MOFA OFFICIAL DISCUSSES G-8 PREPS, AFGHANISTAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000976 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PAUL BROWN AND J. SHRIER STATE FOR EAP/J, EEB KDILLON, AND EUR/ERA CDEON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: PREL AF AU KS CH TT JA SUBJECT: MOFA OFFICIAL DISCUSSES G-8 PREPS, AFGHANISTAN, TRILATERAL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE TOKYO 00000976 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Ministry Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator Takehiro Funkoshi told visiting EAP/J Director that the four major political issues facing the upcoming G-8 summit will be Afghanistan, climate change, Tibet, and G-8 expansion. Japan plans to step up its engagement with Afghanistan by playing a larger role in police training and capacity building, due to a request from the Deputy Secretary that it do more. With regard to the U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD),Japan is anxious to build on what has already been accomplished, and would also be interested in considering enhanced trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Funakoshi, who is a Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator in MOFA's Foreign Policy Bureau, told visiting EAP/J Office Director James Zumwalt on April 9 that for the next several months, his sole responsibility will be planning for the July 7 G-8 Summit meeting. In the meantime, his usual duties will be covered by Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator Keiichi Ichikawa, who, along with Oceania Division Deputy Director Hideaki Ishii, joined Funakoshi for his meeting with Zumwalt. -------------- AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶3. (C) Funakoshi said he believes the U.S. and E.U. both see Afghanistan as the most pressing issue for the upcoming G-8 leaders meeting, and that accordingly, Japan is reevaluating what it can do to play a more useful role there. Noting that Japan's military options are severely limited, he said much thought is being given to working with the Pakistanis and Afghanis on border security issues and capacity building. Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae, following a recent meeting with Deputy Secretary Negroponte, took seriously the Deputy's admonition to him that if Japan can't send troops it should send police, and if it can't send police, it should train police. Sasae appreciated the Deputy's frankness and immediately upon his return had called the police agency. ¶4. (C) Japan had initially, in 2002-03, provided limited assistance to Afghanistan's police, mainly by supplying vehicles, Funakoshi explained. However, Tokyo became distracted by Iraq, and began to focus its assistance there. But now Japan is beginning to coordinate again with the Afghanis about providing vehicles and capacity building for law enforcement. In the past, one Afghan police official has been invited to Japan, but Tokyo hopes to host a training program for up to fifteen senior Afghan police officials later this year. Funakoshi acknowledged that this was a small step, but hopes that it will lead to bigger things. He again stressed that Japan was taking this step as a direct result of the Deputy's intervention with Sasae, and said that Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka will raise this with the Deputy when they meet on April 9. -------------- CLIMATE CHANGE -------------- ¶5. (C) Japan hopes to make climate change a major issue at the summit and is very aware of the U.S. position on this TOKYO 00000976 002.2 OF 004 subject, said Funakoshi, noting our preference to see this addressed by the Major Economies process. He noted that in addition to the normal "outreach five" countries, Japan has also invited South Korea, Australia, and Indonesia to participate in meetings following the G-8 summit. He noted this will be the first time the major Asia-Pacific powers meet together, and although it is unclear what dynamic will arise from this, Japan is hopeful it will be a positive opportunity to discuss climate change issues with major developing countries. -------------- TIBET -------------- ¶6. (C) The current situation in Tibet has become "a real headache" for the Japanese in the run-up to the G-8 Summit, Funakoshi lamented. Tokyo cannot predict what will happen or what the outcome will be, but Prime Minister Fukuda hopes the Summit will not need to address this issue or make a statement about it. His major concern is that Chinese President Hu Jintao is scheduled to arrive the day after the Summit for the follow-on meetings, and Fukuda -- sensitive to Japan-China relations -- doesn't want to Hu's visit to be overshadowed by contentious issues. Funakoshi said Tibet is a "wild card" for Japan's G-8 Summit planners. -------------- G-8 EXPANSION -------------- ¶7. (C) Japan has taken note of calls by French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Brown for an expansion of the G-8, said Funakoshi. However, the Japanese are not comfortable with this idea for a variety of reasons, including the possible impact it might have on attempts at Security Council reform. He acknowledged Japan has received supportive messages from top levels of the USG on this subject, but said the Japanese are unsure where all this will lead. --- TSD SIPDIS --- ¶8. (C) The Secretary has agreed to attend a TSD Ministerial on the margins