COUNTERTERRORISM TRILATERAL BORDER SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000723 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 TAGS: KHLS PTER PGOV PREL AS ID MY RP JA SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM TRILATERAL BORDER SECURITY SUBWORKING GROUP UPDATE TOKYO 00000723 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). Subject: CT Trilateral Border, Transport, and Maritime Security Subgroup Update ¶1. (C) Summary: Government officials from Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Tokyo on February 26 for the Counterterrorism Trilateral Border, Transport, and Maritime Security Sub-Group meeting. The meeting was chaired by Paul Fujimura, Director for Asia-Pacific, Department of Homeland Security. Participants discussed ways to step up regional documentation training in Southeast Asia, measures to boost Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines Tri-border capacity-building, and port security. Improving maritime stability in Southeast Asia, the Philippines port project, and strengthening border controls in Indonesia was also discussed. All sides agreed that it would not be necessary for the subgroup to meet again before the next ambassador-level counterterrorism trilateral meeting. The next ambassador-level CT meeting will be held in the United States in mid-2008 but the dates have not been set. End Summary. Regional Documentation Examination Training -------------- ¶2. (C) Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship Senior Policy Advisor Katherine Taylor recommended establishing an online CT trilateral steering committee to enable CT trilateral counterparts to share information directly via email communications. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, International Security Division, Counterterrorism Branch Executive Director Brek Batley and Fujimura agreed this would be an important first step and noted it would be important to identify who would receive access and to identify what type of information would be shared. Fujimura suggested sharing information on travel patterns and red border fraud alerts such as the ICE Forensic Document Lab's (FDL) Document Alerts. Airline officers and liaison officers, such as DHS Immigration Advisory Program officials, could potentially be included at a later date, Fujimura suggested. ¶3. (C) Ministry of Justice Immigration Policy Coordinator Naomi Hirota provided an update on the thirteenth Document Examination Seminar held in Tokyo in February 2008. Japan has sponsored the seminar since 1995 to provide training on detecting fraudulent documents, document swaps that occur in airport transit lounges, and biometric immigration procedures including finger scanning. Eleven countries participated in the seminar this year, including one official from Burma. Japan focused on the type of document fraud used by Iranians since there has been a sharp increase in the number of Iranians traveling on fraudulent documents, Hirota stated. ¶4. (C) Taylor led a discussion on the merits of document training programs currently conducted by Australia, Japan, and the United States. Providing laboratory equipment, especially hand-held document examination kits, is an important component of efforts to increase the capability of officials at the border crossings and ports of entry to detect fraud, observed Taylor. The goal of providing document training programs to third countries is to create a self-sustaining network of regional document fraud examiners whereby trained officers can go on to train other officers in their home countries without requiring continued assistance from the country providing the initial training. For example, when Australia provides document examination training assistance to countries in Southeast Asia, it begins with bilateral assistance with Australian nationals initially teaching the course. As time goes on, the trainees learn to teach the course themselves and are no longer dependent on Australia for the training. Fujimura noted that the United States has loaned 42 document examination kits to the Philippines with the aim of preventing the kits from disappearing, as has been the case with similar equipment that was donated to the Philippines. ¶5. (C) Japan provides immigration control training seminars TOKYO 00000723 002.2 OF 004 for Southeast Asian countries, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Counterterrorism Cooperation Division Director Fumio Shimizu noted. The training seminars cover travel document security policy and the use of biometric technology. Japan conducts the training seminars on a multilateral basis, whereas Australia and the United States usually provide similar training on a bilateral basis, Shimizu explained. Shimizu told Fujimura that Japan would welcome assistance from DHS on the training courses the Government of Japan conducts in Tokyo. ¶6. (C) One of the challenges of providing multilateral training, is to make sure the selected participants are at the working level, and are the ones who will best benefit from the training. DHS officials have noticed that when they provide training courses in the United States to Southeast Asian counterparts, senior officials want to participate to benefit