ambassadors May 6, Acting U/S Rood pressed for a Board resolution on Iran in June. The EU-3 agreed that Board and UNSC actions were complimentary and not mutually exclusive; the UK was particularly frustrated by the lack of Board action. EU-3 members joined the Acting Undersecretary in seeking to convince Russia and China of the value of a Board resolution which would support DDG Heinonen's investigation and send a strong signal to Iran to cooperate. Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky saw no need for such a resolution, pointing out that much progress has been made and counseling patience. China had no position, though it shared Russia's view of positive progress on Iran. Russia insisted that any Board resolution be coordinated at the Ministerial level as part of the broader P5 1 strategy. Meanwhile, the French are moving forward with plans to host P5 1 experts on May 26-27. Rood encouraged this as a means of demonstrating P5 1 unity in Vienna. ¶2. (S) It was clear from the P5 1 discussion that Russia (and probably China) would not contemplate any action in the Board without explicit instructions. Russia, in particular, does not see the value of doing much of anything in the Board. Absent PolDir agreement, prospects of a P5 1-sponsored Board resolution are slim. We could work with the EU-3 and other like-minded Missions who may be willing to sponsor a resolution, but that would be a more difficult course. End Summary. A/Undersecretary Rood calls for Board Resolution -------------- --- ¶3. (C) P5 1 Ambassadors (China was represented at by DCM Minister Counselor) exchanged views over lunch with Acting U/S Rood on a June Board resolution on Iran and discussed a P5 1 experts meeting in Vienna, now slated for May 26-27. Rood noted the May 2 Ministerial agreement on an updated P5 1 "package" offer to Iran and underlined ongoing concerns about the direction of the Iranian nuclear program. He observed that the NIE had expressed greater confidence than before as to the existence of a nuclear weapons program until 2003 and that other countries had also provided information to the IAEA. These concerns needed to be addressed and accounted for so that the Secretariat can conduct its verification work. Along with incentives, the dual track approach presumed pressure; UNSC sanctions were one means, but the IAEA also had a central role to play. Just because the issue was before the UN Security Council, this did not preclude the Board being seized of the matter, he argued, and asked for thoughts on a Board resolution in June. Charge added that the P5 1 should consider how to best use the month before the upcoming Board to support DDG Heinonen's continuing investigation. Germany: Time to Send a Message -------------- ¶4. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald offered that the Iranians would "eat their words" concerning "baseless fabrications" if the DG reported no engagement on their part. The mid-May timetable for Iran's answers was ambitious and he expected no breakthroughs. Most likely the DG would report that Iran had promised answers but that the investigation was not complete, he said. Germany believed it would thus be useful for the Board to send a message to the Tehran leadership to cooperate with the IAEA investigation. Gottwald regretted the built-in resistance of some groups on the Board to a prospect of a resolution. UK: Need to Change the Dynamic -------------- ¶5. (C) UK Ambassador Smith also shared doubts about Iran providing answers in May. He noted a broad spectrum of views on the Board from those who desperately wanted to believe in progress, to those skeptics who believed progress was impossible. He was disappointed by the procedural way in which the Board has been handling the Iran issue. Since his arrival in Vienna almost a year ago, it seemed to be always the same story: the DG report would come out a few days before the Board meeting and there was little time to do anything beyond national statements. As a result the Board had not delivered much. He agreed that it was not a choice between action in either New York or Vienna. Rood concurred that the Board had devolved into little more than a venue for the DG to report. There was a basis for agreement, even among Board members who took a more optimistic view of the Iran file, he believed, on the value of upholding safeguards and the AP. Building from this core, the Board should be poised to play its established role. The Board would not displace the UNSC or P5 1 but could play a constructive supplementary role, Rood argued. Russia: Patience Please -------------- ¶6. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky took exception to any argument (though none had been made) that there had not been positive progress on the Iran file. He said he had also been in Vienna and had seen remarkable progress on the Iran file. He maintained that the dual track approach had yielded results. "Sometimes no action is not bad," he noted, especially since New York had already taken action. The Iranians were cooperating, he asserted, and he urged support and patience for the Iran-IAEA track. Zmeyevsky also questioned whether Ministers had discussed the prospect of a Board resolution and insisted on coordination at the Ministerial level in the context of the broader Iran strategy. Vienna could not be the spoiler, he reflected, and we must ensure the Board's contribution had a positive impact on the general picture. He counseled that Vienna should wait for the strategic moves on the part of the P5 1 with regard to the updated package to play out and also noted that Tehran was preparing its own proposal. He had no information on the latter proposal but saw it as a good sign that Iran was prepared to cooperate with the P5 1. China: IAEA has a technical mandate -------------- ¶7. (C) Unsurprisingly, Chinese Counselor Liu shared the Russian view of IAEA-Iran cooperation, noting that all issues had been resolved with the exception of the "alleged studies," on which Iran's responses were expected before the June Board. He stressed the technical mandate of the IAEA and the fact that the issue was now before the UNSC. China had no position on how to deal with the Iran file in the June Board. France: Progress? What progress? -------------- ¶8. (C) French