NPT: UKRAINIAN CHAIRMAN PREVIEWS PREPCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000223 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 TAGS: PARM AROC KNPP UP SUBJECT: NPT: UKRAINIAN CHAIRMAN PREVIEWS PREPCOM REF: PAPPAS-DAVIS EMAILS Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Schulte discussed the forthcoming NPT PrepCom with Ukraine PrepCom Chair Yelchenko on April 16. Yelchenko is intent on getting procedural issues out of the way, and seeks to have a productive outcome but did not insist on consensus - he preferred a strong Working Paper to a weak Chairman's Summary. Yelchenko requested the U.S. to quietly raise the issue of the NAM/Africa group's selection of the Zimbabwe Permrep in New York as the next PrepCom Chair with South Africa in the hopes of getting him to withdraw his nomination. The UK and France have already agreed to do so. He also asked if the U.S. could give some assurance on normal visa issuance for the 3rd PrepCom in New York to quiet the Iranians (who are isolated on this matter). Yelchenko expects Iran to acquiesce on procedural issues at the PrepCom but anticipates trouble with Egypt on Middle East Safeguards. Ambassador Schulte advised Yelchenko of U.S. position papers and explained our stance on Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF). At a Polish-hosted lunch April 17, Yelchenko further previewed the PrepCom with the U.S., France, Ireland, Egypt, Finland, Belgium and Lithuania, making many of the same points. Ireland, Finland and Egypt agreed that it would be premature to draw conclusions on RANF at the PrepCom. France also briefed on its priorities. End Summary. Seeking a Strong Outcome -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ukrainian Ambassador Yelchenko told Ambassador Schulte that his immediate goal as NPT PrepCom Chair is to dispense with procedural issues, which he believed was doable absent any surprises. Yelchenko wants to clear the slate of such issues so the 2009 PrepCom and 2010 RevCon can focus on substance, he said at the Polish-hosted lunch. He also hopes that the PrepCom will produce some sort of "outcome," even if it is weaker than a Chair's Summary. Yelchenko did not insist on consensus. A Working Paper would be a "step back" from a Chair's Summary, but in the end, he told Ambassador Schulte, "Who cares?" The content mattered more than the "mechanism" so long as the next PrepCom Chair had something he could work with. He added at the April 17 lunch that between the two approaches, a weak Chair's Summary or a 
strong Working Paper, the former was a "worse" outcome. He also noted that a consensus document would still be possible, were it not for Iran. ¶3. (SBU) Yelchenko confirmed at the lunch that IAEA Ambassador Soltineh will lead Iran's PrepCom delegation. He has consulted with both Iranian Ambassadors in Vienna and Geneva who seem willing to go along with same format, i.e. a Working Paper, as last year. The Iranians are not likely to agree with the substance of such a Working Paper but acknowledge that Iran would be cited therein. On a positive note, both Iran and the Arab group have assured him that they can agree to the agenda so the PrepCom should be able to proceed expeditiously to the General Debate. Next PrepCom Chair/Location -------------- ¶4. (C) Yelchenko did not have a high opinion of the NAM/Africa group designee for the 3rd PrepCom Chair, the Zimbabwe Permrep in New York. An ex-general and "hardly a diplomat," he told Ambassador Schulte, the Permrep would be removed if the regime fell. The only way to undo the NAM/Africa group decision was to get the Zimbabwe Permrep to withdraw his nomination. The UK has agreed to raise this issue with South Africa and Nigeria, and he asked that the U.S. do the same in advance of the PrepCom. The French will also speak with South African Governor Minty (Note: Yelchenko was not sure if Minty would lead the South Africa delegation to the PrepCom. End note). The Nigerian Permrep in New York is seen as a possible alternative for PrepCom Chairman. Yelchenko also noted at lunch the next day that the Africa group had not promoted the candidacy of the Zimbabwe Permrep, but he had been the only one nominated. ¶5. (C) Yelchenko cautioned Ambassador Schulte that the NAM would "go nuts" were this