DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/30/08

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 003033 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/30/08 INDEX: (1) Prime minister made three miscalculations about Lower House dissolution due to support rates and stock prices (Nikkei) (2) DPJ in total war against ruling coalition as wind of Diet dissolution stops blowing (Sankei) (3) JCP's new election strategy seen to favor DPJ (Asahi) (4) Interview with UNVIE DCM Pyatt: U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement beneficial both on political and environment fronts (Hokkaido Shimbun) (5) Japan should rebuild its diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation (Sankei) (6) Column -- Japan's Renaissance: Japan without a strategy faces a crisis in the Japan-U.S. alliance (Shukan Shincho) ARTICLES: (1) Prime minister made three miscalculations about Lower House dissolution due to support rates and stock prices NIKKEI (Page 2) (Abridged slightly) October 30, 2008 Prime Minister Aso Taro will hold a press conference today in which he is expected to announce that he will not dissolve the Lower House for a snap general election anytime soon. He had three options for dissolving the Lower House: at the beginning of the current Diet session, after a supplementary budget clears the Diet, and after the enactment of a bill extending the Indian Ocean refueling activities law. The prime minister seems to have missed the chance due to sluggish support ratings and tumbling stock prices. With a decline in the effectiveness of the "dissolution card," the Aso administration might lose momentum. Early dissolution plan failed The prime minister had a secret meeting with New Komeito Representative Akihiro Ota in Tokyo on Oct. 26. In the session, Ota urged Aso to call a general election at an early date, saying: "Even if the election is put off, we don't have a winning strategy." Aso did not give his nod in approval, insisting, "I must give priority to economic stimulus measures." His initial plan was quite different. "Seeking the people's verdict is my first mission," Aso wrote in his contribution to a monthly magazine after being elected LDP president on Sept. 22. The statement alluded to dissolving the lower chamber at the outset of the current extraordinary Diet session. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda resigned, assuming that his successor would dissolve the Lower House by taking advantage of the momentum of the LDP presidential race. Aso, who was serving as LDP secretary general under the Fukuda administration, must have been acutely aware of such a strategy. Aso's first miscalculation was support ratings. Opinion polls conducted shortly after his cabinet's inauguration showed unexpectedly low rates. The Aso cabinet was also hit hard by the resignation of Land and Transport Minister Nariaki Nakayama over his TOKYO 00003033 002 OF 011 harsh comments on the Japan Teachers Union and others. This prompted Aso to adopt the new strategy of raising popularity independently to create a chance for the dissolution. Priority given to supplementary budget The prime minister then decided to play up his efforts to prop up the economy and dissolve the Lower House after additional stimulus measures reflecting his policy identity cleared the Diet. Aso's economy-first policy ended up tying his own hands. On Oct. 10, the Nikkei Stock Average fell below the 9,000 level for the first time since June 2003. "A party in power is different from an opposition party," Aso snarled on the same day at the DPJ which had been pressing him for an early dissolution. Stock prices rallied at one point after the G-7 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors but again plummeted later on. November 30 plan fizzled On the night of Oct. 16, after the supplementary budget was enacted, Prime Minister Aso asked Finance and Financial Services Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, Administrative Reform Minister Akira Amari, and others, "What do you think of calling the election on November 30?" Sometime between late October when the refueling legislation is expected to clear the Diet and early November was the last chance to dissolve the Lower House in a way not to negatively affect the compilation of a fiscal 2009 budget. Aso issued instruction after instruction to no avail, and the key Nikkei index briefly fell below the 7,000 line on Oct. 24. In a news conference on Oct. 25, after the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM),Aso had to declare: "I am going to prioritize the international role over the domestic political situation." When the key index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell below its post-bubble low on Oct. 27, the prime minister said: "I don't fluctuate between optimism and pessimism." The day before, he had begun secretly indicating to party leaders that he would forgo the dissolution plan for the time being. (2) DPJ in total war against ruling coalition as wind of Diet dissolution stops blowing SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) October 29, 2008 With Prime Minister Taro Aso's decision to delay a dissolution of the House of Representatives and snap election, the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) yesterday shifted its approach from a cooperative stance to a confrontational one. Since the House of Councillors Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee refused to take a vote on a bill amending the new Antiterrorism