GOT DECISION-MAKING: CLEAR AS MUD

S E C R E T TUNIS 000063

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS AND HOPKINS)
NSC (RAMCHAND)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER ECON TS
SUBJECT: GOT DECISION-MAKING: CLEAR AS MUD

REF: 07 TUNIS 1489

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S/NF) As expected in a country with one leader for 20
years, key government decisions in Tunisia are made by
President Ben Ali. What is unusual is that few officials,
including the most senior, seem to know the process by which
Ben Ali makes decisions or who has influence over him.
Rumors and speculation are rife, but facts are few. As a
consequence, most officials in the GOT bureaucracy are
unwilling to take any independent action or offer any
substantive response on policy matters. Whether they are
simply cut out of policy making process, or deliberately
selected because of their natural reluctance to question the
system, it is no wonder the pace of reform in Tunisia is
glacial. The system limits Tunisia's ability to respond to
the country's own challenges and prevents the GOT from
engaging on the full range of bilateral issues. End Summary.

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THE BUCK STOPS HERE
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2. (S/NF) From speed bumps to employment, President Ben Ali
issues instructions for every government activity, as is
trumpeted daily in government-owned and private media.
Senior GOT officials may receive instructions from Ben Ali,
but they rarely sit in on Ben Ali's official meetings. In
bilateral discussions with US officials, the President is
only joined by an interpreter (usually Director of the
Tunisian External Communication Agency Oussama Romdhani) when
needed. By limiting access to information, Ben Ali maintains
exclusive control and makes the system opaque to prevent
others from influencing -- or questioning -- decision-making.
While the most powerful ministers (see below) may
acknowledge having engaged President Ben Ali personally about
a particular issue, or note there are "differing opinions" on
the speed of reform, most can only repeat generic policy
rhetoric from Ben Ali's speeches.


3. (S/NF) Although President Ben Ali conducts weekly Cabinet
meetings, most Tunisians believe that the "shadow cabinet" at
the Presidential Palace has the most influence on key
policies. This "shadow cabinet" includes approximately 20
presidential advisors with portfolios that sometimes mirror
state ministries (e.g., Education, Social Affairs) and others
who are only identified as "Presidential Attaches." In fact,
the Presidency seems to be organized somewhat like an
expanded US National Security Council. Minister of State
Abdelaziz Ben Dhia acts as the National Security
Advisor-equivalent and is widely believed to be the most
influential official in Tunisia. The rest of the officials
who staff the presidency seem to direct and coordinate policy
decisions more than influence actual decision-making.


4. (S/NF) Senior ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD)
party officials, particularly key party activists from the
Bourguiba era such as RCD Vice President Hamad Karoui, also
seem to have some direct influence on presidential decisions.
However, some observers believe Karoui and others of his
generation have more symbolic influence than actual leverage
on the President. Further, Presidency and RCD officials'
interactions with Ben Ali are largely hidden from the public
eye, so rumors abound about who is influential and why
officials are appointed or removed. Many Tunisians fear
that, behind the palace walls, Ben Ali's wife Leila is
exerting insidious influence on government policies. Rumors
abound that Leila is using her position to obtain favors,
particularly related to business matters, for her extended
Trabelsi clan. Ben Ali's second wife is widely despised in
Tunisia as a usurper, and many fear that her influence on Ben
Ali may be part of a grander scheme to become president
herself one day (reftel).

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THE SOVEREIGN FEW
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5. (S/NF) Outside of the President's inner circle, there are
five "sovereign" ministries (Prime Ministry, Interior,
Defense, Foreign Affairs and Justice) that technically report
directly to the President. However, only three -- Prime
Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, Foreign Minister Abdelwaheb
Abdallah, and Minister of Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem --
appear to have regular access to President Ben Ali. Justice
and Defense officially report to the President, but seem to
have more limited access and mandates. PM Ghannouchi, a
technocrat who manages the affairs of the 21 remaining
"technical" ministries, meets regularly with Ben Ali to
report on GOT achievements and receive instructions about new
policies. It is unclear how detailed these meetings are, but
few believe that Ben Ali has the vision or knowledge to
direct technical affairs. Rather, Ghannouchi is almost
universally respected for his savvy management of government
affairs and most believe he is personally responsible for
Tunisia's sustained economic growth and development. His
long history of government service (Ben Ali selected him for
Prime Minister in 1999 and has kept him through numerous
cabinet reshuffles) is indicative of Ghannouchi's success.


