U.S.-JAPAN ROLES, MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003120 SIPDIS DOD FOR OSD/ASA/SEDNEY, HILL, BASALLA PACOM FOR J3, J5 POLAD USFJ FOR J00, J01, J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2023 TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN ROLES, MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES WORKING GROUP Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The bilateral Roles, Mission and Capabilities Working Group (RMC WG),co-chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sedney and State Department Japan Office Director Russel, along with Deputy Director General counterparts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, met in Tokyo on October 7. Highlights from the three-hour meeting include: -- Bilateral Planning: The United States pressed for Japan to complete more site surveys sooner and to provide a timeline. MOD and MOFA indicated a greater understanding of the importance of accurate assumptions in planning. They also acknowledged the usefulness of a plan execution matrix in the bilateral Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 5055. -- Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM): Japan reiterated support for the flexible activation of the mil-mil Bilateral Coordination Centers and stated the need for consideration on how to more flexibly activate the policy-level BCM entities. -- NEO: MOD agreed that early completion of surveys of ports and coordination with relevant ministries is important for NEO. -- Cluster Munitions (CM): MOD requested cooperation in preventing Japan's planned ratification of the Oslo Convention from forcing the Japanese government to ask USFJ to limit the storage or employment of CM in Japan. -- Training on Guam: Japan's Self Defense Forces are examining opportunities for conducting bilateral, JSDF-only joint service, and bilateral joint exercises on Guam. -- Information Sharing: Both sides agreed to establish an Executive Steering Group to oversee information sharing efforts and issues. -- Command and Control Working Group: The work is complete and the results will be fed into other working groups, incorporated into plans and validated during exercises. -- Capability Assessment Group: Work on the bilateral airpower assessment will continue with a workshop on capability-based planning, agreement on terms of reference and commencement of a six month study. -- Extended Deterrence: Japan wants continued dialogue to gain better understanding of U.S. policy and dissuade doubters in Japan. The US-side indicated its unwavering commitment to meet its treaty obligations. Both sides agreed to hold the next RMC WG early in 2009. End summary. ¶2. (U) The bilateral Roles, Mission and Capabilities Working Group (RMC WG) met in Tokyo on October 7. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney and State Department Japan Office Director Daniel Russel led the U.S.-side, which included participants from the Joint Staff, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and Embassy Tokyo. Ministry of Defense (MOD) Deputy Director General for Defense Policy Ryutaro Matsumoto and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Deputy Director General for North American Affairs Koji Haneda co-chaired the Japan side, which included representatives from the Japan Joint Staff Office (JSO). The following are highlights from the presentations and discussions during the meeting. Bilateral Planning Overview -------------- ¶3. (S) USFJ presented a timeline for the bilateral updating of Contingency Plan 5055-09, due for completion in September ¶2009. Responding to DASD Sedney's inquiries, MOD DDG Matsumoto said that Japan is not considering any new roles and missions for the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) under the new guidance driving the update. Turning to surveys of Japanese public and commercial airports and seaports, MOD representative said Japan had completed five surveys and would finish two more this year. The data gained from these site surveys should be reflected in CONPLAN 5055. The U.S. side pressed Japan to complete the surveys of the remaining airports and seaports as soon as possible and said the results of all port surveys need to be reflected in the CONPLAN. The JSO J5 representative agreed with the point, and stated that this is necessary to fully realize the benefits of the planning process. DASD Sedney reiterated past U.S. requests for a timeline for completion of the surveys but received no commitment from MOD and MOFA counterparts. Planning Assumptions -------------- ¶4. (S) The United States highlighted for Japan the importance of realistic assumptions in the planning process and the important role policymakers play in developing these assumptions. Incorrect or unrealistic assumptions will lead to faulty planning and poor operations. The U.S. side suggested that assumptions in the CONPLAN 5055-09 planning process should be separated into those relevant for peacetime, situations in areas surrounding Japan (SIASJ) and the defense of Japan in war/conflict situations. DDG Matsumoto described this as a very effective way to approach the assumptions, while cautioning that more study of the specific information, such as the authorization of strike options during SIASJ, is needed. Update on Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) -------------- -- ¶5. (S) Following up on the flexibility Japan had previously shown on the activation of the mil-to-mil Bilateral Coordination Centers, the United States stressed that flexibility is also needed in activating the more policy-oriented BCM structures, especially the Joint Coordination Group (JCG),that include relevant ministries and agencies (RMA) besides MOD and MOFA. Using those agreed upon BCM structures to bilaterally coordinate on matters that RMA's have jurisdiction over, such as airspace, frequency allocation or access to ports, will be critical during peacetime on the road to a contingency and during the transition to SIASJ or a wartime environment. ¶6. (S) MOD, after describing the political realities and legal guidelines they are operating under, agreed that crisis situations reduce timelines and increase the need for greater information flow. While politics and legal grounds may prevent the activation of the BCM prior to declaration of SIASJ, which MOD DG Matsumoto acknowledged as a problem, preparation and coordination needs to happen before, not during, a crisis. He reiterated his support for the early activation, including during peacetime, of the mil-mil BCC that will allow for coordination between U.S. forces and the JSDF. DDG Matsumoto said more work needs to be done on figuring out how to utilize the JCG and coordinate on policy without the full standup of the BCM. MOFA DDG Haneda agreed, highlighting examples of how early RMA involvement and coordination on contingencies is critical. Both the U.S. and Japan acknowledged the process will be reviewed and improved during CONPLAN 5055 revision and exercised during the KEEN EDGE-09 exercise. Plan Execution Matrix -------------- ¶7. (S) The United States explained why a plan execution matrix, encompassing unilateral and bilateral political decision points, would be an important part of CONPLAN 5055. Clear understanding of the decision points, especially those relevant to the transitions from peacetime, to SIASJ, to wartime, will allow military planners to forecast paths forward. The matrix would not be a commitment to a specific timeline or to specific decisions. JSO expressed concern with how the matrix would reflect the political uncertainty inherent in Japanese decision making. DASD Sedney noted that uncertainty in general is both the challenge of and purpose for planning, with the goal being to reduce, or at least recognize, the uncertainty. MOFA DDG Haneda commented that a matrix would be a useful tool to reduce the unpredictability in decision making during contingencies. (NOTE: JSO had been hesitant to fully take on this tasking proposed by USFJ without policy-level acknowledgment and approval, as many of the decision points are outside of JSO control. By gaining MOFA and MOD tacit approval, JSO should now be able to move forward with developing the matrix in concert with USFJ. End note.) Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) -------------- ¶8. (S) MOFA presented an overview of the bilateral work to develop standard operation procedures to handle NEO. While a good amount of the work is the purview of MOFA and State, more interaction between USFJ and JSDF on NEO, especially during mil-mil exercises, would be beneficial to the process. USFJ confirmed that NEO will be part of the KEEN EDGE-09 exercise. DASD Sedney noted that NEO, which will start well before a SIASJ, involves complicated processes (gaining access to ports, coordinating U.S. and JSDF force flows supporting unilateral and bilateral missions, etc.) that overlap military, government and local activities. Having site surveys of ports completed as soon as possible is critically important to NEO and Japan's Transportation of Japanese Nationals Operations (TJNO) operations, DASD Sedney pointed out. MOD DDG Matsumoto agreed on the need for completion of the site surveys and coordination with Japan Coast Guard, police and fire authorities, and local governments sooner rather than later. Cluster Munitions (CM) -------------- ¶9. (S) MOD reviewed the likely timeline for Japan's signing and ratification of the Oslo Convention banning CM, its plans for replacing the lost capability and concerns how these efforts could cause the Diet to question USFJ's storing CM in Japan. Submitting a budget request for alternative weapons and systems that purportedly equal the effect of CM will cause some Diet members to question USFJ's need for CM to defend Japan. This could result in the Government of Japan being forced to request the United States to remove CM from Japan or to limit their employment on Japanese territory. MOD and MOFA want to prevent this situation and seek to exchange information with the United States at the mil-mil level and then develop a way forward to deal with the Diet and public pressure. USFJ offered that it is not possible to fully replace the capabilities afforded by CM with alternative measures. By giving up this capability Japan is therefore ceding a role and mission to the United States. One way to not get trapped into the Diet scenario MOD laid out is to publically state that Japan gave up CM for humanitarian reasons and is now reliant on U.S. forces to fill the capability gap created. Training on Guam -------------- ¶10. (S) PACOM presented an overview of training areas and types of bilateral, unilateral, single service and joint training opportunities that are and will be available on Guam. The JSO presentation focused on three types of training ) bilateral exercises (service oriented),JSDF-only joint service exercises, and bilateral joint exercises. The JSDF will focus on bilateral first and then expand to joint and joint/bilateral in the future. Functionally, the JSDF would like to focus on force deployment, electronic warfare, ballistic missile defense and TNJO (Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas),with each training event being approximately seven days long, occurring three times a year and taking place on U.S. facilities. PACOM responded that the prospect for Japan to train at Guam largely depends on the scale of the exercise. PACOM advised that the training on Guam would be viewed as an augment to the bilateral training currently conducted on Mainland Japan and Okinawa, and that the United States fully expected the JSDF to maintain and modernize mainland training ranges. Information Sharing Roadmap -------------- ¶11. In response to Japan's early request to establish an Information Sharing Roadmap Working Group, the United States proposed forming an Executive Steering Group (ESG) that PACOM J5 and OSD/Japan Desk would co-chair on the U.S. side. The ESG would take stock of the full range of information currently being shared, take up issues that are not yet being handled, and attempt to resolve issues that current bilateral entities cannot solve. The ESG will not present formal reports to the RMC WG but can refer issues to the group. Japan accepted the counterproposal and said it would name its leadership soon. Space Policy -------------- ¶12. (S) After reviewing changes in Japan's ability to use space for security purposes as a result of the Fundamental Space Law passed in May 2008, MOD introduced its priorities: -- Strengthen intelligence functions -- Increase its technology base and technological cooperation with civilian space entities -- Evaluate possibilities to field assets and technology, such as early warning satellite, signal intelligence satellites, compact reconnaissance satellites and sensor and jamming resistant technologies -- Coordinate with the United States on the use of space MOD has representatives in the Cabinet Secretariat's Space Development Strategy Headquarters that are developing a Basic Space Plan. Internally, MOD is developing guidelines and policy preferences to be ready for the bureaucratic reshuffling that is expected. These efforts will influence the drafting of the Mid-Term Defense Plan and the review of the National Defense Policy Guidelines. DASD Sedney noted that space policy is definitely an RMC issue, as new capabilities will affect bilateral roles and missions. Coordination and cooperation also provide opportunities for progress on information sharing and information security, DASD Sedney stated. Command and Control (C2) Working Group -------------- ¶13. (C) JSO reviewed the results of the C2 WG. These results will feed into other working groups and bilateral activities, get incorporated into plans and be validated during exercises. USFJ noted that the structure identified by the C2 WG presents a range of options, is not meant to be restrictive, and both countries' commanders have the ability to modify it based on real life circumstances. Capability Assessment Group (CAG) -------------- ¶14. (C) The United States previewed the road forward for the CAG's work on airpower: a weeklong workshop by Booz Allen on capability based assessment and planning in October; agreement on a Terms of Reference for the CAG Airpower Assessment Group; and the start of a six-month airpower study in November or December. The JSO said the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force is eager to begin a maritime capabilities assessment. Extended Deterrence -------------- ¶15. (S) During a separate session attended by a limited number of Japanese participants, MOFA explained that extended deterrence is critical to Japan and hence Japan would like input into U.S. policy considerations. Japan is concerned about any shifts in policy that might occur during political leadership transitions in either country, especially given the deteriorating nuclear situation around Japan as North Korea continues to develop capabilities and China expands its arsenal. There are some in Japan that are discussing indigenous nuclear development in Japan, partly due to a lack of confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence. By ensuring better understanding of U.S. policy and plans, we improve the Japanese government's ability to allay these fears and build more trust of extended deterrence. As such, MOFA and MOD are looking forward to continued dialogue with the Department of Defense. DASD Sedney stated that the U.S. policy of extended deterrence has applied to Japan for decades. The U.S. is committed to meeting treaty obligations to Japan and allies. This U.S. commitment remains strong as does its intent to maintain capabilities, political and military, that will allow it to carry out these obligations. ¶16. (U) DASD Sedney's staff and EAP/J Director Russel cleared this cable. SCHIEFFER