LIBYAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000500 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER MCAP PREL LY SUBJECT: LIBYAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ REF: STATE 50900 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d) ¶1. (S/NF) Information below is keyed to questions in paras 4-6 of reftel tasker. - OBJECTIVE MASSEY NAME TRACES: Names for Libyan foreign fighters recovered in the Objective Massey raid in September 2007 were passed in GRPO liaison channels to the External Security Organization (ESO). As of late November 2007, the ESO provided traces on those individuals (see TD-314/77022/07 for further details). - COOPERATION WITH SYRIA: Post assesses that Libyan-Syrian cooperation has been robust and productive. The ESO maintains active channels of communication with its sister organizations in the Syrian Arab Republic concerning efforts to stop Syrian citizens from traveling to Iraq to conduct terrorist operations and to stop the transit of foreign fighters through Syria. See TD-314/69907-07 and TD-314/68798-07 for ESO Director Musa Kusa's assessment of Syria's efforts. Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) transferred 27 Libyan foreign fighters to the custody of the Government of Libya (GOL) in late December 2007 (see TD-314/82371-07 for further details). Information provided by ESO in liaison channels suggests that over 100 Libyan foreign fighters have been transferred from Syria to the custody of the GOL in the past two years. - DOMESTIC ACTION TO STEM FOREIGN FIGHTER FLOWS: Libyan officials have expressed willingness to take greater domestic action and to cooperate in regional and multi-lateral efforts to prevent Libyan citizens from traveling to Iraq to engage in terrorist operations. Post's assessment is that the GOL has calculated that returning extremists pose a potentially serious threat to the regime's stability, and that efforts to stem the flow of Libyan foreign fighters to Iraq are in its strategic best interest. See TD-314/034705-08 for details on ESO's detention of all known Libyan Iraq veterans that returned to Libya in 2004 and 2005. The ESO's leadership has focused on counter-ideological measures, cooperation with neighboring states in the Sahara and Sahel region, and development of more stringent measures to sceen and track young men traveling to/from Libya. (See TD-314/69655-07 for details on combating extremist ideology; see TRIPOLI 120 and TRIPOLI 430 for analysis of factors enabling recruitment of eastern Libyans as foreign fighters; see TD-314/019998-08 and TD-314/019732-08 for details on ESO's cooperation with other North African states to combat foreign fighter flows; see TRIPOLI 248 for details on human and technical surveillance employed at airports by the Internal Security Organization (ISO) and ESO to prevent Libyans from traveling to Iraq and elsewhere to engage in terrorist operations.) Indicating that Libya intends to improve the safety of its travel documents, Libya's National Security Council requested from the Charge on May 7 a list of U.S. companies that produce passports and travel documents with advanced security features, which Post provided shortly thereafter. The GOL facilitated a port security training program under EXBS auspices in March 2008. A parallel training program for airport security (fraudulent document detection and passenger screening techniques) is scheduled for July 2008, and a follow-on training program for land border crossing points is expected to take place in fall 2008. Post's assessment is that the flow of foreign fighters from Libya to Iraq and the reverse flow of veterans to Libya has diminished due to new procedures adopted by the GOL (see TD-314/027806-08 for further details). STEVENS