IAEA/GC: ARAB LEAGUE SEEKS DIALOGUE ON ISRAELI

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000140 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018 TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC IS EG SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: ARAB LEAGUE SEEKS DIALOGUE ON ISRAELI THREAT RESOLUTION REF: 07 UNVIE 557 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Arab League representative Wael Al-Assad met with like-minded Missions (EU-3, U.S., Australia, Norway, Japan) on February 21 to discuss the General Conference (GC) resolution on the "Israeli Nuclear Threat" (INT). Al-Assad appealed for dialogue with those Missions that had successfully opposed the resolution in the last two IAEA General Conferences (reftel). He confirmed that an AL Ministerial in early March would take the final decision on the INT resolution, and promised that the Arab Group in Vienna would have a broad mandate to negotiate text. That said, there was no indication the AL would withdraw the INT resolution singling out Israel, which many of the like-minded advised was unacceptable. The AL is frustrated with the old compromise (two agenda items one resolution); blamed Israel for the failure of the Middle East Forum and is not inclined to engage Israel directly. Al-Assad took under advisement suggestions for having one resolution on Middle East Safeguards that included elements of the INT. Whether it is in one resolution or two, and even if the language is less truculent, it is clear that the AL seeks in some way to highlight Israel's failure to accede to the NPT as a threat to Middle East security. End Summary. Arab League Appeals for Dialogue -------------- ¶2. (C) Canadian Mission invited like-minded Missions (EU-3, U.S., Australia, Japan, and Norway) to unofficial, working-level consultations February 21 with Arab League representative Wael Al-Assad, Director, Department of Multilateral Relations. His office has responsibility for the IAEA General Conference (GC) resolution on the Israeli Nuclear Threat (INT). Al-Assad came to Vienna to discuss the issue in advance of an early March Arab League Ministerial, which will hold a special session on the proposed GC resolution. Vienna-based Arab League Ambassador Wehbe accompanied Al-Assad, but the Arab Group in Vienna was notably absent. Algerian Ambassador Feroukhi, Chair of the Arab Group in Vienna, previously told Ambassador Schulte that the AL is exerting tremendous pressure on the Group, which it sees as ineffective, to do something substantive in the General Conference on this issue. ¶3. (C) Al-Assad characterized this issue as a priority for Middle East security and placed Arab League concerns in a historical context, noting efforts dating back 33 years to establish a Middle East WMD-free zone. He cited a 1995 AL decision for Arab states to accede to the NPT in the hopes of exerting international pressure on Israel to do the same, as well as subsequent NPT Prepcom debates and more than 100 resolutions in various international fora. Al-Assad relayed the frustration of AL states that felt taken for granted since signing the NPT. He noted that they are now being asked to undertake new commitments (i.e. the Additional Protocol) while Israel got away scot-free. (Note: Pressed on this point, Al-Assad said that Arab states were not "averse" to the AP and denied it was a negotiating card. End Note.) He observed that the last two General Conferences were a disappointment to the AL. The no-action motion that cut off debate on the INT at the 50th GC in 2006 was a surprise, and the outcome of the 51st GC with no resolution and no statement was "even worse." Arab League experts meeting last month recommended that the AL Ministerial special session in March give the Arab Group in Vienna a broad mandate to negotiate the INT resolution. ¶4. (C) Invoking a "new spirit of Cairo," Al-Assad appealed for dialogue and asked like-minded Ambassadors to negotiate the substance of the INT resolution, with specific objections, but not to rule out the resolution. There was "no way," he said, the AL would not request the inclusion of the INT on the GC agenda. He argued against direct linkage of the Middle East Safeguards and INT agenda items and noted that the GC in 1991 adopted both resolutions. Asked about the Middle East Forum, Al-Assad blamed Israel for setting impossible pre-conditions for discussing a WMD-free zone. He also saw no point to engage Israel directly and argued that international pressure must be brought to bear on Israel. Like-minded Hold Firm -------------- ¶5. (C) Canadian DCM Wood underlined the desire of the like-minded to move back to a consensus approach on Middle East issues in the GC and urged direct negotiations among the parties concerned. He also relayed concerns that there should not be spillover of the Middle East debate in the omnibus Safeguards and Technical Cooperation GC resolutions. He and other like-minded Missions argued that Vienna is not the place for political discussions more suited to the UNGA First Committee or the NPT Prepcom. French DCM Gross underscored the importance of the IAEA to France, and argued that Middle East issues should not be allowed to detract from the core technical work of the Agency. He also referred to the Egyptian government's letter to 46 member states that had "regrettably" abstained on the Middle East Safeguards resolution, and noted that the GOF had approached Cairo about reviving the Middle East Forum but had not received any positive signals. ¶6. (C) Australia proposed a consensus approach based on the old package coupling the Middle East and INT agenda items. However, Al-Assad argued that the old consensus had been unproductive; nothing had happened for so many years and it was time to push for a resolution. He also pointed out that the AL did not control the Middle East resolution, which Egypt chose to de-couple. Germany further pressed for a consensus approach, questioned whether two agenda items on the Middle East were needed and noted that the Arab group could not negotiate on the basis of fixed positions. Germany, Canada, Australia and Missionoff opposed any resolution that would negatively single out or "name and blame" Israel. Wood further urged flexibility and more constructive engagement. He clarified that the problems with the INT language extended beyond just the title of the resolution. Canada "did not want to see Israel backed into a corner on security matters." Al-Assad promised that the Arab group would be authorized to discuss the language of a resolution. He insisted that the INT resolution does not condemn Israel but simply calls upon Israel to join the NPT. ¶7. (C) Norwegian DCM Lundby noted that the vote on Middle East Safeguards resolution last year was due to the AL's insistence on the INT. He noted that the two rival resolutions on the Middle East could "get in the way of one another," and the Arab group is setting itself up for two "flops." Lundby suggested that it would be tactically smart to combine elements into a single resolution. The UK agreed it was not inconceivable to do so, though Egypt has been unwilling to negotiate the Middle East Safeguards resolution. Canada and the UK observed that the Egyptian resolution had less and less to do with safeguards but more with a WMD-free zone. Al-Assad inquired whether a single resolution would be more acceptable, the like-minded clarified that it depends on what the resolution says. ¶8. (C) Asked whether the Arab League had taken a formal decision to pursue the INT resolution, Al-Assad insisted that no decision would be taken until the March Ministerial. He assured Vienna Missions once again that the Arab Group would have flexibility and broad parameters to negotiate. France cautioned, however, that once the Arab Group requested a GC agenda item with the same title, this triggered a "rapport de force" that risked cutting off dialogue. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) This overture from the Arab League, though welcome, is clearly motivated by the debacles of the last two General Conferences. The Arab League is seeking a way to salvage the INT and while Al-Assad did not say so directly, one obvious way to negotiate the language of the INT resolution is to drop the word "threat." Arab Group Chair Feroukhi recently told Ambassador Schulte that she and other colleagues would support such a proposal though the group remains divided on this point. A similar resolution on "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities" is adopted annually with EU support in the UNGA First Committee. If this were proposed (whether in a standalone resolution on Israel or a combined Middle East resolution),it could split the EU in Vienna. ¶10. (C) However, given the last two victories in successive GCs, the like-minded are holding firm and do not want divisive Middle East debates once again to overshadow the work of this year's General Conference. Certainly, we all have an interest in averting another debacle and remain open to dialogue, but the AL does not seem willing to compromise on the key point of singling out Israel in some way. End Comment. SCHULTE