MP CRITICIZES JAPANESE NUCLEAR PLANS

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #2993/01 3010820
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270820Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8294
INFO RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002993 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/CTR, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS 
DOE FOR KBAKER, NA-20 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018 
TAGS: PARM, ENRG, TRGY, NRR, MNUC, PUNE, JA 
SUBJECT: MP CRITICIZES JAPANESE NUCLEAR PLANS 
 
REF: STATE 107836 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 

>3. (C) Kono said following the accident at the Monju FBR,

rather than cancel plans to conduct reprocessing, the

electric companies developed the Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel

program. However, Kono criticized the MOX program as too

expensive, noting it would be cheaper to just "buy a uranium

mountain in Australia," or to make a deal to import uranium

from other sources. Kono claimed the high costs of the

reprocessing program were being passed to Japanese consumers

in their power bills, and they were unaware of how much they

paid for electricity relative to people in other countries.

In describing the clout wielded by the electric companies,

Kono claimed that a Japanese television station had planned a

three part interview with him on nuclear issues, but had

canceled after the first interview, because the electric

companies threatened to withdraw their extensive sponsorship.



4. (C) In addition to the electric companies, Kono was also

very critical of the Japanese ministries, particularly the

Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). He claimed

the ministries were trapped in their policies, as officials

inherited policies from people more senior to them, which

they could then not challenge. As an example, Kono noted

that Japanese radiation standards for imported foods had been

set following the Chernobyl incident, and had not changed

since then, despite other nations having reduced their levels

of allowable radiation.



5. (C) In a similar way, he alleged, METI was committed to

advocating for nuclear energy development, despite the

problems he attributed to it. Kono noted that while METI

claimed to support alternative energy, it in actuality

provides little support. He claimed that METI in the past

had orchestrated the defeat of legislation that supported

alternatives energy development, and instead secured the

passage of the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) act. This

act simply requires power companies to purchase a very small

amount of their electricity from alternative sources. Kono

also criticized the government's handling of subsidies to

alternative energy projects, noting that the subsidies were

of such short duration that the projects have difficulty

finding investors because of the risk and uncertainty

involved. As a more specific example of Japan neglecting

alternative energy sources, Kono noted there was abundant

wind power available in Hokkaido that went undeveloped

because the electricity company claimed it did not have

sufficient grid capacity. Kono noted there was in fact an

unused connection between the Hokkaido grid and the Honshu

grid that the companies keep in reserve for unspecified

emergencies. He wanted to know why they could not just link

the grids and thus gain the ability to add in more wind

power.



6. (C) He also accused METI of covering up nuclear

accidents, and obscuring the true costs and problems

associated with the nuclear industry. He claimed MPs have a

difficult time hearing the whole of the U.S. message on

nuclear energy because METI picks and chooses those portions

of the message that it likes. Only information in agreement

with METI policies is passed through to the MPs. Elaborating

on his frustrations with the ministries, Kono noted that the

Diet committee staffs are made up of professional

bureaucrats, and are often headed by detailees from the

ministries. He said he had no authority to hire or fire

committee staff, and that any inquiries he made to them

quickly found their way back to the ministries.



7. (C) Kono also raised the issue of nuclear waste,

commenting that Japan had no permanent high-level waste

storage, and thus no solution to the problem of storage. He

cited Japan's extensive seismic activity, and abundant

groundwater, and questioned if there really was a safe place

to store nuclear waste in the "land of volcanoes." He noted

that Rokkasho was only intended as a temporary holding site

for high-level waste. The Rokkasho local government, he

said, had only agreed to store waste temporarily contingent

on its eventual reprocessing. Kono said that in this regard,

the US was better off that Japan because of the Yucca

mountain facility. He was somewhat surprised to hear about

opposition to that project, and the fact that Yucca had not

yet begun storing waste.



8. (C) In describing how he would deal with Japan's future

energy needs, Kono claimed Japan needed to devise a real

energy strategy. He said while he believed Japan eventually

would have to move to 100% renewable energy, in the meantime

he advocated replacing energy produced by nuclear plants

ready for decommissioning with an equal amount of energy from

plants using liquid natural gas. To this he would add new

renewable energy sources.



9. (C) Kono also made a few side remarks concerning the

Japanese election process. He expressed dissatisfaction with

the current election campaign law, which he called outdated.

He noted, for example, that during the official campaign

period he was not allowed to actively campaign on the

Internet. He said he could print flyers during this time,

but only a limited number, which had to be picked up by

constituents at his campaign office. So, to get around these

and other limitations, MPs had to campaign before the

official campaign period began. Given the current

uncertainty on a date for elections, he noted in a humorous

manner that if the government delayed elections long enough,

he and the other MPs would go broke.

SCHIEFFER