to be made a public issue at the Geneva PrepCom. Unfortunately, the designation of the next Chair is second or third on the agenda. He wants to postpone the item until later and have it be a separate decision (i.e. not part of the Chairman's Working Paper). This "stupid issue" could sidetrack the entire conference, he feared. ¶6. (C) Everyone had agreed to hold the next PrepCom in New York with the exception Iran, which wanted assurances on U.S. visas. Yelchenko asked whether the U.S. could send a message to Tehran to this effect. Alternatively, he could note in his Chairman's remarks that the 3rd PrepCom would be conducted in accordance with "normal procedures" but was not comfortable doing so without prior U.S. approval. Yelchenko advised that Iran was isolated in its position. When Iran raised this issue in a NAM session, Indonesia quickly retorted that the NAM had agreed to New York and Cuba was silent. ¶7. (SBU) Yelchenko also mentioned that the Malaysian Permrep in New York is being discussed as a candidate for Chairman of the 2010 RevCon. He did not know him personally but the Malaysian is well-respected. Key Substantive Issues -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte informed Yelchenko that the U.S. would be circulating two position papers on deterring NPT treaty withdrawal and peaceful use of nuclear energy. He further explained the U.S. position on Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF),which, he said, is intended to stem proliferation but does not entail giving up NPT rights or re-writing the NPT. He expected the issue to be raised in the PrepCom but Vienna would be the venue for further technical discussions on RANF. At the April 17 lunch Irish Ambassador Kogan also opined that it would be premature for the PrepCom to draw any conclusions about RANF, a view seconded by Finland and Egypt. ¶9. (SBU) Yelchenko noted a great deal of interest throughout his consultations in U.S. positions, and advised that the more explanation, the better. He also noted concerns voiced at the Dublin Article VI conference over the U.S.-India Nuclear deal and how this may affect the RevCon, i.e. in what capacity would/could India ever join the NPT. At the April 17 lunch, Yelchenko highlighted positive developments on Article VI, citing recent comments by Sarkozy and Bush-Putin. He encouraged the P-5 to set the right tone for the Article VI debate in the PrepCom. ¶10. (SBU) French Ambassador Deniau previewed their PrepCom positions at the lunch. France would stress modern safeguards, including the AP, and the need to incorporate the 3S's (Safeguards, Safety, Security) into perspectives for a nuclear renaissance. The FMCT and ratification of CTBT would also be priorities for France. (Note: Yelchenko also probed the U.S. position on CTBT with Ambassador Schulte. End Note.) Deniau cautioned Ambassador Schulte that Yelchenko would push for implementation of the 1995 PrepCom 13-step roadmap, to which France objects. Middle East Safeguards -------------- ¶11. (C) Yelchenko expressed frustration to Ambassador Schulte with Egypt's overemphasis of the Middle East safeguards issue over the last ten years. He fully expects Egypt to again cause problems first in the Geneva PrepCom and then in the Vienna IAEA General Conference. Egypt continues to feel aggrieved that the "package" agreed to at the 1995 RevCon on Middle East safeguards has not been realized. Yelchenko is trying to re-direct their thinking, arguing that PrepCom decisions have no standing and no effect on the 2010 RevCon. However, the NAM and Egypt want to focus on negative security assurances in the Middle East and Israel in order to lay the groundwork for the RevCon debate. Yelchenko worries that Egypt or the Arab group will insist on specific language in any Chair's Summary or block approval of a Working Paper. (He explained that Working Papers do not require consensus but must be approved in the Plenary.) Iran alone would not be able to block a Chairman's Working Paper but the Middle East Safeguards issue could. ¶12. (C) Over lunch the next day the Egyptian DCM, who will be at the PrepCom, said Egypt wanted to hear ideas on implementing the NWFZ from the three co-sponsors (U.S., UK, and Russia) of the 1995 RevCon resolution on Middle East Safeguards. PYATT