(C) MFA, GIA REPS SAY MONGOLIA WON'T DEPORT DPRK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ULAANBAATAR 000159 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE DEPT FOR EAP/CM, PRM/ANE AND INR/EAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: PREF SMIG PREL KMCA PHUM PINR MG SUBJECT: (C) MFA, GIA REPS SAY MONGOLIA WON'T DEPORT DPRK REFUGEES, BUT VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE OK; BOTH SUPPORT UN REFUGEE CONVENTION ACCESSION Classified By: Charge D'Affaires a.i. Brian L. Goldbeck for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Senior officials of Mongolia's General Intelligence Agency (GIA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),in separate early-April meetings, offered somewhat divergent views on a number of DPRK refugee-related issues, but both denied that the Mongolian Government has changed its policy toward refugees. GIA,s Chief of Counterintelligence (CI) says Mongolia has "permanently halted work" on a new shelter for DPRK refugees, while MFA,s Treaties and Laws (TL) Director General says construction work on the shelter has been "temporarily suspended," to avoid having the shelter become an issue in the June Parliamentary elections. Amid rumors that Mongolia is considering "sending" DPRK refugees with protracted cases back to China, the MFA rep said Mongolia has no such plans, adding that Mongolia would "have no right to send these people away." However, the GIA CI Chief told us that Mongolia is considering allowing four refugees who have spent long periods in Mongolia, and been rejected for resettlement by the USG and the ROK, to voluntarily return to China. Regarding the case of another DPRK refugee who was rejected by the USG and ROK, the GIA has backed away from its earlier commitment to allow her to stay in Mongolia. The MFA,s TL DG said the GOM wants the ROKG to reconsider the individual,s case. (The ROKG has reiterated that its decision on the case is final.) A number of informed sources say DPRK refugee arrivals have declined in recent months. The reasons for the decline are unclear, but some link it to a strengthening of border patrol activities by Chinese and Mongolian authorities near a few main border crossing points along their porous 4,677-km border. ¶2. (S) Senior officials from MFA and GIA confirmed, on April 10 and 7, respectively, that both of their organizations support Mongolia,s accession to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. The CI official also described a late-March disturbance at a GIA shelter that involved some 70 DPRK refugees and resulted in slight injuries to some guards. The GIA and MFA officials said they both expected progress on the ;DPRK-Mongolia labor agreement, which is intended to bring as many as 5,000 DPRK construction workers to Mongolia, but the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Construction both say the deal is stuck pending Parliamentary action to waive labor fees. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. CLARIFICATION SOUGHT ON DPRK REFUGEE CONCERNS RUMORS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) In late March and early April, post picked up a number of comments, tips and rumors that suggested Mongolia, or at least some parts of its government, might be adjusting Mongolia,s long-standing policy of &humanitarian treatment8 of DPRK refugees. Based on this information and the E/P Chief,s meetings with the local UNHCR rep, ROK Embassy DCM, and others, the DCM on April 4 spoke with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting Director General for the Americas, Middle East and Africa Bureau Mounkhou to underscore the USG,s appreciation for the GOM,s humanitarian treatment of DPRK refugees, and to signal concern about the issues described in paragraph one. Mounkhou said he understood the USG,s concerns, adding he would convey this to his superiors and to MFA,s Treaties and Laws Bureau, which handles the DPRK refugee issue. Post sought and gained separate meetings with senior officials in Mongolia,s General Intelligence Agency (GIA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The officials said Mongolia,s humanitarian refugee policy remains unchanged, but the two agencies provided somewhat differing views of specific issues related to DPRK refugees. GIA: &WILLING8 REFUGEES MIGHT GO BACK TO CHINA... -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) In an April 7 meeting with Econ/Pol Chief, GIA First ULAANBAATA 00000159 002 OF 005 Counterintelligence Division Chief