Special Measures Law to extend by one year the Maritime Self-Defense Forces' refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, the passage of the legislation before the end of October is now not possible. Although the committee launched deliberations on a bill revising the Financial Functions Strengthening Law to wipe away financial unrest, there is no prospect for the legislation to be enacted. The DPJ appears to be heightening its pressure on the government and ruling coalition by taking advantage of the divide Diet. The Diet has rushed into a dense fog with no exit in sight. TOKYO 00003033 003 OF 011 In yesterday's Upper House committee meeting, Masahisa Sato, a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),who headed the first MSDF unit to Iraq, said: "Among those attending this committee session, Prime Minister Aso and I have been the only ones who visited Baghdad to give words of encouragement to a Grand Self-Defense unit. If you don't know about the actual situation, you won't be able to make any changes in the policy." Sato's remarks only gave the DPJ an excuse to prolong deliberations. In an informal meeting of the committee directors, directors from the opposition camp protested vehemently, with one director saying: "Since we don't know about the MSDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, we will ask that MSDF officers, who are now deployed, to be called back to testify before the Diet as unsworn witnesses." If such comes to fruition, it will take at least one week for MSDF officers to return home. If they take a sea route, it would take them about three weeks to return home. A ruling coalition director sighed as he said: "The opposition intends to prevent taking a vote at any cost." The DPJ initially agreed with the ruling camp to hold a second vote on the refueling bill on Oct. 31 in the Lower House after it voted it down in the Upper House on the 29th. However, the largest opposition party has now hardened its stance, since the ruling bloc is now delaying Lower House dissolution. Diet Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Jun Azumi said: "Our party has now assumed a confrontational stance (against the government and ruling camp)." DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka said in a meeting on the 28th of the party's Lower House members: "We have changed neither our policy nor strategy. The party has essentially entrusted the Upper House with the matter." He was not altogether displeased with the ruling camp's dismay. He told reporters: "The fact that the government and ruling coalition are unreliable is reflected in the stock prices. (The markets) do not trust a government unless fundamental measures are compiled by it." He spoke indirectly the need for a dissolution of the Lower House. The DPJ's confrontational stance is increasingly become stronger in the Lower House, as well. On the afternoon of Oct. 28 in a Lower House plenary session, Masaharu Nakagawa, a DPJ member, stated: "Market players have completely given up on the Prime Minister. This means the same as if a no-confidence motion against the cabinet was passed. In order to break the present political deadlock, the Prime Minister should ask for the people's vote of confidence on his government and its policies by dissolving the Lower House and calling for a snap election." However, the DPJ's do-or-die resistance could be a double-edged sword. If the DPJ unnecessarily prolongs deliberations on the bill to strengthen financial functions, stock prices will further drop, just like it did in the U.S. after it issued its financial stabilization measure. As a result, the DPJ could be criticized by TOKYO 00003033 004 OF 011 the public. Should the opposition further delay deliberations on the new antiterrorism bill, it will give an excuse to the Prime Minister to put off dissolution until late December, when Article 59 of the Constitution can be applied on the legislation. (Article 59 allows for a bill to be sent back to the Lower House if rejected by the Upper House or if the bill has not been voted on within 60 days after being presented to the upper chamber.) This is the reason that Seiji Suzuki, chairman of the Diet Affairs Committee of the LDP caucus in the Upper House, simply backed down in a meeting with his DPJ counterpart Susumu Yanase, just saying: "Let's leave it to those who are in charge." However, there is a possibility that Aso will be pressed to make a decision on calling for a vote of confidence of the people, if the Upper House passes a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister because of market turmoil caused by confusion in the Diet. Which side -- the ruling bloc or the opposition -- will the public support then? The psychological war is still long from over. (3) JCP's new election strategy seen to favor DPJ ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) October 29, 2008 The next House of Representatives election will be in effect a fight between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). However, there will be a major change in it from past contests. Based on the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) new policy of ending its conventional practice of fielding a candidate in all single-seat constituencies, it will halve the number of candidates running in the election. Citing the need to address the ongoing financial crisis, Prime Minister Aso has decided to delay a general election to next year. But since many of the votes that would have ordinarily gone to the JCP are