SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO TUNISIA

S E C R E T TUNIS 000170

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NEA/FO FOR A/S WELCH, HARRINGTON AND POPAL;
NEA/MAG FOR HOPKINS AND HARRIS; NSC FOR YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER OVIP TS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S WELCH'S VISIT TO TUNISIA

REF: A. TUNIS 79

B. TUNIS 78

C. TUNIS 75 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) Embassy Tunis warmly welcomes NEA Assistant
Secretary David Welch to Tunis next week. Your visit takes

SIPDIS
place in the context of a generally positive bilateral
relationship, and Foreign Minister Abdallah has told us that
he very much looks forward to welcoming you. You will be
arriving on the heels of the mid-February visit of S/CT
Ambassador-at-Large Dell Dailey and the late February visit
of Rep. Bud Cramer; and just ahead of the mid-March session
of the US-Tunisian Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA) Council. Your visit presents an important opportunity
to press the Tunisians to be more forward leaning on regional
challenges, follow up on some of the concrete CT cooperation
issues raised during Amb. Daily's meetings, and to seek
further assurances on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees.
With Tunisia's 2009 presidential and legislative elections in
mind, it is also important that you raise the need for
democratic reform. End Summary.

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Regional/Foreign Relations Issues
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2. (S) Tunisia has long played a moderating role on regional
issues (including Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict). Although the GOT has limited influence on these
issues, it is generally supportive of US goals. For example,
the GOT publicly praised President Bush's recent visit to the
region and US efforts to promote Middle East peace, and
Foreign Minister Abdallah played a constructive role at
Annapolis. Tunisia participates in a variety of regional
fora, such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, and
has no concerns about Israeli participation in the dialogue.
To its credit, the GOT still maintains quiet backchannel
relations with Israeli officials and hosts a number of
Israeli visitors to an annual Jewish pilgrimage to southern
Tunisia. That said, FM Abdallah emphasized the difficulties
the GOT would face in any outreach to Israel when recently
asked to be more forward leaning. It will be important that
you press this issue directly with President Ben Ali and with
the Foreign Minister.


3. (C) Other pending matters on which the GOT has thus far
been non-committal where your engagement might help make the
difference include recognition of Kosovo and the candidacy of
Ambassador Bill Swing as Executive Director for the
International Organization for Migration. On the former, we
predict that Tunisia will eventually recognize Kosovo, but
only after a critical mass of other Arab and Muslim states
have done so. Therefore, any signals that you can give of
upcoming moves to recognize Kosovo will help lay the
groundwork for Tunisia to follow suit. On the candidacy of
Ambassador Swing, we would note that Abdallah seemed
receptive, yet he ultimately remained non-committal. A
personal appeal to him could seal the deal.

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CT Follow Up
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4. (C) The GOT shares our concern about the spread of
terrorism, although we sometimes differ on its definition and
how to combat it. Unlike other countries in the region,
Tunisia has applied a holistic approach to combating
terrorism. The GOT has invested heavily in education, social
programs and economic development in order to combat the
ignorance and despair that may lead some to terrorism. GOT
security forces also actively combat terrorism by monitoring
citizens closely, controlling all mosques and imams,
maintaining strict financial controls and banning religious
political parties -- to the extent of being a police state.
You can expect that your interlocutors will spend a fair
amount of time taking credit for the success of these
policies: the GOT has successfully prevented the execution of
any terrorist acts in Tunisia since the April 2002 al-Qaeda
truck bombing at a Jewish synagogue on the southern island of
Djerba, in which 20 victims were killed.


5. (S) However, we believe support for extremist ideologies
is spreading in Tunisia, and the GOT does not appear to have
a workable long-term plan for success (Refs A and B). In
December 2006/January 2007, the GOT announced the disruption
of a domestic terrorist cell, whose targets allegedly
included the US and UK Embassies and diplomats in Tunisia
(Ref C). In December 2007, thirty were convicted of
involvement in this cell (sentences ranged from the death
penalty to five years); some of these sentences were reduced
on appeal. Additionally, hundreds and perhaps thousands of
Tunisians, particularly young men, have been detained since
late 2006 under the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Many were
planning to join the Iraq foreign fighter pipeline or
detained in and extradited by countries along the way (e.g.,
Algeria, Syria). The GOT tried more than 100 individuals in
2007 and convicted the vast majority of crimes such as
belonging to a terrorist or illegal organization, gathering
money for terrorist activities, attempting to engage in
"jihad" in Iraq and other terrorist actions.


6. (S) Although the Tunisian leadership acknowledges that
domestic factors, like the high unemployment rate among young
university graduates, can encourage extremism, they tend to
emphasize the regional nature of the terrorist threat. It
has taken real steps to disrupt the foreign fighter pipeline,
including by improving air and land border control measures.
Tunisian officials will likely take advantage of your visit
to emphasize the difficulty of effectively controlling
Tunisia's borders with Algeria and Libya. In this context,
they may express disappointment that the Administration's
FY2008 and FY2009 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request
for Tunisia declined significantly at a time when the
military needed to strengthen its CT abilities. We have
emphasized to FM Abdallah and DefMin Morjane that we will
continue to look for creative ways to identify other funding
opportunities to increase assistance to Tunisia. In this
regard, the Tunisians are aware of our pending FY 2008
Section 1206 request for $10 million worth of equipment
(i.e., for ground surveillance radar and night vision
goggles). This would effectively double our military
assistance this year.

