MONGOLIAN VIEWS REGARDING IRAQ DEPLOYMENTS

S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000043

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STATE FOR EAP/CM AND NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ MG
SUBJECT: MONGOLIAN VIEWS REGARDING IRAQ DEPLOYMENTS

REF: A. A) STATE 04865

B. B) 07 ULAANBAATAR 0681

Classified By: Ambassador Mark C. Minton for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA)
Tsogtbaatar told the DCM January 23 that President Enkhbayar,

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his boss, firmly supports Mongolia's continued presence,
stressing Mongolia is essentially in Iraq to support the U.S.
In general, Mongolians support such a presence, in
Tsogtbaatar's view, but the Government of Mongolia (GOM)

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prefers the cover of a UNSC resolution. Tsogtbaatar was
unsure whether June Parliamentary elections would change this
dynamic (ditto regarding U.S. elections),adding it was
unlikely the Parliament would consider changing existing
legal restrictions during an election year. He sought
additional background information on the Defense Cooperation
Agreement idea, welcomed this initial dialogue, and offered
suggestions for other consultations, END SUMMARY.


2. (S) The DCM met January 23 with Presidential Foreign
Policy Advisor (FPA) Tsogtbaatar to discuss ref A proposal
regarding post-2009 participation in coalition activities in
Iraq. Tsogtbaatar said he knew President Enkhbayar's view,
which was to support the U.S. in Iraq, but he could not speak
for the Prime Minister or the Speaker, the other two members
of Mongolia's National Security Council, nor the Cabinet. He
noted that this was an election year for both the U.S. and
Mongolia (for Parliament and local government this year) so
it was difficult to predict how the winners might respond as
far out as 2009 and beyond, and Mongolia will hold
presidential elections in 2009, though he predicted President
Enkhbayar would win that race. In general, he felt that both
Mongolia's ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as
well as the Democratic Party supported Mongolia's continued
presence in Iraq and that support among the Mongolian public
for a presence was generally strong. That said, Mongolia's
presence would also need to be considered within the context
of the participation of other coalition partners, he added.


3. (S) Turning to the framework under which Mongolia
participated, Tsogtbaatar underscored the importance of a UN
Security Council Resolution to provide the umbrella for
Mongolia's participation. He urged that some sort of "bare
bones" UNSC resolution be worked out and he mused that
Mongolia might co-sponsor such a resolution. He thought
participation under a U.S.-Iraq Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) would be problematic, reiterating ref B constraints on
Mongolia's forces (can't be used for combat outside
Mongolia's borders, limited participating under UNSC
resolutions, etc.),but he did not/not rule out such
participation. He said he was not familiar with U.S. DCAs
nor Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and he asked for some
background reading material on these topics.


4. (S) Tsogtbaatar was circumspect about prospects of
getting any kind of special legislation passed through
Parliament to circumvent existing restrictions, noting
Parliament and the GOM has a full plate already this election
year. He concluded by reiterating that it was his view that
this current government, which will last at least through the
June elections, would remain in Iraq through 2008 because it
supports the U.S. This initial exchange on post-2009 was
useful, in his view, and he suggested making discreet
approaches as well to the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy
Advisor, Mr. Jambaldorj (previously the Director General of
the Foreign Ministry's Americas, Middle East, and Africa
bureau) and the Foreign Ministry.


5. (S) The DATT's gleanings from his discussions with
Ministry of Defense officials revealed a somewhat more
tentative assessment of Mongolia's staying power in Iraq,
suggesting that Mongolia might rethink its current 100 troop
commitment should the Poles pull out, regardless of whether
another coalition force might replace the Poles. However,
MOD does not/not play a role in the political decision-making
process.


6. (S) COMMENT: Post's view is that the Mongolian
population largely supports a presence in Iraq and
understands, in general, that it is dangerous business,
although this support has not been tested to date by
casualties. In general, most Mongolian politicians either do
not recognize this popular support or see it as more tenuous.
Tsogtbaatar's boss, President Enkhbayar, has been constant
in his support for the U.S. (as Tsogt repeatedly underscored,
vice commitment to Iraqi freedom, stability, etc.). Clearly a
UNSC resolution affords the GOM the greatest political cover,
both domestically and with neighboring Russia and China.
Post concurs with Tsogt's assessment that seeking domestic
legislation this year to bypass existing limitations is
problematic both practically and politically and is dependent
on the outcome of June's Parliamentary elections. Post will
follow up with approaches to PM FPA Jambaldorj and MFA and
report the results of those discussions. Post would
appreciate receiving releasable DCA and SOFA background
briefing materials. END COMMENT.
MINTON