expected to go to the DPJ due to the JCP's new election strategy, observers see this gloomy expectation as another reason for Aso's decision to delay the election. In the previous general election in 2005, LDP candidate Takashi Sasagawa, chairman of the Executive Council, won a 7th term in the Gunma No. 2 district. Sasagawa garnered 99,919 votes, followed by DPJ candidate Takashi Ishizeki with 98,497 and JCP candidate Yoshiyuki Fujikake with 12, 832. The JCP has decided not to field a candidate in this district in the next general election. If 20 PERCENT of the votes for the JCP are cast for Ishizeki, Sasagawa would be defeated. The number of candidates sponsored by the JCP in single-seat districts was 299 in the 1996 general election, 300 in 2000, 300 in 2003, and 275 in 2005. The party in the past always aimed to field one candidate in every one of the 300 single-seat districts, but only two of its candidates won a Lower House seat in the 1996 election: the Kyoto No. 3 and in Kochi No. 1 districts. JCP's share of the total votes cast was less than 10 PERCENT , and the party had to forfeit deposits (3 million yen per person) it had paid for 223 candidates in 2005. Given the heavy financial burden on it, the JCP last September devised a new formula for fielding candidates in single-seat constituencies: (1) A candidate should be fielded in a district where the JCP attained at least 8 PERCENT of the votes in the proportional representation bloc in the Upper House election in TOKYO 00003033 005 OF 011 2007; (2) on active, powerful candidates should be fielded; and (3) at least one candidate in each of the 47 prefectures should be fielded. As of Oct. 28, the party has announced the names of 147 approved candidates for the next general election, but the number is expected to be around 150 in the end. The JCP intends to let its members vote for the candidate of their choice in districts in which the party is not fielding a candidate. A party source said: "If asked, I will reply to our members, 'I suggest you vote for the DPJ candidate,' although I will not eagerly recommend them to do so," adding: "The view that the change of government is necessary is gaining influence among our supporters." In the by-election in the Yamaguchi No. 2 district for a Lower House seat this April, which was a one-on-one fight between the LDP candidate and the DPJ candidate, more than 90 PERCENT of the supporters for the JCP voted for the DPJ candidate, according to an exit poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun. The dominant view among those affiliated with the JCP is that 60 to 70 PERCENT of the votes that would go to the JCP will likely be cast for the DPJ in the next general election. If 70 PERCENT of the votes originally intended for the JCP go to the DPJ, what would happen? Among the 153 constituencies in which there is no JCP candidate for now, the DPJ candidate is expected to beat the LDP candidate in seven constituencies - Gunma No. 2 district; Hokkaido No. 3 district; Aichi No. 5, 6 & 8 districts; Hyogo No. 11 district; and Yamaguchi No. 2 district - according to a tentative calculation worked out based on the outcome of the 2005 general election. According to a calculation based on the 2003 general election, the DPJ candidate would defeat the LDP candidate in 12 districts - Hokkaido No. 5 district, which is former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura's electoral district; Miyagi No. 3 district; Ibaraki No. 3 district; Saitama No. 9 & 13 districts; Chiba No. 13 district; Gifu No. 3 district; Aichi No. 10 & 13 districts; Hyogo No. 5 & 12 districts; and Okayama No. 2 district. In Aichi No. 9 district, in which former Prime Minister Kaifu ran in the 2003 election, the LDP candidate and the DPJ candidate is expected to run neck-and-neck in the next election. The JCP's new election strategy has made senior members of LDP headquarters nervous. One member grumbled: "Of the votes for the JCP, 80 PERCENT would go to the DPJ. JCP's new policy will inevitably affect election results in the districts where the LDP and DPJ candidates had an evenly matched contest in past elections. We cannot do anything, because we are unable to approach supporters of the JCP." (4) Interview with UNVIE DCM Pyatt: U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement beneficial both on political and environment fronts HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN PRESS (Page 3) October 29, 2008 India is a nuclear weapons state, and yet it has not yet joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S. has lifted a ban on nuclear exports to that nation, by signing the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement (UINA). The signing of such a pact by the U.S. has invited criticism from various countries as applying a double standard. This newspaper interviewed Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Geoffrey Pyatt of the United States Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE) , who promoted the talks between the two countries. TOKYO 00003033 006 OF 011 Interviewer Tomoya Ishii -- The U.S. came under fire as having undermined the NPT. "We are in an age in which close cooperation with India, an immense nation, is indispensable in settling issues that the world faces, including terrorism by Islamic extremists. India hinted at a stance of refusing to cooperate on such issues as the climate change issue, seeking the abolition of international sanctions over nuclear power, by claiming such as an impediment to the building