TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR ADAM SZUBIN'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN MFA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000913 SIPDIS TREASURY FOR SZUBIN, LEV AND POLLACK; CAIRO FOR SEVERENS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 TAGS: EFIN ETTC KTFN PTER PREL PGOV UNSC LY SUBJECT: TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR ADAM SZUBIN'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN MFA OFFICIALS CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d) ¶1. (S) Summary: In a meeting with MFA officials on November 12 on UNSCR 1267-related issues, visiting Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Adam Szubin: 1) stressed the need for better U.S.-GOL coordination with respect to refining the GOL's UNSCR 1267 listing submissions; 2) encouraged the GOL to submit for listing three LIFG leaders and to withdraw its circa 2004 request to list 74 individuals and instead re-submit those names in smaller, better-coordinated tranches, and; 3) urged the GOL to lift Libya's holds on U.S. submissions. Libya had been a leader in submitting large numbers of names to the UNSCR 1267 committee for listing; however, poor formatting and insufficient biographical and evidentiary information had hampered those efforts. Better communication and coordination in advance of Libya's submissions, to include sharing information on targeted individuals, could help alleviate such problems. Host government officials expressed strong interest in greater cooperation on listing submissions and agreed that Libya's MFA and security organizations would work with Post to develop mechanisms to facilitate such coordination. Szubin urged Libya to be vigilant in dealing with Iranian banks and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and its subsidiaries, noting Iran's well-established record of duplicity to mask proliferation activities. End summary. Meeting participants: Libya: MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent) Ahmed Fituri MFA Secretary for International Organizations Affairs (A/S-equivalent) Hindy Abdulatif Hindy Tajuri el-Sheradi Tajuri, Director of United Nations Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Assad al-Djerbi, MFA Americas Desk Officer U.S.: OFAC Director Adam Szubin Charge d'Affaires Chris Stevens OFAC Senior Advisor Ori Lev Treasury Analyst Gregory Pollock A/DCM John Godfrey (notetaker) ¶2. (S) Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Adam Szubin and a small delegation visited Tripoli and met on November 12 with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. Szubin explained OFAC's mission and highlighted the effectiveness of financial sanctions tools in countering terrorism finance and curbing funding for weapons of mass destruction proliferators and states of particular concern such as Iran. The U.S. shares key strategic goals with the Government of Libya (GOL), particularly with respect to defeating al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic fighting Group (LIFG). On UNSCR 1267-related issues, Szubin and his team: 1) stressed the need for better U.S.-GOL coordination with respect to refining the GOL's UNSCR 1267 listing submissions; 2) encouraged the GOL to submit for listing three LIFG leaders and to withdraw its circa 2004 request to list 74 individuals and instead re-submit those names in smaller, better-coordinated tranches, and; 3) urged the GOL to lift Libya's holds on U.S. submissions. UNSCR 1267 LISTING SUBMISSIONS ¶3. (C) Responding to Fituri's speculation that the incoming U.S. presidential administration would be more focused on economic issues than counter-terrorism (CT),Szubin stressed that CT and CT finance would remain high priorities. Libya's current membership on the UNSC and the recent implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims settlement agreement afforded an excellent window of opportunity in which to expand bilateral cooperation on CT finance. The U.S. and Libya have a shared strategic interest in impeding AQ and LIFG from obtaining funding. The UN sanctions process can be very effective, but successful listing requests require substantial evidentiary information and proper formatting, which can take work to achieve. Praising the GOL's decision to avail itself of the UNSCR 1267 mechanism and its previous submission of large numbers of names for listing, he noted that most of the GOL's submissions had unfortunately not been accepted for designation to date. ¶4. (C) The problem was not a substantive difference over goals, but a lack of advance coordination as well as specific information on Libya's submissions, Szubin said. Pointing to Libya's submission of 12 names for listing in 2005, Szubin noted TRIPOLI 00000913 002 OF 004 that the 1267 Committee was only able to add three of these individuals to the Consolidated List. Previous efforts to improve coordination through Libya's MFA and UN Mission had not been productive. Stressing that even if the information the GOL shared was not publicly releasable, Szubin noted that additional information from the GOL could help the U.S. build a case for listing that met the U.S. legal standard. Doing so could allow the U.S. to lift its holds on previous Libyan submissions and support new ones. Drawing on intelligence and law enforcement sources, the U.S. had worked to develop cases to support some of Libya's submissions and had information it could share to help bolster the GOL's listing requests. The focus was on building a fact-based dossier to implicate targeted individuals, Szubin said. Limiting the number of names submitted at one time would also be helpful. ¶5. (S) In addition to lack of biographical and evidentiary information, Libya's submissions had not been properly formatted, a key hindrance in the UN's bureaucratic system. In addition to bio-identifying data, a good submission would feature several paragraphs on the basis for the designation, with detail on what was done by the target, when it was done and how those actions contributed materially to support for designated terrorist entities. Szubin discussed with Fituri and Hindy the UNSCR 1267 cover sheet (blank) and a sample statement of case based on unclassified sources concerning a LIFG-affiliated individual. Szubin also shared the names of two additional LIFG members whose designation the USG could support. He assured his interlocutors that OFAC stood ready to assist the GOL in its efforts to craft submissions that secured designation of individuals who were of concern to the GOL. The key issue from the U.S. perspective was to facilitate good communication between the GOL's security agencies and MFA to obtain sufficient information about terrorist financiers to support listing them under UNSCR 1267. The CDA and Szubin urged the GOL to consider coordinating with the U.S. before submitting its listing requests, as other countries do. Doing so would allow us to share additional information we might have