SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYA'S ALI TREIKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000820 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO LY CD SU SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYA'S ALI TREIKI REF: TRIPOLI 719 TRIPOLI 00000820 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Special Envoy Richard Williamson emphasized the urgent need to stem the violence in Darfur in order to bring relief to the millions of displaced persons and refugees during his meeting in Tripoli with Libyan Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki on October 6. SE Williamson said he appreciated Libya's interest in securing peace in the region and welcomed Libya's initiatives to broker an agreement between the governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena. Treiki reiterated Libya's tri-lateral peace plan that includes a joint Chadian-Sudanese peacekeeping force. The first meeting of Treiki and the Foreign Ministers of Chad and Sudan is scheduled for October 23 in Tripoli. End Summary. TREIKI REITERATES "TRI-LATERAL" PROPOSAL ¶2. (C) SE Richard Williamson met with U/S-equivalent for African Affairs Ali Treiki October 6. Treiki thanked SE Williamson for visiting Tripoli and highlighted the importance of the regular consultations he enjoys with U.S. counterparts, especially A/S Jendayi Frazer. Treiki told SE Williamson that his visit came at an important time, as many initiatives have been proposed to end the crisis in Sudan and that the time had come to choose which vehicle would be most effective in ending violence and providing relief in Darfur. ¶3. (C) Treiki presented SE Williamson with a detailed explanation of Libya's "tri-lateral" peace initiative. The first step is to ease tensions and renew diplomatic relations between Chad and Sudan. After state-to-state hostility has been reduced, Libya envisions a joint peacekeeping deployment consisting of 1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan at 10 locations on the border. He stressed that proximity to the conflict gave Libya a unique position to bring the parties to the negotiating table. He dismissed the recent Contact Group meeting in Asmara as "unsuccessful," and said "nothing was done there - we don't need meeting after meeting." He was equally doubtful that a Qatari proposal to work through the Arab League would net results, noting that African rebels would be distrustful of Arab mediators and noted that even Egypt is not happy with the Qatar initiative. He repeated his recommendation that the "AU/UN framework" was the appropriate venue for other countries to intervene. ¶4. (C) During the meeting, Treiki answered a call on his cell phone from Sudanese Advisor to the President, Mustafa Osman Ismail to coordinate a tri-lateral meeting in Tripoli for mid-October. Ismail said he would be traveling but called back a bit later to say October 23 would be fine. Treiki dispatched aides to coordinate the date with the Chadian FM Moussa Faki. (Note: As in previous meetings, Treiki had to ask - in Arabic - for his aides to remind him of Faki's name. End note.) WILLIAMSON WELCOMES LIBYA'S INITIATIVES, PRESSES FOR IMMEDIATE RELIEF ¶5. (C) SE Williamson noted four rings of interest in Darfur: First, the parties on the ground in Sudan; second, the neighbors with a large stake in peace in Sudan, including Libya; third, more distant countries with a deep interest in the region like the U.S. and EU partners; and fourth, countries who want to help, but are too far removed from the crisis to be effective. He agreed that resolving tensions between the governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena would be a positive step in stabilizing the region. Williamson and Treiki shared their concerns on the inevitable lack of implementation of the September 19 agreement between Minni Minnawi and Ali Osman Taha. Treiki said GOS treatment of Minnawi, and lack of implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement would prevent other rebel groups from negotiating with Khartoum. ¶6. (C) The Special Envoy stressed the importance of immediate relief for the millions suffering in Sudan. After providing Treiki with USG efforts to bolster the UN/AU peacekeeping force and our aid to the region, SE Williamson conveyed our concern that new violence could erupt at the end of the rainy season or with an ICC warrant for President Bashir. Treiki thought that there were "no serious immediate threats except Khalil Ibrahim," and that he is in contact with the GOC to prevent an attack by Ibrahim. Treiki belittled the role of rebel leaders in Europe, especially Abdul Wahid al-Nur, who he derided as, "sitting peacefully in Paris making propaganda." TRIPOLI 00000820 002.2 OF 002 LIBYAN REACTION ¶7. (C) After initially agreeing to a low-key visit, Treiki rolled out the red carpet and had both photos and video of the hour-long meeting. State media reported the visit on the front page and Treiki gave a five-minute interview on TV evening news. However, neither report gave specifics of the meeting, referring merely to friendly consultations, holding out the prospect of further policy consultations with the USG. ¶8. (C) Comment. While the Special Envoy made clear that our priorities were humanitarian relief and an immediate cessation of violence, Treiki's focus continues to be a state-based solution with a longer timeline. SE Williamson gave specific detail of refugee camps of particular concern and recent attacks, but Treiki preferred to talk about high-level diplomatic solutions. The GOL's initiative may be complementary to our goals, but Treiki seems more concerned about securing diplomatic and security gains for Libya than immediately and directly addressing the humanitarian crisis. End Comment. ¶9. (U) This cable has been cleared by SE Williamson. GODFREY