of a cooperative system. "India is expected to become the third largest economic power in the world, following the U.S. and China, by around 2025. It is consuming a great deal of energy, and yet it still depends on fossil fuels. The ratio of nuclear power generation in that country is only 2 PERCENT . The U.S. thought it would be beneficial both on the political and environment fronts, if it cooperated with that nation by supplying energy to it." -- Isn't it the U.S. aim to take part in India's nuclear power business, which is worth about 15 trillion yen? "Since India is not an autocratic state, the construction of nuclear facilities will not progress as fast as expected. However, some U.S. companies are eager to advance into India. The accord signed this time will open the door to business in India. Assisting India by supplying energy will supposedly boost opportunities for foreign companies to sell such products as electronic products to 300 million people in the mid-income bracket." -- Isn't it the case that the Bush administration rushed to sign the pact in an effort to make strengthened relations with India his diplomatic achievement with an eye on the rise of China? "The talks with India started during the previous Clinton administration. In India, there are arguments for and against the idea of increasing targets of inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the Singh administration indicated a stance of accepting stronger IAEA inspections, so the U.S. held out hope that it will join the NPT in the future. "This pact is a special one only applied to India, which has maintained nonproliferation. Such a pact will not be applied to Pakistan, which has allegedly transferred nuclear technology to other countries, or North Korea and Iran, which are uncooperative toward nonproliferation efforts. The criticism that the U.S. has applied a double standard is not correct." (5) Japan should rebuild its diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation SANKEI (Page 11) (Full) October 30, 2008 Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) The U.S.-India nuclear deal, signed by the U.S. Bush administration with India on Oct. 10, will extremely weaken the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which was created as an outcome of efforts made by many countries after the international community signed the TOKYO 00003033 007 OF 011 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 that came into effect in 1970. The deal is based on the United States' decision to provide India, which refused to join the NPT and carried out nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, with nuclear energy technology to be used for peaceful purposes only. Though hesitatingly, Japan also accepted this deal as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This will cause Japan to lose its moral influence in its future diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation and leave a stain. I regret the weakness of Japan's diplomacy, which failed to hold out against the U.S.-India deal. India and Pakistan have not joined the NPT regime. The United States, Japan, and many other countries therefore implemented such sanction measures as prohibiting technology transfer to both India and Pakistan when the two countries carried out nuclear tests in ¶1974. However, the situation changed completely after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The United States and other countries needed cooperation from India and Pakistan for the war on terror and called off their sanctions. At that point, the nuclear nonproliferation regime was already being undermined. The recent nuclear deal between the United States and India is an extension of that trend. According to the United States' account, India is the largest democracy on earth and has been treated as an exception to the NPT regime because it is a responsible nuclear power that has been without nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, all the 45 NSG members have confirmed it. Given this fact, we should say the nuclear nonproliferation regime has become hollowed out or has changed in nature. The United States approached India, a nuclear heretic. What lies behind that is the potential existence of huge commercial interests that can be expected by providing India with high-level nuclear energy technology for nuclear power generation. There is backing not only from U.S. businesses but also from such countries as Britain, France, and Russia attempting to make inroads into India's nuclear market. France, as well as the United States, entered into a cooperative pact with India in late September. The idealism of nuclear nonproliferation caved in to commercial interests. The United States has another expectation. That is a strategic calculation to constrain China and Russia by attracting India, which is a big democratic power. However, India is pushing ahead with its joint development of weapons and systems. As seen from this fact, India is tough, carrying through its nonaligned diplomacy. India is satisfied while thinking to itself that its nuclear policy has now been proved correct with the 45 NSG members' confirmation. India played up its deal with the United States as a diplomatic victory. Moreover, India takes the position that this agreement will not preclude future nuclear testing. In time, India is highly likely to get ahead of China-both in military power and in economic power. If that is the case, India would become a hegemonic power in South Asia. The international tendency of nuclear nonproliferation is being rocked because India is powerful as an exception to the NPT regime. North Korea and Iran would argue back and ask why only India is exceptional. In the future, it would be difficult to stop Brazil and South Africa from going nuclear. TOKYO 00003033 008 OF 011 As mentioned above, Japan has now lost its moral force to advocate stepping up nuclear nonproliferation due to its acceptance of the U.S.