PM FUKUDA AS LEADER: AVOIDING RISK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000561 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USTR/BEEMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: PM FUKUDA AS LEADER: AVOIDING RISK REF: A. TOKYO 00325 ¶B. TOKYO 5019 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons 1.4 b/d Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (C) After five months as Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda has emerged as a cautious, risk-adverse, yet shrewd leader. Fukuda has played a weak hand fairly well and marginalized his opposition party opponent, Ichiro Ozawa. Unfortunately for Fukuda, his low-profile, rejection of Koizumi-style strong leadership, and failure to articulate a vision for Japan has driven down his standing with the public to dangerously low levels. Opinion polls show Fukuda's support rate is now under 30 percent, and over half of the Japanese now oppose the Fukuda cabinet. Fukuda has handled domestic problems, i.e. pensions, the Hepatitis C compensation, Chinese dumpling poisoning, Ministry of Defense scandals, and even the OEF legislation, by delaying decisions as long as possible while sidestepping taking personal responsibility for resolving matters. ¶2. (C) Unlike former PM Koizumi, who famously declared he would reform the LDP or destroy it, Prime Minister Fukuda is governing as a consensus manager, serving more as a "complaint desk" than as a proactive leader. That said, Fukuda has engaged on international issues, restarting Indian ocean refueling, providing aid to Afghanistan, and improving relations with China and Russia. In the run-up to the G-8, Fukuda will likely use foreign diplomacy to burnish his credentials with the voters and stave off a general election. This cable summarizes Post's view of Fukuda's leadership and his handling of significant issues. End summary and comment. Iijima Critical of Fukuda -------------- ¶3. (C) Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's former secretary Isao Iijima expressed concern to Embassy Tokyo in SIPDIS recent weeks about Fukuda's lack of leadership. In a meeting early this year, Iijima grumbled that Fukuda is the first Prime Minister in modern Japanese politics without any policy pledge or vision. Iijima said it is impossible to coordinate candidates for the next election, let alone carry out a Cabinet reshuffle or dissolve the Lower House, without a clear understanding of what the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Prime Minister stand for. Iijima added that Fukuda is being falsely praised for his ability to compile the budget because in reality the budget already had been put together last summer under the Abe administration. ¶4. (C) Iijima also complained that Fukuda tries to avoid responsibility. As an example, Iijima said that it was former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kaoru Yosano who devised and then presented to Fukuda the idea of a stopgap bill to resolve the expiring gasoline tax issue. According to Iijima, Fukuda handed the idea back to Yosano, saying it was Yosano's responsibility. Reform or Conversion? -------------- ¶5. (C) Jiji Press Chief Commentator Shiro Tazaki, speaking at a gathering of diplomats, described how Fukuda met with editorial writers on January 17 before giving his policy speech to the Diet. During that meeting, one writer asked why "reform" was not mentioned in the speech. Fukuda replied that he would use the word "conversion" instead and could conduct "real reform." Tazaki said that Fukuda seemed to be TOKYO 00000561 002 OF 004 positioning himself as different from former Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe and that Fukuda wanted to establish his own style. Asked what "real reform" meant to Fukuda, Tazaki answered that he thought Fukuda meant "reform for consumers," as Fukuda stated in his policy speech. Fukuda needs to appeal to the public, argued Tazaki, but Fukuda's aide told Tazaki that Fukuda would not embrace such an approach. Rather, Fukuda's style is to gradually demonstrate that he has acted upon an issue. ¶6. (C) Tazaki also commented that Fukuda is shaping up to be a weak candidate and party leader in the next Diet election. Fukuda is a good administrator, he said, but he does not convey to the general public, or even to other LDP members, what it is he wants to do or in what direction he thinks Japan should go. No Leadership, says Kato -------------- ¶7. (C) Senior ruling party politician Koichi Kato told Embassy Tokyo in February this year that poor economic management and a lack of leadership could force the Prime Minister to dissolve the Diet in the fall, with the ruling coalition likely to lose its two-thirds super-majority in the Lower House. The Japanese people are looking for vision and leadership, which PM Fukuda has yet to provide, Kato said. (See reftel A). Examples of Fukuda's Delayed Leadership -------------- ¶8. (C) Fukuda's management style of delaying action has revealed itself in his handling of various crises during the first months of his tenure. Beginning with the OEF legislation, followed by the pensions problem, the Hepatitis C problem and finally the Chinese dumpling food poisoning incident, Fukuda has demonstrated a reluctance to make a final, definitive decision until the last possible