SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO TUNISIA

S E C R E T TUNIS 000170 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NEA/FO FOR A/S WELCH, HARRINGTON AND POPAL; NEA/MAG FOR HOPKINS AND HARRIS; NSC FOR YERGER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER OVIP TS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO TUNISIA REF: A. TUNIS 79 ¶B. TUNIS 78 ¶C. TUNIS 75 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Embassy Tunis warmly welcomes NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch to Tunis next week. Your visit takes SIPDIS place in the context of a generally positive bilateral relationship, and Foreign Minister Abdallah has told us that he very much looks forward to welcoming you. You will be arriving on the heels of the mid-February visit of S/CT Ambassador-at-Large Dell Dailey and the late February visit of Rep. Bud Cramer; and just ahead of the mid-March session of the US-Tunisian Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council. Your visit presents an important opportunity to press the Tunisians to be more forward leaning on regional challenges, follow up on some of the concrete CT cooperation issues raised during Amb. Daily's meetings, and to seek further assurances on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees. With Tunisia's 2009 presidential and legislative elections in mind, it is also important that you raise the need for democratic reform. End Summary. -------------- Regional/Foreign Relations Issues -------------- ¶2. (S) Tunisia has long played a moderating role on regional issues (including Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Although the GOT has limited influence on these issues, it is generally supportive of US goals. For example, the GOT publicly praised President Bush's recent visit to the region and US efforts to promote Middle East peace, and Foreign Minister Abdallah played a constructive role at Annapolis. Tunisia participates in a variety of regional fora, such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, and has no concerns about Israeli participation in the dialogue. To its credit, the GOT still maintains quiet backchannel relations with Israeli officials and hosts a number of Israeli visitors to an annual Jewish pilgrimage to southern Tunisia. That said, FM Abdallah emphasized the difficulties the GOT would face in any outreach to Israel when recently asked to be more forward leaning. It will be important that you press this issue directly with President Ben Ali and with the Foreign Minister. ¶3. (C) Other pending matters on which the GOT has thus far been non-committal where your engagement might help make the difference include recognition of Kosovo and the candidacy of Ambassador Bill Swing as Executive Director for the International Organization for Migration. On the former, we predict that Tunisia will eventually recognize Kosovo, but only after a critical mass of other Arab and Muslim states have done so. Therefore, any signals that you can give of upcoming moves to recognize Kosovo will help lay the groundwork for Tunisia to follow suit. On the candidacy of Ambassador Swing, we would note that Abdallah seemed receptive, yet he ultimately remained non-committal. A personal appeal to him could seal the deal. -------------- CT Follow Up -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOT shares our concern about the spread of terrorism, although we sometimes differ on its definition and how to combat it. Unlike other countries in the region, Tunisia has applied a holistic approach to combating terrorism. The GOT has invested heavily in education, social programs and economic development in order to combat the ignorance and despair that may lead some to terrorism. GOT security forces also actively combat terrorism by monitoring citizens closely, controlling all mosques and imams, maintaining strict financial controls and banning religious political parties -- to the extent of being a police state. You can expect that your interlocutors will spend a fair amount of time taking credit for the success of these policies: the GOT has successfully prevented the execution of any terrorist acts in Tunisia since the April 2002 al-Qaeda truck bombing at a Jewish synagogue on the southern island of Djerba, in which 20 victims were killed. ¶5. (S) However, we believe support for extremist ideologies is spreading in Tunisia, and the GOT does not appear to have a workable long-term plan for success (Refs A and B). In December 2006/January 2007, the GOT announced the disruption of a domestic terrorist cell, whose targets allegedly included the US and UK Embassies and diplomats in Tunisia (Ref C). In December 2007, thirty were convicted of involvement in this cell (sentences ranged from the death penalty to five years); some of these sentences were reduced on appeal. Additionally, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Tunisians, particularly young men, have been detained since late 2006 under the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Many were planning to join the Iraq foreign fighter pipeline or detained in and extradited by countries along the way (e.g., Algeria, Syria). The GOT tried more than 100 individuals in 2007 and convicted the vast majority of crimes such as belonging to a terrorist or illegal organization, gathering money for terrorist activities, attempting to engage in "jihad" in Iraq and other terrorist actions. ¶6. (S) Although the Tunisian leadership acknowledges that domestic factors, like the high unemployment rate among young university graduates, can encourage extremism, they tend to emphasize the regional nature of the terrorist threat. It has taken real steps to disrupt the foreign fighter pipeline, including by improving air and land border control measures. Tunisian officials will likely take advantage of your visit to emphasize the difficulty of effectively controlling Tunisia's borders with Algeria and Libya. In this context, they may express disappointment that the Administration's FY2008 and FY2009 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request for Tunisia declined significantly at a time when the military needed to strengthen its CT abilities. We have emphasized to FM Abdallah and DefMin Morjane that we will continue to look for creative ways to identify other funding opportunities to