Tsogtbaatar said Mongolia has no plans to force North Korean refugees to return to China, where they resided after leaving the DPRK and before reaching Mongolia. (Rumors to this effect were circulated by UNHCR,s Country Rep and the ROK Embassy,s DCM ) please protect both sources.) Tsogtbaatar did, however, say that Mongolia is considering allowing four refugees who have spent long periods in Mongolia and been rejected for resettlement by the USG and the ROK to voluntarily return to China. "We have to respect their wishes," Tsogtbaatar said. He said the Government of Mongolia (GOM) has four such refugees in mind, adding that they would not be "officially" returned, but that they would "go back the same way they came" (meaning crossing the border by foot). Tsogtbaatar said the ROK Government had refused to resettle the four because each had lived in China for more than 10 years. ... AND MFA SAYS, "WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO SEND THEM BACK" -------------- ¶4. (S) MFA Treaties and Laws Bureau Director General Altangerel told us on April 10 that Mongolia has no plans whatsoever to send DPRK refugees back to China. "These people don,t have documents, so China wouldn,t take them. And at any rate, we don,t have a right to send these people back," he said. "Mongolia is a party to many conventions, including the UN Convention on Torture. We have obligations, and we have no right to send these people away, and especially not to North Korea." Altangerel, who heads to Britain in mid-May to serve as Mongolia,s Ambassador, acknowledged that the GIA "might have another position" on this issue. We asked who would resolve a disagreement between the MFA and GIA on whether DPRK refugees should return, or be returned, to China. Altangerel evaded the question, stating merely that perhaps UNHCR could provide a solution. STRONG SUPPORT FOR REFUGEE CONVENTION -------------- ¶5. (SBU/NF) Tsogtbaatar and Altangerel both stated that the GIA and MFA are in agreement that Mongolia should accede to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. Altangerel said the Justice Ministry also supported the proposal. He added: "We're waiting for a National Security Council decision on this matter, but we don,t yet have a date for that meeting." (Note: At least two of the NSC,s three members are currently overseas. Prime Minister Bayar flew to Moscow on April 10. President Enkhbayar departed on April 9 for China and Hong Kong. End Note.) JOINT-SHELTER PAUSE: TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT? -------------- ¶6. (S) The GIA confirmed to post on March 28, and again in the April 7 meeting with GIA,s Tsogtbaatar, that the GOM had decided to "permanently halt" construction of a joint GIA/Mongolian Border Force shelter for DPRK refugees. The USG had provided partial funding, through UNHCR, for the shelter, which was intended to have between 100 and 120 beds, as well as a space for USG personnel to interview DPRK refugees seeking resettlement in the U.S. At the March 28 meeting, a senior GIA official said the decision to permanently halt the project had been made by the Cabinet, in the form of a resolution. On April 7, however, Tsogtbaatar said the decision had been made by Mongolia's NSC, which had issued &specific guidance8 to the GIA on this matter. MFA,s Altangerel, however, stated that work on the joint shelter has been stopped only temporarily, and only for political reasons. "The Government asked us to discontinue construction work on the shelter until after the (June 29 Parliamentary) elections," he said, adding that it is probable that this work will be resumed thereafter. Altangerel said leaders of a certain political party (presumably the ruling Mongolian People,s Revolutionary ULAANBAATA 00000159 003 OF 005 Party) are &very concerned8 that another political party might try to make the shelter an election issue, adding that the Government is "very sensitive" to this concern. "Many Mongolians fear a big influx of refugees from China," he said. "They might think shelters are a first step toward setting up refugee camps in Mongolia (for Chinese refugees)." DISTURBANCE AT GIA SHELTER -------------- ¶7. (S) Counterintelligence Chief Tsogtbaatar revealed that in late March, at an unidentified GIA shelter for DPRK refugees, there was a disturbance of some sort. Seventy or so refugees, some armed with knives, allegedly took part. Tsogotbaatar did not elaborate on the causes of the incident SIPDIS but surmised that its aim was to injure the shelter's