Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO365
2008-02-12 09:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN UNABLE TO PROVIDE MUCH ASSISTANCE ON LEBANON

Tags:  PREL PHUM KDEM EFIN EINV LE SY JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000365 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA SOMERSET, IRWIN, AND MONZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM EFIN EINV LE SY JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN UNABLE TO PROVIDE MUCH ASSISTANCE ON LEBANON

REF: A. STATE 10786

B. 07 TOKYO 4374

C. 07 TOKYO 3078

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000365

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA SOMERSET, IRWIN, AND MONZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM EFIN EINV LE SY JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN UNABLE TO PROVIDE MUCH ASSISTANCE ON LEBANON

REF: A. STATE 10786

B. 07 TOKYO 4374

C. 07 TOKYO 3078

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Other than public statements in support of
the Lebanese government, Japan is unable or unwilling to take
further steps at this time to support Lebanon. Funds are not
available for the Special Tribunal, Lebanon does not qualify
for Japanese official development assistance (ODA),the
provision of assistance to Lebanese security forces is
prohibited by Japan's constitution, and Japan is hesitant to
jeopardize its "normal" bilateral relations with Iran and
Syria by speaking out against them in the absence of more
concrete evidence of troublesome behavior. Japan has no
plans to send or receive high-level delegations to or from
Syria and will notify us in advance if such visits become
possible. Finally, Japan will not impose economic or
financial sanctions against states, individuals or
institutions undermining Lebanon's sovereignty without a
Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution. However, Japan's
views toward Syria have hardened somewhat as Tokyo closely
examines possible links between Damascus and the DPRK. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Japan fully supports efforts to stabilize Lebanon and
to bolster the government of Prime Minister Siniora,
according to MOFA First Middle East Division Principal Deputy
Director Akihiro Tsuji, who told Embassy Tokyo Political
Officer that Middle East and African Affairs Bureau Deputy
Director General Shinsuke Sugiyama had held productive talks
on Lebanon earlier this month in Washington with NEA DAS
Gordon Gray and NEA/ELA Director Abercrombie-Winstanley.
According to Tsuji, Japan's major priority in the region is
to advance the Middle East Peace Process in line with the
President's Annapolis initiative. Much hard work remains to
be done to realize an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord by the
end of the year, and events in Lebanon are only likely to
complicate matters, he explained. But while taking the issue
of Lebanon and Syria quite seriously, Japan lacks the
leverage to do much in the case of either country, he
asserted.


3. (C) Tsuji then reviewed Japan's response to each of the
items contained in ref A demarche:

-- The Tribunal: Japan agrees that it is critical that the
Tribunal be established as soon as possible and understands
the need for funding. However, despite the efforts of his
division to lobby for such funds, none are forthcoming given

competing priorities and a shrinking ODA budget. Earlier
efforts to identify Japanese judges to serve on the Tribunal

TOKYO 00000365 002 OF 003


(ref B) came to naught when the Ministry of Justice was
unable to identify "qualified" candidates to put forth.
Tsuji admitted that one problem was finding judges willing to

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serve abroad.

-- Economic Assistance: Repeating the same position we have
heard on previous demarches seeking aid for Lebanon, Tsuji
noted that Japan's ODA program is criteria-based, and as
Lebanon's per capita GNP exceeds USD 4,000, Lebanon would not
qualify for ODA even if funds could be found in the shrinking
assistance budget. While Japan has been able to find small
amounts of funds for humanitarian relief in Lebanon in the
past year, such funds cannot be used to cover foreign debts.
(NOTE: Japan contributed USD 700,000 in emergency grant aid
last July through the UN Relief and Works Agency for
humanitarian assistance for Palestinian refugees affected by
the fighting at the Nahr El-Eared refugee camp. In addition,
Japan contributed approximately USD 11 million in the
aftermath of last year's conflict between Israel and
Hizbollah in South Lebanon. END NOTE.

-- Military Assistance: Japan is prohibited by law from
providing assistance to foreign militaries.

-- Strong Statements in Favor of Lebanon's Government: Japan
is prepared to make such statements, confirmed Tsuji, who
said the most recent such statement was issued in November
concerning the stalled presidential election. Political
officer urged Tsuji to press for more frequent statements,
particularly following violent incidents aimed at the
government and its supporters. (NOTE: MOFA issued a press
statement condemning the assassination of MP Walid Eido, his
son, and others last June. END NOTE.) Tsuji noted that
Japan was prepared to strongly support Prime Minister Siniora
last year during his planned visit to Tokyo, and was
disappointed when the visit had to be canceled at the very
last minute. Siniora's invitation to Tokyo remains open, but
Japan realizes it will be difficult for him to travel.

-- Statements Condemning Syria and Iran: Tsuji said this
would be very difficult to do, given the fact Japan enjoys
and hopes to maintain "normal" bilateral relations with both
countries, and in the absence of "concrete evidence" of
troublesome behavior by either country. Political Officer
argued that Iranian and Syrian support for elements opposed
to Lebanon's moderate government are self-evident, but Tsuji
responded that more would be needed before Japan would openly
condemn either Damascus or Tehran.

-- Senior Level Travel: Tsuji said there are currently no
plans to receive any high-level Syrian delegations, nor are
there any plans to send such a delegation to Damascus.
However, Japan believes in maintaining dialogue. When Senior
Vice Foreign Minister Katsuhito Asano visited Damascus last

TOKYO 00000365 003 OF 003


June, the Japanese had been careful to consult with the
Department in advance and Asano had delivered a strong
message to Syrian President Asad to moderate his behavior
(ref C). If high-level visits are to be contemplated in the
future, Tokyo will again notify us in advance, Tsuji said.

-- Financial Sanctions: Japan will not impose financial
sanctions in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution
pursuant to Chapter VII, similar to those enacted against
Iran, according to Tsuji.


4. (C) Despite Japan's desire to maintain "normal" relations
with Syria, Tsuji confided that since reports of possible
collusion between Syria and the DPRK have surfaced, MOFA is
taking a much more critical and careful look at relations
with Damascus. In the past, policy decisions concerning
Syria could pretty much be made by the First Middle East
Division. Now anything to do with Damascus ends up on desks
much higher in the Ministry, he said.
SCHIEFFER

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