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Guantanamo
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7. (S) Tunisia accepted the transfer of two Tunisians from
Guantanamo in June, 2007. Following public allegations that
the transferees were subject to "torture," Ambassador Godec
had a series of meetings with GOT officials in which he
inquired about the status of the transferees and pressed GOT
officials for renewed assurances about their treatment. The
officials denied allegations of torture and repeated earlier
commitments. In private conversations with us, the Tunisian
lawyer who represents both for the two transferees told us
that one (Abdallah Ben Omar) had been mistreated (slapped)
and threatened (that he and his family members would be
raped),but that he had not been "tortured." The lawyer said
the other detainee (Lotfi Lagha) had not been mistreated,
although he was reportedly held in solitary confinement for
weeks after his transfer. Without having had the opportunity
to speak to or examine Ben Omar ourselves, it is our
assessment that claims of his mistreatment are credible. At
this juncture, we believe the only option to obtain "better"
assurances is to raise the issue directly with President Ben
Ali. However, even Presidential assurances may not ensure
future transfers
do not result in allegations of torture.

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Political Reform
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8. (S) Since the launch of the President Bush's Freedom
Agenda, despite significant public and private USG efforts,
Tunisia has made little tangible progress toward sustained
political reform. Embassy Tunis has long focused our efforts
on working to promote freedom of expression and freedom of
association. In the past year, we saw some significant steps
forward, including the release of jailed dissident Mohamed
Abbou; the granting of permits to publish two new
publications -- a weekly opposition party newspaper and an
independent weekly magazine; and the de facto removal of
"depot legal," or "prior review" for bound publications. But
heavy-handed repression, often at the hands of the security
forces, continues apace. The GOT continues to control
political life; several activists have complained of
harassment; others have been denied permission to travel
internationally.


9. (C) With the 2009 elections looming, there have been calls
from various Tunisian groups for Ben Ali to present his
candidacy. (Note: There is even a banner hanging from the
facade of the Foreign Ministry.) President Ben Ali has given
some indications to US officials that suggest he is open to
greater political liberalization, even suggesting that he
wants to weaken the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally
(RCD) party and allow the opposition to strengthen. Our take
on these statements, though, is that Ben Ali was referring to
the loyal opposition, some of whom will likely endorse his
candidacy. It is critical that you take up with your
Tunisian interlocutors the importance of helping to create a
more level and transparent playing field -- for all parties
-- in the run-up to 2009.

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Economic Engagement
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10. (C) The past year has seen a considerable increase in
economic engagement, from last fall's economic delegation led
by EEB P/DAS Dibble, to the first nationally based US
business delegation to visit Tunisia in 15 years. This
activity will culminate in a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) Council in Tunisia March 10-11. The GOT has
appreciated the Embassy's focus on economic engagement, and
your interlocutors, or at least one of them, Minister of
Development and International Cooperation Nouri Jouini will
likely make a pitch for increased US investment. To help tee
up the TIFA Council, it would be helpful for you to
underscore the importance that US investors -- not just the
USG -- attach to economic reform, particularly in the areas
of market access, transparency, and intellectual property
rights.

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Key Themes
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11. (S/NF) You may wish to draw from the following themes
with GOT officials:

-- Regional/Foreign Relations Issues: Both President Ben Ali
and FM Abdallah will welcome a read-out on the status of key
challenges across the region. Express appreciation the
moderating role that Tunisia plays, citing the MFA statement
on POTUS visit to the Middle East. Press for more concrete
manifestations of Tunisian support with respect to the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process and recognition of Kosovo.

-- Security Cooperation: Emphasize that our two countries
share common values, which are reflected in a common stand
against terrorism and extremism. Reiterate message that we
expect increased cooperation on counterterrorism --
specifically, more, better, and faster information exchange
(including on a specific case about which you will be briefed
at Post). Drawing implied linkage to preceding, note that
the USG is ready to provide greater CT assistance, training
and cooperation. While acknowledging Tunisian disappointment
over projected FMF cuts, make clear that we will seek
opportunities for other funding, as appropriate.

-- Political Reform/Extremism Nexus: Express concern that
lack of political space can have adverse consequences, i.e.,
contribute to the perception that violent extremism is the
only way to express opposition to government policies. The
run-up to the 2009 elections is a key opportunity to build on
President Ben Ali's own statements by encouraging specific
actions to promote freedom of expression and association.

-- Economic Engagement: Note that Tunisia deserves credit
for its social and economic progress. Express that we share
the desire to see increased trade and investment. Advise the
Tunisians to use the upcoming TIFA council to advance the
kinds of economic reforms (e.g., permitting franchising) that
will attract more US companies.

-- Bottom Line: If Tunisia is prepared to do more on key
issues of concern to the United States, e.g., regional
challenges and/or political liberalization, we are prepared
to look for other ways to deepen our engagement.


Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
GODEC