6. (S/NF) In comparison, the Foreign Minister and Interior
Minister both joined the cabinet relatively recently (2005
and 2004, respectively) after long stints as presidential
advisors in Carthage. As the President was once Minister of
Interior himself and is often derided as a uneducated
policeman, most Tunisians believe Ben Ali personally approves
all matters of state security. However, Minister of Interior
Belhaj Kacem makes little reference to Ben Ali and it has
been our observation that the most powerful officials are
those who invoke Ben Ali the least. Unsurprisingly, the
Minister and his ministry are the most opaque in Tunisia and,
while many rumors exist, those in the know are silent about
the internal decision-making process. More broadly, however,
Tunisians fear of the MOI's reach leads many to believe that
the majority of decisions are influenced by the security
services.


7. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Abdallah is the most vocal about
his interactions with President Ben Ali and often shares with
us that he has consulted with the President, or been advised
by the President, regarding a particular issue. For example,
days before his June 2007 visit to Washington, Abdallah told
the Ambassador that he had yet to discuss with Ben Ali the
priorities for the visit -- and therefore could not tell the
Ambassador on what he hoped to focus. Abdallah, who has
worked closely with Ben Ali since the early 1980s, seems to
enjoy a wide mandate domestically and is believed to be
personally responsible for imposing the increasingly stifling
controls at the MFA (septel). However, there is little to
indicate he has significant influence over foreign policy
direction. Inside the Ministry, Abdallah has surrounded
himself with a few key staff members, leaving most career
officials in the dark about policy decisions.

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ADRIFT ON THE SHIP OF STATE
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8. (S/NF) Beyond the sovereign three, most Tunisian officials
seem to be combing Ben Ali's speeches for clues on what
policy direction they should take. In meetings, the timid
regurgitate Ben Ali's words rather than offer substantive
policy information. As Ben Ali's speeches seem to be
prepared in the Presidential Palace, GOT officials are often
scrambling to bring laws or policies into compliance with Ben
Ali's announcements. One Prime Ministry official -- a quasi
GOT-wide staff assistant -- maintains a database of all Ben
Ali guidance in speeches, directives and meetings, which
serves as reference of official policies and ensures laws and
regulations comply with Ben Ali's announcements.


9. (S/NF) The 22 non-sovereign ministers, who report directly
to the Prime Minister, may launch new initiatives that are in
accordance with presidential directives. Thus, a few
officials take Ben Ali's public statements as direct policy
guidance and take action accordingly. One senior economic
official explained, "President Ben Ali announced in a speech
that the protection of international property rights was a
priority. Then I received a Presidential medal. So I knew
that I had the authority to create legislation that was in
accordance with the President's speech." However, some
officials believe that the safest course is taking no action.
One private sector contact lamented that Tunisia has "real
ministers" who are competent technocrats, but do not feel
empowered to take independent decisions.

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COMMENT
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10. (S/NF) Bureaucratic paralysis may be one way the regime
maintains control over the country. If officials lack
empowerment, nothing can happen without high-level approval.
But the system has become increasingly catatonic, and
Tunisians note that the GOT is undertaking little relevant
reform. Similarly, the system limits Tunisia's ability to
engage on the full range of bilateral issues with the USG.
While many officials tell us Ben Ali has a "plan" for
political reform, no one has ever indicated they have even a
vague idea of what this plan entails. Prime Minister
Ghannouchi has successfully maintained steady economic growth
over the past decade, but there are indications Tunisia's
top-down system is struggling to adjust to a globalized
world. Worse, those who realize that Tunisia must move
faster to respond to the growing pressures of unemployment
and extremism seem unable to effect real change. While these
pressures build gradually, it is unclear how destabilizing
any real shock -- like the death of President Ben Ali -- to
the system would be. End Comment.

Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
GODEC