Ambassador Deniau countered that the facts on the ground were not encouraging as Iran continued to add cascades, develop new generation centrifuges and make rapid progress in its ballistic missile program. Iran had addressed next to nothing on weaponization and its declarations were not sufficient. Deniau enjoined the P5 1 to demonstrate unity including in Vienna. He argued forcefully that a resolution by the Board as the technical body in charge of the Iran file would help the broader P5 1 strategy. Charge also pointed out that a Board resolution would counter Iran's claims that the IAEA had given it a clean bill of health when several issues were unresolved and more information from governments is prompting more questions for Iran. In the wider context, he argued, a strong signal from the Board to Iran that the Vienna file was not closed would be useful as the Iranian body politic digests the updated P5 1 offer. ¶9. (C) Rood reminded the P5 1 that they should not lose sight of the fact that Iran remains out of compliance with its Safeguards agreement and weaponization was of the utmost concern. The common denominator, Gottwald noted, was that Board members do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Vienna had a role to play on the technical side in helping to clean up these issues. He saw a division of labor with New York that did not preclude a Board resolution. Rood agreed that unless there was a significant change in the nature of Iran's cooperation on weaponization, it would be useful for the Board to weigh in to reinforce the Secretariat's investigation. The DG has said several times he needs Iranian cooperation, Rood noted, so the goal is to get Iran to cooperate and give the Secretariat credible information. Smith added that Iran must provide more than superficial cooperation and the next DG report must demonstrate cooperation in substance not just form. Otherwise, the Agency could not fulfill its technical mandate, he observed. Smith reminded the P5 1 that the Board has required such cooperation and compliance of Iran in the past. P5 1 Experts Meeting in Vienna -------------- ¶10. (C) Deniau reported that PolDirs had agreed to the idea of a French-hosted P5 1 experts meeting in Vienna, and suggested May 26-27, which would coincide with the expected release of the DG's report on May 23. (Note: The French Mission has since sent invitations. End Note.) Rood observed that expert consultations in Vienna would reinforce the perception that the P5 1 were working together. Experts should focus in particular on weaponization, which goes to the heart of the matter, and support the Secretariat. ¶11. (C) China flagged practical issues with getting Austrian visas in time for the meeting. More constructively, Liu suggested that calling the expert consultations the "Second Experts Meeting on the Iran Nuclear Issue," following up on a similar meeting in June 2007, would help Beijing grasp the format and expectations of the meeting. Deniau clarified that the purpose of the meeting would be to take stock of developments since last year. Charge suggested that the Secretariat could also be brought into the discussion on the sidelines of the experts' meeting. Deniau further advised P5 1 counterparts to not discount Iran's technical capacity and the sense of urgency associated with the Iran file. Rood agreed that we should not take this for granted and allow Iran time to master enrichment. Comment: Prospects for a Resolution -------------- ¶12. (S) The Russian position has not changed since the P5 1 meeting in Vienna (reftel). Absent agreement at the PolDir level, we see little prospect for a P5 1-sponsored Board resolution in June. We also have seen no enthusiasm on the part of the EU3 to sponsor a resolution on their own. ¶13. (S) A P5 1 sponsored resolution would have the best prospect for passage on the Board, and may command consensus. NAM and Arab resistance could be overcome given the current composition of the Board, particularly if we can bring South Africa and the Arab states along. South Africa is the only NAM standard bearer on the Board and could call for a vote. South Africa shares our concerns on weaponization (and said so in the March Board),but in a recent discussion, Governor Minty was unenthusiastic about a resolution, telling Charge that calls for cooperation from the likes of South Africa and Egypt are a better way to maintain pressure on Iran. ¶14. (S) A non-P5 1-sponsored resolution would clearly have a tougher road. It could take the form of an EU-3 sponsored (as in the past) or other like-minded-sponsored resolution, in the hopes of eventually dragging along Russia and China. Abstentions by Russia and China, however, would open the spigot for other Board members to follow suit. If we are concerned about P5 1 unity, a like-minded country such as Canada could front a resolution in lieu of the EU-3. Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire is willing to do so, if the EU-3 raise no objections. Australia would also likely be disposed to take a leadership role. ¶20. (S) Absent consensus, a Board resolution would have to garner a majority of those present and voting (abstentions don't count) in the 35-member Board to secure passage. Of course, much will depend on the content of the resolution; the closer it hews to the DG report and supports the Secretariat, the more support it will get on the Board. In the "yes" column, we can count the EU-3 and like-minded and the EU members/associated states: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, U.S., UK, Austria, Croatia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and Albania, totaling 14 votes. Among those who could be readily persuaded, we would include most of GRULAC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador) along with Thailand, the Philippines, and less engaged African states: Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria (assuming they show up for a vote),for a total of another 10 votes. We could include Switzerland in this column but they may well abstain. The hardest sells will be: Russia, China, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and possibly Iraq, totaling 9 votes. Bolivia must pay arrears to regain its voting rights and is hardly engaged on the Board. PYATT