about specific individuals and help properly format Libya's listing requests. SMALLER IS BETTER & LIFTING LIBYAN HOLDS ON U.S. SUBMISSIONS ¶6. (S) Noting that insufficient evidentiary and biographical data and poor formatting had compelled the U.S. to place holds on many of the 74 names the GOL submitted for listing in August 2004, Szubin stressed that the U.S. would ideally like to see all of Libya's submissions accepted for listing. He suggested that the GOL withdraw the list of 74 names, work in cooperation with the U.S. and others to develop more robust statements of case and re-submit the individuals' names in smaller tranches. The U.S. would be happy to review the format and substance of those submissions, and to work on possible joint submissions of LIFG financial supporters based in Europe and, particularly, Switzerland. In addition, there was confusion about 19 LIFG leaders whose names Libya submitted in May 2005. The U.S. would encourage the GOL to re-submit the names of two members from that tranche and one additional individual - Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abdallah Sa'id, and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman - whose designation the USG could support and about whom the USG had information that could bolster those submissions. Reiterating that the two sides shared common goals but had suffered from a lack of good communication, Szubin urged the GOL to lift holds Libya had placed on recent U.S. submissions, including branches of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) and members of the Abu Ghadiyah network. ¶7. (S) Denying that the holds had been politically motivated, MFA UN Affairs Director Tajuri argued that Libya needed time to perform its own investigations of the three indivduals. "Just as the U.S. requested more information about the 74 names we submitted, Libya needs more information about the listings the U.S. requested", he said. Pushing back, Szubin underscored that the RIHS had been previously designated so that there was no question about the propriety of designating additional branch offices, and that the activities of the Abu Ghadiyah foreign fighter facilitation network were well-known. He urged his GOL counterparts to seek additional information from the Libyan security services should they need it, as the USG does when other countries nominate names to the Committee. He added that, to his knowledge, Libya had been the only state to place a hold TRIPOLI 00000913 003 OF 004 on the submissions. GOL WELCOMES GREATER COORDINATION ¶8. (S) Stressing the importance of having implemented the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, Fituri emphasized the GOL's desire for greater dialogue and cooperation on the "very sensitive" issues of 1267 listings and CT finance. He agreed that greater exchange of information and coordination in advance of Libya's submission of individuals' names for listing would be beneficial, indicated the GOL would be receptive to such an approach and said the Libya's MFA and security organizations would work with Post to develop modalities for such exchanges of information. Fituri was keen to hear Szubin's assessment of Libya's cooperation in comparison with other Arab states. Szubin said Libya's performance on implementing UNSCR 1267 sanctions appeared to have been good and pointed to Libya's interest in FATF/MENA as a positive sign. Libya had been a leader in terms of the volume of its submissions for UNSCR 1267 listing; however, formatting problems and insufficient information had hampered those efforts. With better communication and coordination, Libya was poised to be a leader in this area. ¶9. (C) Fituri and Hindy both asked for Szubin's assessment of Libya's efforts to modernize its banking and financial sector. Emphasizing that recent bank privatizations and regulatory reforms were positive signs, Szubin stressed the need to develop robust banking supervision and controls in tandem with modernization to mitigate the potential for Libya's financial system to be exploited by terrorist financiers or rogue regimes. States with more developed financial systems were in some ways at greater risk for such exploitation. Transparency was key, Szubin said: the questions asked of those establishing accounts and executing funds transfers, the identification they were required to provide and basic banking controls were the essential building blocks to any effective effort to combat money laundering and terrorist finance. ¶10. (C) Fituri asked what training opportunities for banking, CT finance and money laundering were available, stressing that Libya was particularly interested in receiving training from the U.S. CDA outlined training possibilities under the Financial Service Volunteer Corps (which conducted its first training in Libya earlier this month),the Commercial Law Development Program (which concluded an initial assessment visit this week) and training under the auspices of the Treasury Department. Szubin highlighted an upcoming opportunity for Libya to participate in a regional workshop on CT finance, to be held under Treasury-State auspices early next year. Fituri stated unequivocally that Libya would participate, and asked to be informed of any other potential CT finance and banking training so that his office could help coordinate GOL support for same. IRISL & IRAN AIR ¶11. (S) Noting that four separate UNSCR's called for tough sanctions against Iran's banks and companies involved in proliferation activities, Szubin stressed the need for vigilance in dealing with Iranian banks, which had a long history of fraud and using front companies to mask proliferation activities. In a similar vein, the U.S. had, consistent with UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803, designated the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Iran Air Cargo under E.O. 13382. Noting the fact that he had seen a number of IRISL cargo containers aboard vessels in Tripoli's harbor, Szubin cautioned the GOL to be careful with respect to any dealings with IRISL and/or its subsidiaries. Echoing remarks reported ref B, UN Affairs Director Tajuri questioned whether IRISL's designation was really a multilateral issue (vice a bilateral U.S.-Iran one) and called for more information. Szubin pushed back, stressing that U.S. sanctions on IRISL had been adopted in parallel with a UNSCR that singled out IRISL as a proliferation risk. The important point with respect to interactions with Iranian banks or commercial entities was that Iran's record of duplicity to mask proliferation activities - to include submitting false bills of lading in the case of IRISL - was well-established. The GOL should take care to avoid interactions with Iranian entities, which could expose Libya to exploitation by Iranian proliferating entities and/or call into question Libya's commitment to implementing UNSCRs targeting Iran. TRIPOLI 00000913 004 OF 004 ¶12. (U) OFAC Director Szubin's party cleared this message. STEVENS