LITTLE CHANGE IN JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS UNDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000643 SIPDIS SIPDIS MOSCOW PASS VLADIVOSTOK HELSINKI PASS ST. PETERSBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA RU SUBJECT: LITTLE CHANGE IN JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS UNDER MEDVEDEV REF: A. TOKYO 0328 ¶B. 07 TOKYO 5019 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1 .4 (B) (D) ¶1. (C) Japanese Foreign Ministry, Russian Embassy Tokyo, and Japanese academic experts see little chance Russian President-elect Dmitriy Medvedev will make significant changes in Japan-Russia relations. Outgoing President Vladimir Putin's expected central role in conducting international affairs, combined with Medvedev's subordinate position and commitment to Putin's policies, demonstrate that Moscow will not offer any compromises on the Northern Territories issue. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda likewise has few negotiating cards to play over the four islands, because any new approach would involve Tokyo making new, unpopular concessions. However, a leading Russia expert advises that former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, a close Fukuda advisor and confidante, presented Putin with a version of the 2001 Irkutsk Declaration as a way to break the deadlock during a December 2007 Moscow meeting, but received an equivocal response. On missile defense, Moscow has not raised concerns about United States-Japan missile defense cooperation since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov offered objections during his October 2007 visit to Tokyo. Japanese diplomats say they have heard rumors that Putin, not Medvedev, may represent Russia at the July G8 Summit at Hokkaido's Lake Toya. End Summary. -------------- No Change Under Medvedev -------------- ¶2. (C) Foreign Ministry Russia Division Principal Deputy Director Kotaro Otsuki told Embassy Tokyo that Japan sees little chance that the March 2 election of Russian President-elect Dmitriy Medvedev will result in significant changes in Japan-Russia relations. Otsuki assessed that Medvedev, who has little foreign policy experience, will initially focus on domestic issues, leaving outgoing President Vladimir Putin to take the lead on diplomatic initiatives. Tokyo officials have heard, but cannot confirm, reports that Putin may represent Russia at the July 7-8 G8 Summit at Hokkaido,s Lake Toya. Putin's apparent primacy on the international stage, combined with Medvedev's subordinate role and publicly stated commitment to continue Putin's overseas policies, demonstrate that Moscow is not prepared to offer any compromise on the Northern Territories issue, Otsuki concluded. ¶3. (C) Tokyo and Moscow have not yet confirmed the dates for Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura's hoped for March visit to Moscow, according to Otsuki. The schedule will depend on the political situation in the Diet, where sensitive budget deliberations are ongoing. If the visit takes place, Koumura would look to confirm that: 1) the course of Japan-Russia foreign relations will remain unchanged, and 2) discussion on the NT issue will proceed on the basis of prior understandings. -------------- Japan's Payment for World War II -------------- ¶4. (S) On March 8, Russian Embassy First Secretary Yuri Yuriev rejected, using the strongest language to date, any possibility of change in Moscow's views on the Northern Territories, noting that the "new President's appointment would have no impact on Russia-Japan relations." According to Yuriev, the situation regarding the Northern Territories is "the result of Japan's fiasco during World War II," and represents "a payment for its aggressive military policy and the alliance with Hitler's Germany." He continued that "no TOKYO 00000643 002 OF 002 Russian leader who wants to continue in his job until the new election would ever think about returning the islands to Japan." The status quo would continue until Japan altered its "principled position" demanding the return of the four islands. -------------- Medvedev Placates Hardliners -------------- ¶5. (C) Aoyama Gakuin University Professor Shigeki Hakamada argued that Medvedev cannot afford to adopt a conciliatory approach to Tokyo. Medvedev must take a hard-line stance on the diplomatic front in order to prevent former KGB and military officials from assuming greater power. A new Russian state-nationalism, which has replaced communism or the Orthodox Church as the leading ideologies in defining Russian identity, has fueled domestic public opinion and serves to block discourse on the territorial issue, Hakamada opined. -------------- Mori Proposal -------------- ¶6. (C) Hakamada observed that Prime Minister Fukuda likewise has few negotiating cards to play over the four islands, because any new approach would involve Tokyo making new, unpopular concessions. Former Prime Minister and senior LDP member Yoshiro Mori, who visited Moscow in December 2007 (Ref A),exercises some influence on Fukuda's thinking, according to Hakamada. Mori negotiated the 2001 Irkutsk Declaration with Putin that called for a "parallel approach" - the immediate return of Habomai and Shikotan while continuing negotiations on Kunashiri and Etorofu. According to Hakamada, Mori pitched a version of the Irkutsk proposal to Putin during last December's meeting, but received an equivocal response. Mori and Putin are said to have good "personal relations," Hakamada asserted. -------------- Abe vs. Fukuda -------------- ¶7. (C) Moscow officials plan to invite Fukuda to Moscow in the near future, primarily because Russian leaders do not want to take up the Northern Territories issue at the July G8 Summit, Hakamada said. One former Russian Foreign Ministry official reportedly told Hakamada that former Prime Minister Shintaro Abe's departure was "regrettable," because Abe had been a "realist" and had "his own strategy as a statesman." -------------- Missile Defense Cooperation -------------- ¶8. (C) Russian Division Principal Deputy Director Otsuki noted that Moscow has not raised concerns about United States-Japan missile defense cooperation since Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov offered objections during his October 2007 visit to Tokyo (Ref B). Otsuki expressed little concern about the impact BMD cooperation might have on future Japan-Russia relations. ¶9. (C) Professor Hakamada further offered that United States-Japan missile defense cooperation "is not a serious concern" for Russia. Moscow views a United States military presence in Poland and the Czech Republic as a more serious concern. Hakamada suggested that Moscow is worried that Japan will develop its own missile technology and sees Washington-Tokyo BMD cooperation as a way of keeping Japan in check. SCHIEFFER