PHYSICAL PROTECTION: MOFA SUPPORT FOR US/JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000498 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/J, ISN FOR BURKART PASS TO DOE FOR AOKI, KROLL, GOOREVICH, KRUPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 TAGS: ENRG JA KNNP MNUC SUBJECT: PHYSICAL PROTECTION: MOFA SUPPORT FOR US/JAPAN DIALOG Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. MOFA official Yasuyoshi Komizo, meeting February 18 with a visiting interagency delegation, conveyed strong support for continuing U.S.-Japan cooperation on the physical protection of nuclear materials. He also noted GOJ willingness to send representatives to the U.S. to participate in a proposed workshop on radiological emergency preparedness. Regarding the revision of INFCIRC/225, Komizo noted that before deciding whether to join the ""core group"" of countries working on that effort, the GOJ would want to find out whether Japan could have any influence on the outcome of the revision process. He also said progress toward a comprehensive bilateral agreement for sharing sensitive physical protection information would be slow, given domestic political sensitivies in Japan. End summary. ¶2. (U) A DOE/NNSA-led interagency delegation met February 18 with Yasuyoshi Komizo, Director of MOFA's International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division, on the first day of a week-long series of meetings with GOJ ministries and technical organizations regarding the physical protection of nuclear material. The meetings, which ran through February 22 and included site visits to the Tokai Unit 2 power reactor and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, continued U.S.-Japan technical-level consultations aimed at strengthening Japan's regulatory and technology infrastructure for the security of nuclear materials and facilities. Melissa Krupa (NNSA) led the U.S. side, accompanied by J. Mentz (State),B. Westreich (NRC),J. Glaser (NNSA),J. Hill (NNSA),and Energy Attache ¶R. Cherry. MOFA officer Yukari Aosa accompanied Komizo. ¶3. (SBU) The delegation thanked Komizo for MOFA's support of the bilateral consultations on physical protection issues. Komizo noted in response that MOFA strongly supports the U.S.-Japan dialog and a more active role by Japan in international efforts to strengthen nuclear security. While MOFA has no direct role in physical protection matters domestically, it is willing and able to play an active role in getting the appropriate Japanese organizations involved and in coordinating GOJ positions on physical protection. ¶4. (SBU) Komizo noted Japan's interest during its G8 presidency to promote efforts to strenthen the nuclear infrastructure in countries interested in developing peaceful nuclear power programs. A paper drafted by Japan is presently being coordinated in both the Nonproliferation Director's Group and the Nuclear Safety and Security Working Group. ¶5. (C) From his comments on the G8 process, Komizo gave a brief status update on Japan's negotiations with Russia on an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In frank comments, Komizo observed that Russia needed western technology, which was only available from France or Japan. Since the French would not agree to share the technology, Russia had to come to Japan. Komizo pointed out that Russia had accepted many of Japan's conditions for the negotiations, including the separation of military and civilian activities at facilities directly related to its commercial nuclear program. Russia is also in discussions with the IAEA about the application of international safeguards at Angarsk (with Russia to pay the cost of safeguards). Finally, Komizo said that a Russian decision to move up the schedule for shutting down its last two plutonium production reactors was in response to a Japanese demand. ¶6. (SBU) When asked about the U.S. proposal to hold a workshop on radiological emergency preparedness, Komizo said Japan was prepared to send a small (5-6 person) delegation to participate in the workshop in the U.S. Japan would like the workshop to take place in April 2008, if possible. Before accepting an invitation to attend the workshop, Komizo said, Japan would like to know how the workshop in the U.S. would differ from one held in China last December. Del promised to inform NNSA/NA-40 of the Japanese interest in sending a team to the U.S. in April. Del also noted the workshop in the U.S. would involve more hands-on experience with emergency response equipment and techniques than the one held in China. ¶7. (C) Del inquired about GOJ views on prospects for a bilateral agreement for the sharing of classified physical protection information, noting that the absence of a formal mechanism could hamper more detailed information exchanges the U.S. and Japan may wish to have in the future. In response, Komizo was frank in explaining that information sharing on nuclear security issues was a very sensitive matter in Japanese domestic politics. Transparency and openness are very important for Japanese public acceptance of nuclear power, he said. To enter into an agreement that provided for the sharing of classified information about the security of nuclear facilities and material could detract from the perception of transparency and openness, possibly undermining public acceptance. If, for example, the information sharing concerned potential insider threats, that could be interpreted as suggesting that some segment of the Japanese population was a problem. A comprehensive information sharing agreement would likely have to be submitted for Diet approval. In the event any such issues arose in the Diet debate, the political fallout could negate any potential benefit from having the agreement. That said, Komizo didn't rule out information sharing, but stressed that the GOJ would want to proceed deliberately, first to identify specific issues on which Japan would like to share information, and then to discuss the appropriate means to share that information. Identification of limited areas of information sharing might not require Diet approval, Komizo said. ¶8. (SBU) When asked for his views on possible roles that nongovernmental bodies could play in facilitating the sharing of physical protection best practices, Komizo said, ""You mean something like WINS."" He went on to say that, while the Japan Atomic Energy Agency has participated in international discussions on the concept of WINS (World Institute for Nuclear Security),governments should proceed with caution in considering whether to set up a body that would deal with physical protection -- which is universally viewed as being the responsibility of sovereign governments. Komizo said the analogy between WINS and WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators),which promotes best practices for safety, is not entirely accurate. For example, he noted, safety cooperation with India and Pakistan continued following the 1998 nuclear tests. ""Physical protection is different,"" he said. ¶9. (SBU) Del asked about Japanese interest in sharing information on non-lethal use of force, a topic introduced in the last high level consultations on physical protection, in July 2007. Komizo confirmed the Japanese National Policy Agency is interested in having discussions and would welcome a concrete proposal from the U.S. ¶10. (C) Komizo was noncommittal regarding the timing of the next round of high level consultations. He pointed out that, if the aim was to engage the broadest range of Japanese organizations, then it would be more effective to have the meetings in Japan. In another frank comment, he went on to say that both he and Ambassador Nakane, the Japanese principal in the high level discussions, have been in their current positions for several years and would likely rotate to new positions following the G8 Summit this July. Komizo suggested scheduling the next high level meeting early after the new team is installed, so they can more quickly become acquainted with the U.S. and Japanese efforts. ¶11. (SBU) Finally, Del informed Komizo that the U.S. was interested in Japan joining the ""core group"" of countries (U.S., UK, France, Australia, Canada) that has been meeting to discuss possible revisions to the international physical protection guidelines in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4. Komizo replied that he was aware of longstanding interest in certain (unspecified) countries in updating the guidelines, but he declined to say whether Japan would join. Rather, he noted that METI and MEXT -- the two ministries with primary responsibility for nuclear security in Japan -- would first want to understand the status of the core group discussions. The GOJ would then be able to determine the likelihood of influencing the revision process and making substantive contributions to it. ¶12. Del cleared this cable prior to departure. SCHIEFFER