of the G-8 Ministerial in June, Zumwalt advised. Funakoshi replied that this was great news. He expressed Japan's preference to host the meeting over lunch in Tokyo on June 28, the day after the G-8 Ministerial concludes in Kyoto on June 27. This is because Foreign Minister Koumura plans to return to Tokyo the evening of June 27, and it would also make it unnecessary for the Australians to come to Kyoto. However, said Funakoshi, if the Secretary has a strong preference to remain in Kyoto, the Japanese would be willing to consider hosting the summit over dinner on June 27 in Kyoto. Zumwalt replied he would pass this information to the Secretary's office. ¶9. (C) Funakoshi said DFM Sasae plans to be in Washington May 27-29 and is very hopeful he'll be able to meet with Ambassador William Burns to coordinate G-8 and TSD issues, if Ambassador Burns has been confirmed as Under Secretary for Political Affairs by then. Zumwalt advised that it is not possible to calendar any events until the confirmation TOKYO 00000976 003.2 OF 004 process is complete, and said he did not know when this will be. ¶10. (C) Zumwalt told Funakoshi we believe that now is a good time to take stock of what we've accomplished through the TSD process and were we'd like to see it go in the future. It is our impression that the new government in Canberra is enthusiastic about continuing the process, and as the Department prepares for a new administration in the U.S. a good opportunity will present itself to evaluate what has been accomplished. We'd welcome Japanese ideas about how the TSD can continue to work in the future, said Zumwalt, SIPDIS pointing to the good counterterrorism cooperation that has taken place, which perhaps can be expanded in South East Asia and among the small island democracies of the South Pacific. Another possible area of cooperation would be to work together to improve the capacity of the Timor-Leste Coast Guard, he suggested. ¶11. (C) Japan agrees that the new Australian government shows signs of continued support for the TSD process, said Funakoshi, and that the TSD process has been fruitful. He speculated that one future area of cooperation could be in the peace-building field. He said there are preliminary discussions about allowing the Coast Guard to help train the Timor-Leste navy with capacity building. Oceania Division Deputy Director Ishii agreed that it is a good idea to focus on South East Asia. The region, he said, obviously needs assistance, and Japan's ODA budget is shrinking. At the same time, China has been expanding its influence in the region. He thought the TSD would be a good mechanism with which to coordinate U.S., Japanese, and Australian efforts in this field. ¶12. (C) Ishii also asked about the timing for the release of the Joint Ministerial Statement on Disaster Relief. Zumwalt replied that it would probably be best to release this in conjunction with the upcoming TSD summit. If, for some reason, the summit will not take place, he would then see no reason to wait. He also reminded Ishii that we are waiting for Japanese feedback on the Disaster Relief guidelines. Ishii undertook to research the question and get back to us. ¶13. (C) Another possible area of cooperation for the TSD, suggested Zumwalt, might be the "Coral Triangle Initiative," an international environmental effort to preserve the coral in the region bordered by the Philippines, Indonesia, and the South Pacific Islands. Ishii was not familiar with this initiative, and Zumwalt undertook to provide him with information about it. ¶14. (C) Finally, said Funakoshi, Japan is also willing to look into whether it can play a more helpful role in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Japan would like to help with this in Asia, where peace-keeping training operations are less well developed than they are in Africa. Mongolia comes to mind, he said, but then cautioned that before Japanese troops can become involved in such activities, it must be clear that the training involved is for peace-keeping operations, rather than for the development of national military forces. -------------- SOUTH KOREA -------------- TOKYO 00000976 004.2 OF 004 ¶15. (C) The new government in South Korea presents us with a possible opportunity to develop a trilateral relationship similar to the one we currently have with Australia, Zumwalt suggested, noting that we would be interested in learning about Japan's view of such an arrangement. Funakoshi replied that Japan agrees very much that this is something worth looking into. Cautioning that we are not making any type of proposal at this time, Zumwalt noted that we would not see any value in setting up a framework without agreeing on possible content and said we would welcome Japanese thoughts on what such a grouping might concentrate on. Working to respond together to natural disasters or environmental disasters, such as oil spills, in the North East Asia region were among possible ideas for consideration, he suggested. In addition, it might be worth exploring joint military exercises as confidence building measures. Ichikawa commented that the Japanese and South Koreans have very little experience working with each other, and that strategic discussions between them and the U.S. might be a good opening step. He agreed the timing is right to undertake such an initiative and that Tokyo should take advantage of this opportunity. SCHIEFFER