from "a free trip abroad" which prevents the line officers, who will truly benefit from the training, from being able to attend. It is also important to conduct the training in the region, so that local participants will have a "sense of ownership" over the training seminar, Fujimura noted. Tri-Border Capacity Building -------------- ¶7. (C) Clandestine intelligence reporting indicates Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines continue to be areas of concern, Batley stated. At the Counterterrorism Trilateral held in Sydney last June, there was agreement to boost information sharing among appropriate government agencies from Australia, Japan, and the U.S. The U.S. agreed to set up a matrix of partner activities. This matrix is currently under development and will help boost bilateral and trilateral cooperation by reducing redundancy, he noted. While this matrix is still under development, it is still a key deliverable that demonstrates CT trilateral efforts, Batley stated, adding Australia will organize an additional meeting on this in Jakarta soon. Our embassies are talking with one another but we need to ramp it up and move beyond information sharing to improved coordination, Batley emphasized. 8 (C) Japan has experience working with Southeast Asian maritime agencies in a bid to boost security, Shimizu stated. Japan co-sponsored the Japan-ASEAN Counterterrorism Dialogue at the Ambassador-level starting in 2006 and maritime security was at the top of the agenda. Indonesia was initially on board with this, but later abandoned it, Shimizu explained. Maritime security, particularly PSI, is a particularly sensitive issue for Indonesia, agreed Batley. There is still room for Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to coordinate, however. ¶9. (C) U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Yuri Graves provided an update on the USCG International Port Security Program and Australian Embassy Customs Counsellor Robert Rushby provided an update on the Australian Coastwatch South. Over the last eighteen months, the Australian Customs Service (including Border Protection Command) and Australia's Department of Defense have been working with the Philippine's Defense and border agencies to help implement an integrated civil and defense solution to improve maritime security and border controls, particularly in the south of the Philippines, and this initiative is known as Coast Watch South (CWS). The goals of CWS include helping the Philippines prepare a robust framework for interagency coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain, to provide subject matter expertise and learning opportunities to share experiences on how to implement an approach to address threats in the maritime domain, and to help the Philippines identity future needs to "operationalize" CWS. With the Philippine navy as the lead, other participating agencies include the Philippine Coast Guard, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Philippine National Police, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Immigration, and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. ¶10. (SBU) Since the Philippine navy has the official lead on TOKYO 00000723 003.2 OF 004 CWS, requests for the release of information from the United States and Japan, including requests for copies of the draft executive order, along with any offers to donate or provide support to CWS, should be directed to Commander Wenefredo B Banua of the Philippine Army, Rushby emphasized. He can be reached via the Office of the President, National Security Council as Chairman of the Interagency Technical Working Group on Border Crossing. Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency -------------- ¶11. (C) Japan Coast Guard officer Makoto Tamura provided an update on the current status of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and on Japan Coast Guard efforts to support the MMEA. The MMEA was officially launched by the Malaysian Prime Minister's Office in February 2005 and began operations on November 30, 2005. Japanese efforts to support the MMEA include a JICA technical cooperation project on "Maritime Guard and Rescue," training seminars on maritime security, a search and rescue workshop, maritime drug enforcement seminar, and providing training opportunities at the Japan Coast Guard Academy. Shimizu noted that the Malaysian Customs Department has requested equipment in the form of maritime security grant aid, and Japan is currently studying the request. ¶12. (C) Fujimura asked participants if CT trilateral countries should use the Philippine port project as a model structure for the MMEA, or if an ad hoc approach is best given Malaysian sensitivities to third-country assistance. Australian Department of Transport and Regional Services Director of International Relations David Hammond responded that it is too early to use the Philippine port project as a template for Malaysia. The environment in Malaysia is too sensitive and it is dangerous to think we can create a silver bullet or template to solve all maritime issues. We need to be very careful with Malaysia, particularly since our relationship with them is not as robust. Shimizu agreed and stated that the