DPRK: JAPANESE EXPERT RECOUNTS RODONG SINMUN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003215

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KN JA
SUBJECT: DPRK: JAPANESE EXPERT RECOUNTS RODONG SINMUN
CONVERSATION

REF: 10/29 EMBASSY BEIJING E-MAIL (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer per 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (S) DPRK expert Hajime Izumi recently recounted for
Embassy Tokyo his late October meetings with Lee Yong,
Beijing Bureau Chief for North Korea's Rodong Sinmun. During
their discussions, Lee stressed that it would be unacceptable
for a non-Six Party participant to provide energy assistance
to the DPRK; stated that the eight abductees remaining on
Japan's official list are dead, and that the only way for
Japan to accept this would be for Tokyo and Pyongyang to form
a joint investigation committee; and predicted that, in the
near term, there would be no improvement in North-South
relations. End Summary.


2. (S) During a recent meeting with Embassy Tokyo and
Washington visitors, Shizuoka University professor and
prominent DPRK watcher Hajime Izumi described his late
October discussions in Beijing with Lee Yong, Beijing Bureau
Chief of the DPRK's Rodong Sinmun Newspaper (reftel). Izumi
first met with Lee in 2007, and this was their sixth meeting
since then.

Energy Assistance
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3. (S) According to Lee, the DPRK cannot in principle accept
energy assistance from countries outside the Six Parties
process. (Note: Lee asked Izumi to "write this point down,"
which Izumi took to mean that Lee wanted the message passed
to the Japanese Government. End Note.) The DPRK had
originally tried to resolve the nuclear issue bilaterally
with the United States, but the United States had insisted
that the countries concerned with the North's nuclear program
need to play a role to ensure that the DPRK keeps its
promise. In response, the DPRK accepted the Six Party
process. Now, if countries like Australia are brought in to
provide energy assistance, "the Six Party Talks would become
meaningless," Lee said. However, if the United States now
prefers to settle the nuclear issue bilaterally with the
DPRK, the DPRK would not care about who bears the energy
assistance burden, Lee added.


4. (S) It is also difficult in principle for the DPRK to
allow the United States to cover for Japan, because "this
would give Japan special status" and would be tantamount to
permitting Japan to break its Six Party pledge. If Japan
continues to refuse to provide energy assistance, the DPRK
will again slow down disablement or suspend the process. As
a result, the completion of the second phase might be
extended into the next U.S. administration, Lee suggested.

Japan-DPRK Relations
--------------


5. (S) On abductions, once the DPRK launches its
investigative committee, Lee stressed that Japan must carry
out its pledge to lift sanctions on North Korea partially --
namely, travel between the two countries and charter flights.
That said, the DPRK wonders whether Japan seriously believes
that the eight abductees remaining on the government's list
are alive. "It is beyond comprehension," Lee said. As such,
the job of the DPRK's investigative committee will be to
confirm once and for all the deaths of the eight abductees.
But, Japan might refuse to accept these conclusions, Lee
surmised. Therefore, Japan and the DPRK should form a joint
investigative panel in the future and work towards a
conclusion that both can acknowledge and accept, Lee
suggested.


6. (S) In order to break the deadlock in Japan-DPRK
relations, it is necessary to reach an all-encompassing
agreement on the settlement of the past and pending bilateral
issues, Lee said. However, it is difficult for the two
countries to find a mutually acceptable way forward. For the
DPRK, normalization, followed by a settlement of the past

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(that is, compensation for Japan's colonial rule) and
resolution of other pending issues, is most desirable.
However, Japan categorically refuses. On the contrary, Japan
wants pending issues settled first, then normalization and
the settlement of the past. The DPRK cannot accept this
approach because it is not in the spirit of the Pyongyang
Declaration. The only feasible way forward is for Japan to
provide energy and humanitarian assistance in the context of
the Six Party Talks. The DPRK would understand this approach
as reflecting Japan's sincere desire to make an effort to
settle the past, Lee said.

North-South Relations
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7. (S) The DPRK cannot compromise with President Lee
Myung-bak, Lee said, and President Lee should change his
attitude and policies towards North Korea. Particularly
problematic is President Lee's "3000 strategy." The plan's
goal of increasing the DPRK's per capita GDP to USD 3,000
harms the DPRK's self-esteem. "It treats the DPRK like a
beggar," Lee asserted. Because of the ROK's current stance
towards the DPRK, "there is no prospect for improving
North-South relations in the near term," Lee said. The key
is whether President Lee will change his position or not.
The DPRK will not beg the South for food or fertilizer, Lee
said.

DPRK Internal Affairs
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8. (S) Before meeting with Izumi, Lee told him that he had
read Izumi's article on the role of North Korea's National
Defense Commission (NDC). Commenting on the article's
contents, Lee said "there are no mistakes or parts that need
to be fixed." (Note: In a November 2008 Chuo Koron article,
Izumi wrote that the DPRK,s National Defense Commission will
continue to strengthen and grow in influence, even eclipsing
the Korean Workers Party. Currently, the NDC's role is
similar to that of the Politburo when Kim Il Sung was alive.
However, while military officials accounted for around
two-thirds of the Politburo's membership, 90 percent of the
NDC are military officials, Izumi noted in his article. End
Note.)
SCHIEFFER