SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF S/CT AMBASSADOR DAILEY

S E C R E T TUNIS 000104 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT (DAILEY, INGALLS, WORMAN),NEA/FO (GRAY) AND NEA/MAG (HOPKINS AND HARRIS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL TS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF S/CT AMBASSADOR DAILEY REF: A. TUNIS 79 ¶B. TUNIS 78 ¶C. TUNIS 75 AND PREVIOUS ¶D. TUNIS 9 Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Embassy Tunis warmly welcomes S/CT Ambassador Dell Dailey, NEA DAS Gordon Gray and accompanying delegation to Tunis from February 10-12, 2008. Your visit takes place in the context of a generally positive bilateral relationship. While cooperation with military and intelligence services is growing, the Government of Tunisia (GOT) can and should do more to improve counter-terrorism cooperation. GOT officials will tell you that Tunisia shares USG concerns about Islamic extremism and is committed to addressing the root causes of terrorism. However, the regime is inherently controlling and officials are generally reticent about information sharing. Your visit presents an opportunity to press the GOT for greater cooperation and discuss opportunities for USG assistance. End Summary. -------------- Overview -------------- ¶2. (C) Tunisia proudly -- and justifiably -- calls itself a "country that works." Despite Tunisia's relatively small economy (2006 real GDP was about $25.5 billion) and lack of natural resources, the Tunisian government has proven itself capable of providing basic education, health care, housing and a workable infrastructure to its population. Tunisia has the most diversified economy in the region and enjoys one of the highest standards of living on the continent. However, the political system is dominated by a single party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD),and political liberties -- specifically freedom of expression and association -- remain tightly controlled. ¶3. (C) Internationally, Tunisia plays a moderating role on regional issues (including Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Although the GOT is not a major player on these issues, it is generally supportive of US goals. For example, the GOT publicly praised President Bush's recent visit to the region and US efforts to promote Middle East peace. Tunisia participates in a variety of regional fora, such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, and has no concerns about Israeli participation in the same. To its credit, the GOT still maintains quiet backchannel relations with Israeli officials and hosts a number of Israeli visitors to an annual Jewish pilgrimage to southern Tunisia. Further afield, Tunisia's military has participated to a limited extent in a number of UN-led peacekeeping operations, including in the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea. -------------- CT Success on the Wane? -------------- ¶4. (C) Tunisia, led by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali since his 1987 palace coup, has long stressed the dangers of terrorism, including in international fora. The GOT strongly shares our concern about the spread of terrorism, although we sometimes differ on its definition, whom to label a terrorist, and how to combat it. Unlike other countries in the region, Tunisia has applied a holistic approach to combating terrorism. The GOT has invested heavily in education, social programs and economic development in order to combat the ignorance and despair that may lead some to terrorism. GOT security forces also actively combat terrorism by monitoring citizens closely, controlling all mosques and imams, maintaining strict financial controls and banning religious political parties -- to the extent of being a police state. The GOT has successfully prevented the execution of any terrorist acts in Tunisia since the April 2002 al-Qaeda truck bombing at a Jewish synagogue on the southern island of Djerba, in which 20 victims were killed. ¶5. (S) However, support for extremist ideologies is spreading in Tunisia, and the GOT does not appear to have a workable long-term plan for success (Refs A and B). In December 2006/January 2007, the GOT announced the disruption of a domestic terrorist cell, whose targets allegedly included the US and UK Embassies and personnel in Tunisia (Ref C). In December 2007, thirty were convicted of involvement in this cell (sentences ranged from the death penalty to five years); their appeal is scheduled to be heard on February 8. Additionally, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Tunisians, particularly young men, have been detained since late 2006 under the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Many were planning to join the Iraq foreign fighter pipeline or detained in and extradited by countries along the way (e.g. Algeria, Syria). The GOT tried more than 100 individuals in 2007 and convicted the vast majority of crimes such as belonging to a terrorist or illegal organization, gathering money for terrorist activities, attempting to engage in "jihad" in Iraq and other terrorist actions. -------------- Regional -- and Internal -- Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (S) Although it tends to dismiss the domestic causes of terrorism, the GOT is rightly concerned about the regional nature of the terrorist threat. It has taken real steps to disrupt the foreign fighter pipeline, including by improving air and land border control measures. Tunisian officials will stress their concern about effectively controlling Tunisia's borders with Algeria and Libya. The terrain presents many difficulties, from patrolling the forested northwest mountain regions to effectively controlling the remote desert regions in the south. The GOT does complain about cross-border CT cooperation with its neighbors, although it remains unclear how much coordination occurs, both at the tactical and official level. For example, GOT officials have shared no details about recent reports that the Arab Maghreb Union plans to expand CT cooperation. ¶7. (S) The internal relationship between various GOT CT elements is more troubling. Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has primary responsibility for Tunisia's CT efforts and is the least transparent about its activities. Even inside the MOI information appears to be strictly compartmentalized. The more forthcoming Ministry of Defense (MOD) plays a secondary role in support of MOI efforts and lacks much of the critical intelligence information that drives MOI CT activities. This disconnect between the two agencies prevents the GOT from applying an interagency approach that would make better use of all of its CT resources. While there are indications the two ministries may have worked more closely together over the past year, there is little evidence that a truly integrated CT approach will be applied. -------------- The Role of the US -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) The GOT participates in a handful of active counter-terrorism training/exercise programs with a variety of US agencies and expresses interest in greater cooperation. Officials were disappointed that the Administration's FY2008 and FY2009 foreign assistance request for Tunisia (particularly Foreign Military Financing) declined significantly at a time when the military needed to strengthen their CT abilities. Conversely, the GOT at times refuses or does not respond to our offers of assistance (e.g. in 2006, the GOT effectively declined to participate in State's ATA program). GOT interlocutors sometimes complain that USG programs are not appropriate for Tunisia's needs or resources. ¶9. (S/NF) The USG tries to tailor our offers to specific GOT needs, but in exchange we expect better cooperation from the GOT. For example, the GOT should have been more forthcming about the Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007 thwarted terrrist plot and subsequent investigations and arress. In 2007, several senior USG officials engage the highest levels of the GOT, including Ben Al, on this point and the general need for improve cooperation. At year's end, there was some indcation that information exchange was improving (RefD). However, to ensure this is a long-term improement, it is essential to continue to urge the GT to continue responding to specific US requests. The USG is not the only country concerned about its intelligence relationship with Tunisia; foreign government counterparts, including from France and Great Britain, have told USG officials they have similar concerns. -------------- Key Themes -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) You may wish to stress the following themes with GOT officials: -- Recognize Tunisia's stability in face of growing regional threat. (All GOT) -- Inquire about the regional threat and level and quality of CT cooperation with Algeria and Libya. (All GOT) -- (Drawing implied linkage to above point) Stress USG is ready to provide greater CT assistance, training and cooperation. (All GOT) -- Request improved intelligence sharing and information exchange on domestic threats, specifically threat information and individuals of mutual interest. (All GOT, but for MOI action) -- Express concern that lack of political space can have adverse consequences, i.e., contributing to the perception that violent extremism is the only way to express opposition to government policies. (All GOT) -- Urge immediate assistance with specific cases to be briefed at Post. (MOI Only) -------------- GOT Interlocutors -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) The Embassy has requested meetings with several GOT officials and provides the following insight on each: -- Minister of Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem tends to be reticent and brusque. He is quick to cite the importance of Tunisian sovereignty and may reject the suggestion that the MOI could or should improve information sharing. Providing the context behind specific USG requests and stressing our similar views on fighting terrorism may help make the conversation fruitful. -- Minister of National Defense Kamel Morjane has years of experience as a UN and Tunisian diplomat and is generally gregarious and open. Morjane can be expected to express his concern about the domestic terrorist threat, his perceptions about increased public support for extremism, and some of the factors behind these trends. He will also outline the MOD's CT role and ask for USG assistance in improving Tunisia's defense capabilities, specifically increased Foreign Military Financing (FMF),which has declined in recent years. -- Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelwaheb Abdallah, whom you met on the margins of the meeting between Under Secretary Burns and representatives of the Arab Maghreb Union at the UNGA, is a political animal, who has a penchant for long monologues. He is quite close to President Ben Ali. While not personally involved in Tunisia's CT efforts, he can convey the message that the USG is concerned about our CT relationship. Although Abdallah tends to claim that all aspects of our bilateral relationship is "excellent," it is worth stressing the specific actions the USG expects. Abdallah can be expected to expound on the GOT,s efforts in various international fora to promote a Counter-terrorism Code of Conduct. Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm GODEC