JMSDF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000645 SIPDIS SIPDIS OSD FOR APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USPACOM FOR J00/J2/J5; USFJ FOR J00/J01/J2/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA SUBJECT: JMSDF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NEW CASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON PERSONAL COMPUTER REF: 07 TOKYO 3028 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 7 call, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Vice Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Kato briefed the Ambassador on the recent incident involving a JMSDF officer who disappeared on February 23 after being questioned for having AEGIS information on his personal computer. Kato stated that the AEGIS information found in the personal computer does not disclose anything different from the 2007 AEGIS case. Kato added that the Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile data that was also found in the officer's computer is not U.S. classified information. The Ambassador strongly urged that U.S. experts conduct forensic analysis of all confiscated hard drives. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On March 7, Vice Admiral Tamotsu Kato, Vice Chief of Staff of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) called on the Ambassador to brief on the incident involving a JMSDF officer who disappeared for 11 days after being questioned by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) for having classified military information on his personal computer. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (C) The Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun reported on February 28 that a JMSDF lieutenant had disappeared after being questioned by MOD on February 23 for possibly having classified AEGIS information on his personal computer. The Maritime Staff Office (MSO) provided initial notification to Embassy Tokyo's Defense Attache on February 29. On March 3, MSO officials briefed more extensively on the case, explaining that: -- the lieutenant ignored MOD-wide rules prohibiting the use of personal media in the workplace and downloaded classified information from his workstation to a portable drive, which he used to transfer the information to his home computer; -- he subsequently inserted the drive into his workstation again, without realizing that the drive was infected with a computer virus; -- the computer virus contained in his portable drive alerted MOD's network security staff, which led to an investigation on February 23; -- on his return from MOD to his assigned vessel, the lieutenant disappeared after slipping away from his escort; and, -- the confiscated personal computer contained classified AEGIS information and a file containing data from Japanese exercise firings of the NATO Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles. The JMSDF found the lieutenant on March 5 and currently has him under custody. -------------- AEGIS INFORMATION THE SAME AS IN 2007 CASE -------------- ¶4. (C) Kato assured the Ambassador that the AEGIS data found on the MSDF lieutenant's computer does not include any classified information beyond what was leaked in the 2007 AEGIS case. He acknowledged, however, that parts of the file are classified. MOD's initial investigations reveal that the lieutenant had obtained the AEGIS data in 2001 while serving on board the MSDF vessel Myoukou with LCDR Matsumoto, a former trainer at the Program Generating Center (PGC) who created the 800-page AEGIS training material from the 2007 case (reftel). Matsumoto had assembled the AEGIS material during his previous assignment at PGC and brought the files with him when he was assigned to the Myoukou. He subsequently loaded them onto the vessel's wardroom computer, from which the lieutenant downloaded the information onto his personal computer, Kato said. -------------- KATO CLAIMS SEA SPARROW INFO "UNCLASSIFIED" -------------- ¶5. (C) Kato added that, in addition to the AEGIS information, the hard drive of the confiscated computer also contains information on the Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile system. He noted, however, that the JMSDF considers the Sea Sparrow information to be unclassified, given the age of the data and infrequent usage of the missiles by Japanese vessels. Therefore, while the Japanese classification for the document is "s-e-c-r-e-t," the data contained therein is not considered to be classified U.S. information, Kato claimed. -------------- AEGIS/SEA SPARROW COMPROMISE UNLIKELY -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Kato, the lieutenant is one of 100 possible violators narrowed down from the initial 4,800 personnel investigated in the 2007 AEGIS case. MOD plans to investigate 80 other MSDF personnel who have served, or are currently serving on board the Myoukou since 2001. Kato added that the lieutenant's personal computer does not have the "Winny" file-sharing software installed, making compromise of either the AEGIS information or the Sea Sparrow data unlikely. (Note: This is not consistent with the information provided to the Defense Attache by MSO staff.) The JMSDF will try to conclude its investigations on the AEGIS information leak by the end of the month. Kato stressed that the JMSDF will cooperate fully with U.S. authorities and report to the Ambassador the final outcome. -------------- AMB: U.S. EXPERTS NEED TO CONDUCT ANALYSIS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that it is imperative that U.S. experts conduct forensic analysis of all confiscated hard drives in the recent case. He also expressed concern that the incident appears to contradict earlier reports that investigations on all JMSDF personnel involved in the 2007 AEGIS leak are complete and the problem is contained. SCHIEFFER