S/P GORDON'S TRILATERAL POLICY TALKS WITH JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003115

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/P, EAP, EAP/J, AND EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2018
TAGS: PREL KS KN JA
SUBJECT: S/P GORDON'S TRILATERAL POLICY TALKS WITH JAPAN
AND SOUTH KOREA: NORTH KOREA DISCUSSIONS

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: North Korea was a major topic of discussion
at Trilateral Policy Planning talks held in Tokyo October
28-29 by S/P Director David Gordon and his Japanese and South
Korean counterparts, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister for Foreign
Policy Koro Bessho, and Deputy Minister for Planning and
Coordination Lim Dae-Hong. South Korea views the North as
both a threat and a potential partner, and is not entirely
certain about the status of Kim Jong-Il's health, although
they believe he is recovering from a stroke and maintains
some control. Seoul does not expect a famine in the North
this year and will continue to seek a dialogue with
Pyongyang, even though this may be problematic. Japan's
policy of seeking normalization with North Korea will
continue unchanged under Prime Minister Aso, and Tokyo views
it as important that trilateral coordination on planning for
contingencies continue. The U.S. remains committed to the
denuclearization of North Korea and concurs that contingency
planning for a change in government in Pyongyang is urgently
called for. Other topics discussed, including Pakistan and
Afghanistan, regional architecture, global financial turmoil,
global warming, and the future of global governance, are
reported septel. END SUMMARY.

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ROK: BIFURCATED VIEW OF DPRK
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2. (C) Both internal factors - such as KJI's health and food
shortfalls - and external challenges - such as political
changes in the United States and the global financial crisis
- will impact the situation inside North Korea, ROK Deputy
Foreign Minister Lim Dae-Hong said. Although it remains
difficult to assess how things will evolve in the DPRK, South
Korea's bifurcated view of the North remains the same: it is
both a potential military foe and partner. Because
North-South relations are fundamentally different from those
of other independent countries, a special approach is needed.
Lim described his country's policy of pursuing economic
interests, denuclearization and reconciliation through
flexible, pragmatic and results-oriented means.

Kim Jong-Il's Health
--------------


3. (C) South Korea assesses is likely that Kim Jong-Il (KJI)
suffered a stroke in August, but that he is recovering, said
DFM Lim. The next three to five months will be critical to
see if he makes a full recovery. In spite of KJI's medical
problems, the ROK senses there have been no signs of change
in the DPRK's power structure, including the leadership and
the military. Lim said that given recent DPRK contacts with
both the South and the United States, including North-South
military talks and verification discussions, it seems that
the North's decision-making process is still functioning.

The North's Economy and Food Supply
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4. (C) On the economy, although Pyongyang had initially
touted 2008 as a "year of change," there have been no major
improvements either in economic capacity or the standard of
living, Lim continued. The ROKG assesses that the North
needs approximately 5.5 to 6 million tons of food and will
only harvest about 4.7 million. In spite of this shortfall,
it does not seem that there will be a famine in the North
(although Lim added that the World Food Program has a more

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gloomy assessment). The DPRK has yet to respond to the ROK's
May offer of food assistance, Lim said.

North-South Dialogue
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5. (C) North-South dialogue remains problematic because of
Pyongyang's refusal to respond to Seoul's offer to begin
discussions and due to continued North Korean denunciations
of the ROK, Lim reported. That said, North-South exchanges
and economic cooperation continue to expand, with exchanges
increasing 39% from September 2007 to September 2008 and
trade increasing 16% over the same period.


6. (C) South Korea will continue to seek dialogue with the
North "without getting agitated," Lim continued. The North
requested military talks on October 2 and again on October 27
to seek a cessation of South Korean NGOs' sending leaflets by
balloon into North Korea (the leaflets contain criticisms of
the KJI regime and descriptions of his illness and family
structure, and often have U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan
attached). In response to this request, the ROKG asked the
NGOs to cease, but was rebuffed. The distribution of
leaflets has been a feature of North-South relations since
1953, but this was the first time that the North has ever
asked for a halt. As such, the ROKG assesses that the KJI
regime is weakening and believes that the situation in the
North "is not good," Lim said.

KJI: Nationalist or Traitor?
--------------


7. (C) Embassy Seoul Pol M/C offered several observations.
On the DPRK's harvest, there is a gap between the ROKG's and
WFP's assessments. Also notable is the ratcheting up of the
DPRK's anti-ROK rhetoric in recent days. Over the past two
decades, there had been significant developments in South
Korea, especially in regard to the need to engage North Korea
and its leadership. Finally, Pol M/C suggested that the
three parties, and possibly China, need to discuss regional
cooperation on security and other issues.


8. (C) Deputy Minister Lim noted that within the ROK there
are two views of KJI: that of the nationalist and that of the
traitor to the Korean people. The ROKG must bear both of
these views in mind as it works to help the North deal with
its internal difficulties while persuading it to accept
"world reality" and take the peaceful road to unification
without nuclear threats.

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U.S. VIEW: FUTURE OF DPRK UNCLEAR
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9. (C) S/P Director Gordon agreed that we do not know what's
happening with KJI, how serious his condition is, nor what
the prospects are for political transition. Significantly,
in contrast to Kim Il-sung, who had undertaken a long-term
effort to lay the groundwork for KJI's eventual succession, a
similar process does not seem to be underway now. Also
notable are the North's ham-handed and fitful efforts to
portray things as normal (particularly KJI's health). The
PRC also does not seem to have a good grasp of what is going
on in North Korea. That said, while whatever is happening
does not seem to have impacted the North's decision-making
and governing processes - and perhaps we can assume that the
system will show continuity and resilience - we need to be
prepared for contingencies.