guards, and that some guards in fact suffered slight injuries. He did not provide further details. In our meeting with MFA,s Altangerel, we did not ask about this incident, and he did not refer to it. BORDER TIGHTENED, FEWER DPRK ARRIVALS -------------- ¶8. (S) According to UNHCR, ROK Embassy, GIA and MFA sources, the number of new DPRK arrivals to Mongolia, for purposes of resettlement elsewhere, has declined in recent months. These sources provided differing statistics, but all cited a decrease. A senior Border Force official, quoted by a UNHCR source on March 28, said that on both sides of the Mongolia/China border, from the southeastern Mongolian city of Zamyn Uud to the easternmost tip of Mongolia, "the protection force is reinforced, and that is why fewer (DPRK) refugees are arriving." (Note: The Nalaikh Border Force shelter had 83 refugees when Post visited on February 5. By March 28, it had 60. End Note.) ¶9. (S) MFA,s Altangerel said on April 10 that although the numbers of DPRK arrivals were down, &personally, I think they will go back up.8 He said he was recently told by Border Force officials in the easternmost province of Dornod that they had "greatly improved border measures" there, and that as a result, "DPRK refugees are moving west." He said Dornod used to be the preferred point of entry, but that its adjacent neighbor to the west, Sukhbaatar province, has become more popular. He added that Mongolia was starting to see more arrivals in Dornogovi province, to the southwest of Sukhbaatar, and even in Govi-Altai province, far to the west. (Note: It is unclear exactly what is meant by a "tightening" or "reinforcing" of the Border Forces, given the thinness and limited capabilities of these forces along its 4,677-km border with China. End Note.) ¶10. (S) COMMENT: Post surmises that, beyond any "tightening" along Mongolia,s porous borders, there might be other explanations for the short-term decline in DPRK refugee arrivals, possibly including fewer DPRK refugees managing to leave the DPRK; fewer opting to uproot from China where they,ve lived in recent years; tighter movement controls and checks within China, making it more difficult to reach the Mongolian border; and a wait-and-see attitude regarding the new ROKG's attitudes toward refugees, to name a few. END COMMENT. GIA WALKS BACK DPRK REFUGEE PROMISE -------------- ¶11. (S) For years, the GOM has provided quality care to DPRK refugees seeking resettlement elsewhere (overwhelmingly in the ROK). In the case of DPRK refugee Kim Mi Ok (A97 052 982),the GIA informed the USG in late 2007 that Mongolia would allow her to stay, in the event that she was rejected by the USG. Kim, who had spent many years in China and was rejected by the ROK, was refused in March by DHS. In our March 28 meeting with the GIA, we reminded the GIA of the ULAANBAATA 00000159 004 OF 005 assurance it had given in her case, but the GIA said merely that no North Korean refugee would be allowed to stay permanently in Mongolia. (Note: Another possible interpretation is that the GIA official initially misspoke, making a precedent and new policy which was subsequently more carefully considered and then reversed. In any case, Kim has formally requested a DHS review of its refusal decision, and DHS has agreed to re-interview her. End Note.) Altangerel said on April 10 that he was familiar with Kim,s case, adding that the GOM was continuing to assess it. He said he could not understand why the ROK Government refused to accept Kim, given that Koreans from the North are considered citizens of the South. CONCERNS FOR MS. KIM'S SAFETY -------------- ¶12. (S) The GIA recently informed the USG that it was planning to move Kim, for safety reasons, from her modest hotel in central Ulaanbaatar to another facility outside of the capital. After we informed the GIA about DHS, plan to re-interview Kim, the agency indicated it would keep her at the hotel for the time being. GIA said its safety concerns stemmed from the fact that Kim's presence, as a North Korean woman, has become widely known in the neighborhood around the hotel. The GIA linked this threat to possible retaliatory action by DPRK authorities. In addition, Tsogtbaatar said the GIA is afraid that the DPRK Embassy might obtain documents or photos showing Mongolia helping North Koreans be resettled in other countries. He added that this could be considered a violation of the (Mongolia-DPRK) friendship agreement. DPRK-MONGOLIA LABOR AGREEMENT -------------- ¶13. (S) The senior MFA and GIA officials