AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH ABDUCTEES' FAMILIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002882 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM KN JA SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH ABDUCTEES' FAMILIES Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer per 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met October 16 with two prominent representatives of the abductees' family association -- Chairman Shigeo Iizuka and Shigeru Yokota (the father of Megumi Yokota, the best known abductee) -- to discuss the recent delisting of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror. Hearing the Ambassador's explanation that delisting was necessary to convene the Six Parties and get a final, written verification regime, Iizuka and Yokota expressed their understanding of the decision. "I agree that it was the right decision" to approach denuclearization and delisting "from the big picture," Yokota said. Iizuka added that although many in Japan consider the delisting decision a "slap in the face," he would like to "deliver the right message to the Japanese public." End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met October 16 with Shigeo Iizuka, Chairman of the Association of Families of Victims of North Korean Abductions and Shigeru Yokota, former Chairman of the Association, to discuss the recent U.S. delisting of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Recalling their meeting in July, the Ambassador noted that at that time, the President had given notice that he was prepared to lift the DPRK's terror designation, provided a satisfactory verification regime could be put in place. Under the terms of U.S. law, the President is required to give this notice, and the Congress has 45 days to raise any objections. Forty-five days passed without objection from Congress, but the President did not delist North Korea because he did not believe that the North Koreans had given enough assurances that they would allow the necessary inspections to occur, the Ambassador explained. ¶3. (C) In fact, because the North Koreans did not agree to our verification-related requests, the President did not remove the DPRK from the terrorism list, the Ambassador continued. Subsequently, the North Koreans indicated they might be prepared to negotiate verification terms, and the product of these negotiations was an oral agreement that indicated that the North was ready to respond to all of our verification demands. That said, an oral agreement is not enough for the United States, so we agreed to convene the Six Parties in Beijing to put in writing what the North Koreans orally assured us. At the next round of Six Party 
discussions, the participant countries, including Japan, will be able to voice their opinions to ensure that the final, written document reflects the oral agreement we reached with the DPRK, the Ambassador said. ¶4. (C) With this oral agreement, we were presented with the opportunity to move forward the Six Party process, including allowing inspectors from the participant countries to enter the DPRK to carry out verification activities, the Ambassador explained. Essentially, we had to ask whether we were prepared to delist North Korea in order to allow the Six Parties to convene to ensure that the oral agreement is accurately reflected in the final, written verification document. If we had refused to delist North Korea, our conclusion was that the Six Party Talks would have come to an end. While some in Japan, including the abductees' family members, may not agree, we felt that this was our best chance to keep the process going, get something in writing and continue to push on the abductions issue. Otherwise, with the collapse of the Six Party Talks, progress on both denuclearization and abductions would have ceased, the Ambassador stressed. ¶5. (C) As the President told Prime Minister Aso, and as contained in statements released by the White House and State Department, the United States will not forget the abductions issue and we will continue to press the DPRK at every opportunity to resolve this matter, the Ambassador said. The Ambassador added that the President had specifically asked him to ensure that the families, Japanese people and Japanese government understand that this is an issue that we consider very important and that we will keep pushing forward. ¶6. (C) As an abductee family member, if one looks at delisting in a vacuum, then it is very disheartening and deeply regrettable, Iizuka said. But the family members and other Japanese have high expectations regarding the verification regime and hope that the United States and others establish strict verification measures. For the TOKYO 00002882 002 OF 002 Japanese, the three key issues at hand are nuclear proliferation, missiles and abductions, and there has been no change in the Japanese Government's position on these. The family members understand that the President will never forget the abductions issue. They also understand that the North's nuclear capabilities are a threat to Japan, so the Six Party framework must ensure a strict verification program, Iizuka said. ¶7. (C) Thanks to the Ambassador's explanation, "we understand why President Bush delisted North Korea," Iizuka continued. The family members understand that the United States has consistently pressed the DPRK on the abductions issue, and they ask that the United States continue to use every opportunity to urge the North Koreans to resolve this matter. The Ambassador offered his assurances that the United States will continue to do everything it can to press the North Koreans on this. ¶8. (C) Yokota expressed his understanding that, without delisting, there was a chance that both the denuclearization and abductions discussions would have failed. "I agree that it was the right decision to approach these issues from the big picture," he said. However, the North Koreans are not trustworthy and do not keep promises. Yokota said that he hopes that the United States works hard at disablement and, if it succeeds, "then we will know that the United States made the right decision." The Ambassador said that he shares Yokota's skepticism about the North Koreans, which is why we need to see the verification regime in writing and subsequently carried out. In response to Yokota's concern that delisting the North will lead to many benefits, the Ambassador noted that ongoing sanctions will continue to make it difficult for the DPRK to operate as a normal state in the international system. Although they have been delisted, their position with regard to international financial institutions remains the same, the Ambassador said. ¶9. (C) Iizuka said that public opinion and the media consider delisting to be a bad idea and a "slap in the face," and that the United States ignored Japan's interests. But, speaking on behalf of the Families Association, Iizuka said he had listened to what the Ambassador had said and "would like to deliver the right message to the general public." SCHIEFFER