EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA: GETTING AT THE ROOTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 000079 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO (GRAY),NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS) AND NEA/PPD (DOUGLAS) STATE ALSO FOR S/CT AMBASSADOR DAILEY NSC FOR RAMCHAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL SOCI PREL KPAO TS SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA: GETTING AT THE ROOTS REF: A. TUNIS 78 ¶B. 07 TUNIS 1068 Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) This is the second cable of a two part series on extremism in Tunisia; it addresses GOT efforts to combat rising extremism, what threat it represents, and how the USG should respond. The GOT regularly points out that it has been fighting terrorism since the 1980s and note it has invested heavily in the education, economic development and social programs that address the root causes of extremism. To date, these efforts have been largely successful, but observers, including the United States, argue that greater political liberalization is needed if a moderate and stable Tunisia is to persevere. All evidence indicates growing support for extremist ideologies among Tunisian youth; these views are the minority, but are likely to gain popularity if the status quo continues. Continued, multi-faceted US engagement with Tunisia will increase the country's prospects for long-run success. End Summary. -------------- GOT EFFORTS NOTEWORTHY... -------------- ¶2. (S) The GOT has always invested heavily in education, economic development and social programs. After banning the religious an-Nahdha (Renaissance) party, which allegedly was behind several terrorist attacks in the late 1980s and early 1990s, President Ben Ali continued to promote social and economic programs as the antidote to political Islam and terrorism (Ref B). He also expanded GOT control over religious institutions to ensure Tunisia's secular system was not threatened by radical clerics. (Comment. This has met mixed success, as some Tunisians now feel that the GOT religious engagement lacks credibility. End Comment.) ¶3. (S) While the country has witnessed strong economic growth (almost ten years of average five percent GDP growth),and illiteracy plummeted, today Tunisia continues to face high unemployment, particularly among educated youth. The GOT is actively expanding educational opportunities to give students, particularly in rural areas, access to local higher education and better future prospects. Employment remains a top GOT priority, but Ben Ali also announced a "comprehensive dialogue with youth" in 2008, in part to combat what many fear is the growing radicalization of Tunisian youth. Similarly, the government has an active campaign to promote tolerance and moderation through media, ruling party engagement and other public fora, including a new religious (and moderate) radio station. ¶4. (S) The GOT has also successfully combated domestic terrorism through security measures. Once a Minister of Interior, Ben Ali has employed Tunisia's police and gendarmerie to combat the spread of radical ideologies. Thousands of citizens have been detained, and hundreds convicted, under the 2003 anti-terrorism legislation. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) has also improved border security, particularly at airports, to prevent Tunisians from joining the Iraq foreign fighter pipeline. In the past year, the Ministry of Defense has sought to improve its own counterterrorism (CT) capacities, in support of the MOI. These efforts have prevented the successful execution of a terrorist act in Tunisia since the April 2002 al-Qaeda truck bombing at a Jewish synagogue on the southern island of Djerba. -------------- ...BUT NEED REFINEMENT -------------- ¶5. (S) Despite some tangible achievements, Ben Ali's counterterrorism efforts are increasingly criticized. While almost all Tunisians agree that the country's stability requires a tough stance against terrorists, some argue this is only a short-term solution to a broader problem. Some believe GOT security services are using collective punishment (e.g. targeting whole families or villages for crackdowns) to deter extremists, whereas an approach using engagement and dialogue would be more effective. One lawyer, explaining how TUNIS 00000079 002 OF 002 easy it seems to be to convince his "extremist" clients of the validity of a moderate interpretation of Islam, lamented that there was not more public dialogue on these issues. Civil society contacts, including former an-Nahdha leaders, believe that extremist ideologies would lose popularity if the majority of moderate Tunisians had the opportunity to discuss religion, violence and political opposition in public fora. ¶6. (S) In the face of domestic and international calls for political reform, the GOT continues to argue that it is pursuing a gradual strategy, since rapid democratic reform creates more extremism, rather than stability. (Comment. Most domestic advocates would give this approach a chance, but argue that the GOT's "gradual strategy" has actually been rolling back democratic freedoms. End comment.) Further, most officials prefer to argue that Tunisians are responding to foreign influences like al-Qaeda, pan-Arab satellite television, and conservative religious scholars from the Gulf, rather than any domestic factor. While there is little doubt that these factors have played a role in radicalizing Tunisians, it would be naive to ignore domestic factors. -------------- HOW CAN WE HELP? -------------- ¶7. (S) The USG has taken a multi-pronged approach to supporting GOT CT efforts. Public diplomacy efforts seek to combat extremism through engaging key public opinion influencers and target populations, especially youth outside the capital. We seek to expand economic, educational and civil society programs that promote moderation and dialogue. Additional resources for such programs as educational exchanges and broader US economic engagement would help. On the security side, USG support for and cooperation with security and military officials continues to expand -- but we can and should do more to help. Finally, USG officials continue to urge President Ben Ali and other key officials that political reform is another necessary component of any counterterrorism plan. While some Tunisians argue that the Ben Ali regime is incapable of change -- regardless of the threat -- USG officials must make the link between democracy and stability if we are ever to convince Ben Ali reform is in his own interest. All of these efforts by the USG could help Tunisia combat greater extremism in the long term, but the GOT can be a reluctant partner on issues it deems "sensitive." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (S) While many of the GOT's CT efforts are commendable, the continuing spread of violent Islamic extremism over the past year indicates that GOT countermeasures may not be adequate to address a changing reality on the ground. It remains unclear how much of the support for extremism is simple romanticization and how much could lead to actual terrorist activities. At this point, the threat seems to be largely contained. However, as long as the GOT fails to see the link between political liberalization and regime stability, it will lack the flexibility needed to respond over the long term. Unless Ben Ali and others can address this fundamental weakness in the GOT CT plan, the extremist threat is likely to continue to rise. End Comment. Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm GODEC