-India nuclear deal in the NSG. In the meantime, the Diet avoided discussing Japan's diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation. The negligence of politicians also led to its giving up of opportunities to display its international moral power. Japan has annually presented a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee for the total abolition of nuclear arms. Japan has now distorted its basic standpoint. This will greatly affect Japan on the diplomatic front. Is it possible for Japan to introduce such a resolution from now on while taking the same position? How will Japan develop its diplomacy toward the NPT Review Conference in 2010? Japan nodded to the U.S.-India deal under the condition that India freezes its nuclear testing. Accordingly, if and when India carried out a nuclear test, Japan should then take strict sanctions. However, I wonder if Japan, which is stressing its strategic ties with India, can really take strict measures against that country. In the meantime, another question is how Japan will respond if and when its nuclear-related businesses are asked by the United States to provide their technologies to India. In that case, Japan's technology transfer to India should be preconditioned at least on India's acceptance of the obligation to cut its greenhouse gas emissions. Japan should make diplomatic efforts to persuade the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after the next administration comes into office in January next year. That is because the United States' prompt ratification thereof can be expected to pressure India into halting its nuclear testing. Now is the time Japan should seriously consider what it should do to rebuild the weakened, deteriorated nuclear nonproliferation regime. One of the possible steps for that is to develop and spread technologies for nuclear nonproliferation around the world. (6) Column -- Japan's Renaissance: Japan without a strategy faces a crisis in the Japan-U.S. alliance SHUKAN SHINCHO (Pages 164-165) (Full) October 30, 2008 By Yoshiko Sakurai, journalist In the evening of Oct. 19, four Chinese military ships transited the Tsugaru Strait from the Japan Sea to the Pacific. The four ships included a Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyer, Chinese-made latest frigates Jiangkai I and Jiangkai II, and a refueling vessel. A Sovremenny-class destroyer is loaded with missiles that travel at two times the speed of sound which even the U.S. fears. It is difficult to detect by radar a missile that travels as low as six meters above sea level. In 2000, a Chinese ship conducting an intelligence-gathering operation passed the Tsugaru Strait from the Japan Sea to the Pacific and back. The vessel was probably engaged in gathering information on the radio waves used by the U.S. Armed Forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, in addition to the sea current, water TOKYO 00003033 009 OF 011 temperature, and the topography of the seabed. After eight years, Chinese warships navigated through the Tsugaru Strait for the first time. The Chinese Navy's area of deployment has obviously expanded. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) believes that threat with no substance behind it is not threat at all, so a threat always has to be real. The PLA thinks the benefit of its naval-power buildup is that it enables China to pose a political threat to other countries just by navigating through the waters of the world. The PLA believes that, once it can successfully make other countries aware of the power of its Navy, China's political and diplomatic power will naturally increase. The PLA Navy with 260,000 personnel is comprised of three fleets of the North Sea, the East Sea, and the South Sea, each of which has waterborne ship units, submarine units, aviation units, ground battle units, and coastal artillery units, and has become a pillar to support the country's arms race into the space. U.S. Pacific Commander Keating testified before the Senate Military Committee on March 12 about the PLA Navy's tough attitude. According to the Commander, when he visited China, a PLA Navy key officer suggested the Pacific should be divided in two "with you (the U.S.) acquiring the area to the east of Hawaii and with us acquiring the area to the west of Hawaii." U.S. Ambassador to Japan Schieffer relayed this information to the Japanese press on the next day of Commander Keating's testimony. The Ambassador must have felt the deep message. The meaning (of the Ambassador's message) is that the situation may develop into the course described in China's scenario unless Japan builds up a strong foundation. It means a U.S. partner in Asia is not limited to Japan forever. U.S. displeasure Japan kept falling short of expectation in responding to the information conveyed by Ambassador Schieffer seven months ago, Jim Auer told me. Auer, a former U.S. Navy officer, served as Pentagon's Japan Desk director under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Auer has been described as Richard Armitage's right-hand man at the Defense Depart. In 1988, Auer retired to establish the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University. He now serves as director of the center. Auer, a close observer of Japan-U.S. relations for 20 years, said: "The U.S.