moment. OEF legislation -------------- ¶9. (C) Throughout the autumn Fukuda refused to commit to using the Diet Lower House's two-thirds majority to pass the OEF legislation that the opposition-controlled Upper House was sure to vote down. He told Embassy Tokyo that he wanted to wait for public support of the legislation to reach 60 percent. Only in December when it became inevitable that the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) would not abandon its opposition to the bill did Fukuda finally publicly articulate his willingness to use the Lower House majority to override the DPJ-controlled Upper House veto. Pensions -------------- ¶10. (C) After making a public promise that the missing 50 million pension accounts would be tracked down and the system would be fixed, Fukuda then left the problem in the hands of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) and its Minister Yoichi Masuzoe. When it became apparent in December that completely identifying all missing or incomplete pension accounts was impossible, Fukuda attempted to backtrack on his promise. The polls then indicated a drop in his support, however, forcing him to reverse himself a second time. In late December Fukuda promised a thorough review of the pension system and policies that would focus on consumers. Hepatitis C -------------- TOKYO 00000561 003 OF 004 ¶11. (C) As with the pension problem, Fukuda left resolution of the Hepatitis C lawsuit against the government to MHLW. The plaintiffs have been pursuing the government for at least five years seeking a settlement for victims who contracted hepatitis C after being administered bad blood products. Ministry officials angered the plaintiffs in October by revealing that the Ministry had data that would have helped identify or warn hundreds of patients before their illnesses worsened. Then the government presented an offer to the victims which would have compensated only some victims under different conditions. As public sentiment began to turn against Fukuda, reflected in a drop in his support rate, LDP Headquarters Director General Hitoshi Motojuku told Embassy Tokyo that he called Fukuda directly to tell him that he had to take care of the issue immediately because it was seriously affecting the LDP. Fukuda then instructed the LDP to draft legislation providing blanket relief to the Hepatitis C victims, an idea Motojuku said came from Yosano. Gyoza-gate -------------- ¶12. (C) When first faced with the case of poisoned dumplings from China Fukuda told reporters that "the relevant government officials will deal with it." Subsequently, however, Fukuda reportedly became angry at the officials responsible for moving too slowly and established a panel charged with thoroughly implementing new food safety measures by expanding inspection of imported products. More Engaged on International Issues -------------- ¶13. (C) On the international front Fukuda has demonstrated a greater willingness toward engagement and decisions. On February 4, for example, Fukuda met with Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta and promised continued support for Afghanistan's reconstruction and security. On February 5 the Japanese government announced $110 million in aid for the country. Albania's Prime Minister met with Fukuda on February 5 to discuss Kosovo's independence and the Japanese government is now reportedly discussing recognizing Kosovo as a state. Fukuda sent Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin a personal letter in late December proposing that Japan-Russia relations be raised to a higher level -- particularly a resolution to the Northern Territories -- and Putin responded positively (see reftel B). The media has reported that a resolution may be close in the on-going East China Sea dispute over oil and natural gas deposits although the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry denies the reports. Marginalizing Ozawa: Rope-a-dope Strategy -------------- ¶14. (C) To date, PM Fukuda has managed to marginalize opposition DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa by avoiding head-on clashes in Diet deliberations and other public fora. Typical of this was the January 9 party leaders debate in the Diet. Billed ahead of time as a major political confrontation, Ozawa sought to draw out the Prime Minister on issues as varied as pensions and the overseas dispatch of SDF units. Rather than turning the question-and-answer session into a political slugfest, Fukuda instead disarmed Ozawa with responses such as "you're right" and "I agree with you." ¶15. (C) Most damaging to Ozawa's reputation was last November's grand coalition fiasco. During closed-door discussions between Fukuda and Ozawa, the two agreed to set up a grand coalition to get beyond the divided Diet. The TOKYO 00000561 004 OF 004 only problem for Ozawa was that when he took the proposal back to his party's leadership, it was rejected and he resigned. Although the DPJ eventually pleaded with Ozawa to return, the damage to his public image was done. ¶16. (C) As a result, while Fukuda's non-support rate of over 50 percent exceeds his 30 percent support rate, he is nonetheless more popular than Ozawa. In a recent poll, when asked about a possible Ozawa Prime Ministership, only 21 percent of the respondents offered their support. SCHIEFFER