increase assistance to Tunisia. In this regard, the Tunisians are aware of our pending FY 2008 Section 1206 request for $10 million worth of equipment (i.e., for ground surveillance radar and night vision goggles). This would effectively double our military assistance this year. -------------- Guantanamo -------------- ¶7. (S) Tunisia accepted the transfer of two Tunisians from Guantanamo in June, 2007. Following public allegations that the transferees were subject to "torture," Ambassador Godec had a series of meetings with GOT officials in which he inquired about the status of the transferees and pressed GOT officials for renewed assurances about their treatment. The officials denied allegations of torture and repeated earlier commitments. In private conversations with us, the Tunisian lawyer who represents both for the two transferees told us that one (Abdallah Ben Omar) had been mistreated (slapped) and threatened (that he and his family members would be raped),but that he had not been "tortured." The lawyer said the other detainee (Lotfi Lagha) had not been mistreated, although he was reportedly held in solitary confinement for weeks after his transfer. Without having had the opportunity to speak to or examine Ben Omar ourselves, it is our assessment that claims of his mistreatment are credible. At this juncture, we believe the only option to obtain "better" assurances is to raise the issue directly with President Ben Ali. However, even Presidential assurances may not ensure future transfers do not result in allegations of torture. -------------- Political Reform -------------- ¶8. (S) Since the launch of the President Bush's Freedom Agenda, despite significant public and private USG efforts, Tunisia has made little tangible progress toward sustained political reform. Embassy Tunis has long focused our efforts on working to promote freedom of expression and freedom of association. In the past year, we saw some significant steps forward, including the release of jailed dissident Mohamed Abbou; the granting of permits to publish two new publications -- a weekly opposition party newspaper and an independent weekly magazine; and the de facto removal of "depot legal," or "prior review" for bound publications. But heavy-handed repression, often at the hands of the security forces, continues apace. The GOT continues to control political life; several activists have complained of harassment; others have been denied permission to travel internationally. ¶9. (C) With the 2009 elections looming, there have been calls from various Tunisian groups for Ben Ali to present his candidacy. (Note: There is even a banner hanging from the facade of the Foreign Ministry.) President Ben Ali has given some indications to US officials that suggest he is open to greater political liberalization, even suggesting that he wants to weaken the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party and allow the opposition to strengthen. Our take on these statements, though, is that Ben Ali was referring to the loyal opposition, some of whom will likely endorse his candidacy. It is critical that you take up with your Tunisian interlocutors the importance of helping to create a more level and transparent playing field -- for all parties -- in the run-up to 2009. -------------- Economic Engagement -------------- ¶10. (C) The past year has seen a considerable increase in economic engagement, from last fall's economic delegation led by EEB P/DAS Dibble, to the first nationally based US business delegation to visit Tunisia in 15 years. This activity will culminate in a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council in Tunisia March 10-11. The GOT has appreciated the Embassy's focus on economic engagement, and your interlocutors, or at least one of them, Minister of Development and International Cooperation Nouri Jouini will likely make a pitch for increased US investment. To help tee up the TIFA Council, it would be helpful for you to underscore the importance that US investors -- not just the USG -- attach to economic reform, particularly in the areas of market access, transparency, and intellectual property rights. -------------- Key Themes -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) You may wish to draw from the following themes with GOT officials: -- Regional/Foreign Relations Issues: Both President Ben Ali and FM Abdallah will welcome a read-out on the status of key challenges across the region. Express appreciation the moderating role that Tunisia plays, citing the MFA statement on POTUS visit to the Middle East. Press for more concrete manifestations of Tunisian support with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and recognition of Kosovo. -- Security Cooperation: Emphasize that our two countries share common values, which are reflected in a common stand against terrorism and extremism. Reiterate message that we expect increased cooperation on counterterrorism -- specifically, more, better, and faster information exchange (including on a specific case about which you will be briefed at Post). Drawing implied linkage to preceding, note that the USG is ready to provide greater CT assistance, training and cooperation. While acknowledging Tunisian disappointment over projected FMF cuts, make clear that we will seek opportunities for other funding, as appropriate. -- Political Reform/Extremism Nexus: Express concern that lack of political space can have adverse consequences, i.e., contribute to the perception that violent extremism is the only way to express opposition to government policies. The run-up to the 2009 elections is a key opportunity to build on President Ben Ali's own statements by encouraging specific actions to promote freedom of expression and association. -- Economic Engagement: Note that Tunisia deserves credit for its social and economic progress. Express that we share the desire to see increased trade and investment. Advise the Tunisians to use the upcoming TIFA council to advance the kinds of economic reforms (e.g., permitting franchising) that will attract more US companies. -- Bottom Line: If Tunisia is prepared to do more on key issues of concern to the United States, e.g., regional challenges and/or political liberalization, we are prepared to look for other ways to deepen our engagement. Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm GODEC