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U.S. Committed to Denuclearization
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10. (C) The United States remains committed to seeking North
Korea's denuclearization through the Six Party Talks, S/P
Director Gordon continued. Although progress has been slower
than we had hoped, we have achieved progress in the
disablement of Yongbyon and we now have in place mechanisms
to learn more about the North's nuclear program. While this
is a challenging and lengthy process - particularly when it
comes to disablement and verification -- there is no
alternate approach. The Six Party process has been very
useful to move forward while engaging CHINA on a practical
set of issues. Our view is that CHINA is uncomfortable with
the North Korean regime and its nuclear and missile
ambitions. It is not inconceivable that the PRC would seek
to use political uncertainty in the North to shape a new
regime there more suitable to China's preferences, S/P Gordon
observed.


11. (C) A co-incidence of interests among the five parties -
particularly since the election of ROK President Lee
Myung-bak -- has narrowed the North's room to maneuver on the
nuclear issue, S/P Gordon said. That said, it is difficult
to conclude that Pyongyang has made the decision to give up
its nuclear program. Our strategy of using the Six Party
process to generate momentum with the North is thus the way
to go. Regardless of who the next U.S. President is, it is
unlikely that there will be a shift away from our overall
multilateral approach, although there may be changes in
modalities or players, Dir. Gordon said.

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JAPAN: BASIC POLICY UNCHANGED
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12. (C) For Japan's part, Deputy Vice Minister Bessho stated
that newly-elected Prime Minister Aso has said Japan will
continue its basic policy of seeking normalization with the
DPRK based on a comprehensive solution to the nuclear,
missile and abductions issues. Furthermore, while it is
important to discuss the state of KJI's health, it is a given
that he will die at some point, and we need to be prepared
for what will happen when he does.

Coordination Sought
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13. (C) Invited by Bessho to speak, MOFA Japan-Korea Economic
Affairs Division Director Takeshi Akahori urged the United
States, ROK and Japan to continue their coordination "at all
levels" to ensure the North does not drive a wedge among
them. He also flagged the lesson of KEDO and the money spent
on it as useful for reflection as the three sides pursue
possible future projects in the North. Finally, he urged the
three sides to think hard about possible DPRK scenarios; for
example, in conversations with ROK economists, no one seemed
to have given much thought to what the cost of reunification
would be, and this was worrisome, Akahori said.

A North Korean "Regent"?
--------------


14. (C) Japan MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau Deputy Director
General Kazuyoshi Umemoto suggested that, in considering
future scenarios, perhaps Korean history could offer a guide
as to what happens in messy successions. Also, Umemoto
suggested that another factor impacting future scenarios is
that the North Koreans of today are better aware of what is

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happening outside and how poorly off their country is.


15. (C) Responding to Umemoto, the Blue House's Lee
Choong-myon said that there is precedence in Korean history
of regent or collective systems of leadership being
established. It seems clear that KJI is not in good
condition and that change at some point is certain. Turning
to the U.S. election results, while there may not be any big
change, there could be differences in nuance and focus. In
the end, the ROKG hopes that the new administration will
emphasize trilateral coordination and cooperation, Lee said.

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NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING
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16. (C) Returning to a theme discussed earlier, DVM Bessho
noted that although all three countries discuss
contingencies, there was little discussion about where
ultimately they thought things should end up after a
contingency. Should something chaotic happen, it would be
difficult to plan and think clearly, so planning early - and
knowing in particular the ROK's thinking on post-contingency
scenarios - is necessary. MOFA's Park Jong-dae, S/P's James
Green and Seoul Pol M/C noted that discussions have taken
place over the years, but they are normally detailed military
discussions that leave out post-hostilities actions as well
as what role Japan should have. Embassy Tokyo Pol M/C
suggested that a discussion of diplomatic and civil
administrative responses to a reunification scenario would be
useful.


17. (C) S/P Gordon concurred that, while we do robust
military planning, it is a challenge to do broader planning.
The example of German reunification is instructive in that
the scenario we ultimately faced was one that we didn't plan
for; our view of contingencies had been too narrow. We thus
need to think more broadly about possible DPRK contingencies
and eventually consider how we want to involve China, both in
terms of process and substance.

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PARTICIPANTS
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18. (U) United States:

-- S/P Director David F. Gordon;

-- Mr. James Green, S/P Staff;

-- Mr. Mike Meserve, Embassy Tokyo Political Minister
Counselor;

-- Mr. Joseph Yun, Embassy Seoul Political Minister Counselor;

-- Mr. Marc Knapper, Embassy Tokyo Deputy Political Counselor
(notetaker);

-- Mr. Evan Reade, Embassy Tokyo First Secretary (control
officer).


19. (U) Japan:

-- Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Policy Koro Bessho;

-- Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto, Deputy Director General for Foreign
Policy;


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-- Ms. Hikariko Ono, Director, Policy Planning Division;

-- Mr. Takehiro Kano, Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator;

-- Ms. Mayu Higiwara, Deputy Director, Policy Planning
Division;

-- Mr. Kensuke Nagase, Deputy Director, Policy Planning
Division.


20. (U) Republic of Korea:

-- Deputy Foreign Minister for Planning and Coordination Lim
Dae-Hong;

-- Mr. Park Jong-Dae, Director, Policy Planning and
Coordination Division:

-- Mr. Kim Tae-Jin, Counselor, ROK Embassy Tokyo;

-- Mr. Lee Choong-Myon, Assistant Secretary to the President
for National Security Strategy, Office of the President;

-- Mr. Lee Dong-Gy, First Secretary, Japan Division;

-- Mr. Kim Yeon-Sik, Second Secretary, North America Division;

-- Mr. Yun Young-Ki, Second Secretary, Policy Planning and
Coordination Division.


21. (U) S/P Director Gordon cleared this cable.
SCHIEFFER