TAIWAN CONTINGENCY: NO "AUTOMATIC" JAPANESE SUPPORT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000693

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USFJ FOR
J00/J01/J2/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR CH JA
SUBJECT: TAIWAN CONTINGENCY: NO "AUTOMATIC" JAPANESE SUPPORT

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura and other senior
officials underscored publicly on March 13 that a Taiwan
Strait contingency will not "automatically" invoke the
Japanese legislation governing rear area support for U.S.
forces. These senior-level comments -- the most unequivocal
to date on the Japanese Government's position in regard to a
Taiwan Strait contingency -- were made in response to same
day press reports that Ministry of Defense (MOD) Defense
Policy Bureau Director General Takamizawa had told a ruling
party gathering that a Taiwan Strait contingency can invoke
the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security
of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ
law). Contacts at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) believe that
pro-China ruling party members had "tricked" Takamizawa into
making these sensitive remarks on the Taiwan Strait issue.
End Summary.

Rear Area Support Law "Not Automatically Applied"
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2. (C) The Japanese press reported on March 13 that MOD
Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige Takamizawa
had suggested during a meeting of the Liberal Democratic
Party's (LDP) Research Committee on Security Issues that the
Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of
Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ law)
will be invoked in the event of a contingency in the Taiwan
Strait. In the most senior and unequivocal comments to date
on Japan's position in the event of this contingency, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Machimura clarified during a subsequent
press conference that "a situation involving Taiwan does not
mean that the SIASJ law will be applied automatically at
all." Senior LDP Diet member and drafter of the 1999 law
Taku Yamasaki said separately that "strategic ambiguity is
what is most required in such a situation." Administrative
Vice Minister of Defense Masuda also held a press conference
the same evening, stating emphatically that the Japanese
government's position on the issue remains unchanged -- that
the concept of a contingency in areas around Japan is not
geographic, but situational. Finally, Takamizawa also stated
to the press that his remarks were taken out of context and
apologized for any misunderstanding.


3. (C) MOD contacts stress that the press and some members of
the Diet had "mischaracterized" Takamizawa's remarks.
According to MOD Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division
Deputy Director Kyosuke Matsumoto, Takamizawa was responding
to a question from an LDP Diet member whether the SIASJ law
will apply in a Taiwan Straits contingency. He explained
that Japan would "step up surveillance in the area and
tighten security measures in such event." Takamizawa did
not, however, mention directly the SIASJ law, Matsumoto said.


4. (C) Matsumoto asserted that Takamizawa appears to have
been "set up" by pro-China members of the LDP, including Rep.
Koichi Kato, whom he believes had leaked Takamizawa's
comments to the press. Thanks in large part to immediate
actions to mitigate the situation by Machimura, Masuda, and
Takamizawa himself, Matsumoto said he does not believe the
issue will create serious problems for Takamizawa or MOD.


5. (S) Comment: Since passage in 1999 of the "Law Concerning
Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan," there
have been numerous assurances from Japanese defense and MOFA
officials that SIASJ would be invoked in the event of a PRC
attack on Taiwan and, most importantly, Japan would: (1)
allow U.S. forces to mount operations from basis in Japan and
(2) supply rear area and logistics support to U.S. forces
engaged in a conflict. The need to maintain "strategic
ambiguity" qualifies this commitment, however. In effect, it
is a "soft" promise that may or may not be kept depending on
the political situation in Japan or on who Japanese leaders

TOKYO 00000693 002 OF 002


and policymakers are at the time. End Comment.
SCHIEFFER