-Japan relationship is in a far serious condition than the Japanese people think." The Japanese government is unhappy with President George W. Bush, who removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, because the delisting means that the United States has recognized North Korea as a nuclear power, which means that Japan is exposed to the threat of nuclear attack from that country. Since there are other nuclear powers -- Russia, India and Pakistan - surrounding Japan, Japan, too, should prepare the environment for possessing its own nuclear weapons to protect its national security. There is a way to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance further that would help the U.S. nuclear umbrella function better. This can be achieved by Japan allowing the entry of nuclear weapons by changing TOKYO 00003033 010 OF 011 the present three no-nuclear principles (neither make nor possess nuclear weapons, and not to allow their entry into Japan) into two no-nuclear principles. Meanwhile, Japan should continue its refueling and water supply mission in the Indian Ocean to support the war on terror in and around Afghanistan. Japan should allow the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to exercise the right of collective defense. Ultimately, it may be necessary for Japan itself to guarantee its own security. Eventually, Japan should press ahead with debate on whether it should possess nuclear weapons or not. When Auer was told there was such thinking in Japan, he noted that the thinking on the U.S. side was even more severe than that in Japan. Auer, being an American who knows Japan very well, stated: "I know that the Diet is discussing a bill to extend the Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. But frankly the situation has been created that the United States will not be able to directly receive oil that Japan will supply. The Japanese side has questioned whether the fuel the MSDF had supplied to be used for Afghanistan had been diverted for use toward Iraq, as well. Both countries are a part of the war on terror. The moves of U.S. warships depend on the situation. If it is said that the fuel should be used for Afghanistan alone, it will be very difficult to use it. That is why people are beginning to think in the United States that it is difficult to get along with Japan." In October 2007, (then) Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba questioned the United States whether the nearly 800 times that Japan provided refueling services were used for purposes other than the original intent. He promised in the Diet to investigate it. (Auer said that) even though the United States disclosed that information, it was displeased by the experience. Japan-U.S. alliance should be further strengthened Japan has continued to provide China with an incommensurable amount of official development assistance (ODA). Although the government has said that ODA is provided to support the people's livelihood, it has yet to question China how it has been used. What has been so far not been disclosed is that ODA has contributed to China's military buildup. Still, China opposed Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat and influenced leading Asian and African countries to do the same. China used its own ODA to manipulate those Asian and African countries. There is a possibility that China may have slipped in its own ODA to Asia and Africa, replacing Japan's aid, but Japan has never questioned China about it. When seeing such a situation from a viewpoint of national interests and an ally, there is a clear contradiction. The U.S. displeasure is understandable. The primary reason for the United States being unhappy with Japan is that no matter how hard the MSDF troops have worked, they have never fought alongside the U.S.-led multinational force. The MSDF's refueling mission is not a military operation; it is a commercial activity. The Ground Self-Defense Force's activities in the southern Iraqi city of Samawah were not military operations. It is only natural that the United States may conclude it should find more reliable ally if Japan always says it will not make any military contribution. That is how little Japan's refueling mission is appreciated. TOKYO 00003033 011 OF 011 However, both Auer and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer - the one who informed Japan of China's proposal to the U.S. to share control of the Pacific -- are asking Japan whether it wants to become a dependable ally. If Japan has no intention to do so, there is even a possibility that the United States will change to another partner. That possibility will probably become stronger if Democratic candidate Barack Obama is elected president. Japan must make better efforts. The first matter to attend to is to effectively strengthen the alliance that is particularly vital to meet the threats from China and North Korea. In order to become a normal country, Japan should allow itself to use the right of collective self-defense. Japan then should approach the United States with confidence to query whether it is appropriate for China, which has a different set of values, to ever become the U.S.' ally. Japan should stress to the U.S. that there should be no other country but Japan qualified to be America's ally. SCHIEFFER