both commented separately on the joint labor agreement signed in Pyongyang on February 2; the deal is intended to bring as many as 5,000 DPRK construction workers (and perhaps 300 road and agricultural laborers) to Mongolia between 2008 and 2012. Altangerel said the MFA had long supported the agreement, which he said was good because it would reduce Mongolia,s reliance on Chinese labor. He said there had been some wrangling within the GOM over how to approve the agreement; Labor Minister Demberel, he said, didn,t understand that the agreement requires Parliamentary ratification. Once he understood that, Altangerel said, the agreement was submitted to Parliament. Although some &technical details8 of the agreement will have to be worked out, Altangerel said he was confident that the deal will move forward. (Note: Construction Minister Tsolmon informed the DCM on February 3 that the arrival of the DPRK laborers was on hold, pending Parliament's passage of legislation exempting them from the monthly labor fee. Tsolmon felt that this legislation was unlikely to be passed before late May or June, given the closeness of Parliamentary elections on June 29. End Note.) ¶14. (S) The GIA,s Tsogtbaatar said he believes that the labor deal will ultimately move forward, but noted that Mongolian law limits the number of foreign residents allowed in Mongolia at any given time, and said this might result in fewer than 5,000 DPRK laborers being allowed to enter Mongolia for work. (Note: Our reading of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens, Article 24.1, suggests that there would have to be 8,250 DPRK citizens in Mongolia before further arrivals from North Korea would be turned away. End Note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (S) The GIA,s policy of "we might let them leave for China voluntarily" articulates a new dimension to Mongolia,s long-standing policy voiced by MFA that Mongolia has & no right to send these people back to China.8 ULAANBAATA 00000159 005 OF 005 Basically, the GIA says we can,t make refugees stay; MFA says we can,t and won,t make refugees go. The GIA,s approach recognizes the refugees, right to choose whether to remain in Mongolia or depart (for China, the DPRK, or Sweden, for that matter, if they wish); UNHCR and the USG would caveat this to add provided their decision is freely made without influence or coercion. MFA,s approach says the GOM will not/not deport or compel the refugees to leave, and specifically not to China or the DPRK to an uncertain fate. ¶16. (S) We understand the GIA,s apparent frustration at not being able to place overseas a small number of DPRK refugees who have been rejected for resettlement, as well as its organizational frustration at being saddled with a difficult, thankless task with little in the way of recognition or rewards. Adding to that frustration is an often contentious and difficult DPRK refugee workload and now one willing to lash out in violence against its GIA protectors/guards. It is probable that some of the GIA,s angst is related to the dust-up at the shelter. Some of these refugees may see no hope of ever reaching the ROK or U.S. and conclude that a return to China would be better than languishing indefinitely at a Mongolian shelter. But that is a question for the refugees themselves to answer, and not the GIA on their behalf nor the GIA alone on behalf of the GOM. (We will encourage the UNHCR's UB office to identify the four in question and to ascertain their intentions.) It is unclear to us whether the MFA's apparent opposition to any such return, voluntary or otherwise, would prevent the GIA from acting independently. While the MFA has more pull with Mongolia,s top leadership, the GIA apparently has physical custody of the refugees in question, and as they say, possession is nine-tenths of the law. ¶17. (S) One thing that is not in doubt is that post has made the GOM keenly aware of USG,s continued interest and concern over the treatment of DPRK refugees. Since March 28, post has held talks on four occasions with GOM officials: On March 28, April 7 and April 10, Econ/Pol Chief met with (respectively) Deputy Chief Enkhsukh of the GIA,s First Counterintelligence Division; Enkhsukh,s superior, Tsogtbaatar; and MFA's Altangerel. On April 4, the DCM SIPDIS spoke with MFA,s Acting DG for the Americas, Mideast and Africa Bureau DG R. Mounkhou. We expect to apprise the Foreign Policy Advisors to the President and Prime Minister when they return to Mongolia next week. END COMMENT. GOLDBECK