case in the Philippines, compared to Malaysia, is very different. Improving Maritime Stability in Southeast Asia -------------- - ¶13. (C) Japan remains committed to the fight against terrorism but the unstable domestic political situation and weak Diet could constrain the government's ability to continue funding projects at current levels, Shimizu noted. Due to a shrinking budget, Japan has had to curtail the amount of financial assistance it provides, and cannot finance U.S. programs in Southeast Asia. Information on U.S. initiatives is still very useful in and of itself to Japan, and Japan appreciates being informed on current and pending U.S. efforts in the region. ¶14. (C) The U.S. delegation gave a presentation on inviting trilateral partners to observe training events and recommended that the U.S., Japan, and Australia hold a trilateral meeting to coordinate training provided to Southeast Asian countries. In addition, Fujimura recommended the trilateral partner "operational components" work together to build capacity in the region. Hammond agreed that conceptionally, this is a good idea, but noted this would be challenging since Australia uses a lot of contractors and subcontractors. Japan would welcome additional cooperation and coordination, Tamura noted. Fujimura, Hammond, and Shimizu agreed that bulk cash courier training is one example of where Australia, Japan, and the U.S. have worked well together when providing training to other countries. Philippines Port Project -------------- ¶15. (C) The U.S. and Australia provided an update on the status of the "Needs Analysis Report," led a discussion on "lessons learned" and facilitated a brain storm session on the possibility of applying the Philippines port project model to include Davao International Airport. The Philippines Port Project is a flagship for the trilateral process, but is only one project within the trilateral TOKYO 00000723 004.2 OF 004 process, Hammond emphasized. It does not represent the whole process, he noted. It is often touted as a model, pilot, or template, and our expectations may be too high, he stated. The Philippines port project is only one specific issue, and we can expect much more out of the trilateral process, he explained. ¶16. (C) Australian delegates provided an overview of the "Lessons Learned" document and noted the impact that Embassy staff turnover can have on the timeline of accomplishing CT trilateral goals. Staff turnover at Embassies delays the amount of time it takes to make progress because new personnel need to be educated on the CT process. Fujimura agreed and noted that we need to improve communication so the CT trilateral progress does not grind to a halt due to staff turnover. Meeting on a regular basis is one way to accomplish this, he suggested. It is also imperative for our capitals to keep information flowing to Embassies at post, he stated. ¶17. (C) Shimuzu stated he was impressed with the candid honesty in the Lessons Learned paper and noted that if there is a real need, Japan would support moving forward on the Davao port project. Tokyo would need more information to be able to successfully sell the project to Japanese policymakers, however. From a local perspective, it might be premature to move forward on Davao, but if Tokyo, Washington, and Canberra supported a decision, we would do our best to implement it, he stated. Improving Border Controls in Indonesia -------------- ¶18. (C) Australia Department of Immigration and Citizenship Security Policy Officer Katherine Taylor said Australia has the energy to move forward on trilateral cooperation in Batam Indonesia, but recommended that our embassies in Indonesia meet to assess whether now is the right time to move forward. We should examine the lessons learned from the port project in the Philippines, she noted. Shimizu said Japan is not convinced on the reasons behind picking Batam for our next project when there are so many other priorities. The Indonesian government is very sensitive and the CT trilateral approach could easily backfire, he explained. Taylor said Australia suggested Batam because there is a strong need, and it would be easier to get started there, but noted Australia welcomes other suggestions. Fujimura noted Batam is a common transit route for terrorists and is a money laundering point. Taylor emphasized that like Japan, Australia would not risk jeopardizing its bilateral relationship with Indonesia, and said in contrast to the Philippines, a very different approach would be needed before Australia would be willing to move forward. Next Steps -------------- ¶19. (C) Australian, Japanese, and U.S. participants agreed that it would not be necessary for the subgroup to meet again before the next ambassador-level CT trilateral meeting. The next CT trilateral will be held in the U.S. in mid-2008 but the dates have not been set. The subgroups need to make substantive progress before the ambassador-level meeting takes place. In the interim, on-line discussions would be a useful way to maintain momentum. Meeting on the side-lines of other meetings might also be useful, the delegates agreed. Finally, all sides noted the importance of continuing to boost information sharing efforts. SCHIEFFER