JAPAN PM FUKUDA SHIFTING "SLIGHTLY" ON ABDUCTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000232 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA KN SUBJECT: JAPAN PM FUKUDA SHIFTING "SLIGHTLY" ON ABDUCTION ISSUES, DPRK REF: TOKYO 00098 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The newly-established LDP Subcommittee on Korean Peninsula Issues, created by senior LDP members Taku Yamasaki at the behest of Prime Minister Fukuda, reflects the PM,s "slight" shift to a dialogue-oriented approach to resolving the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues, Diet contacts tell Embassy Tokyo. The subcommittee,s members believe that, while the United States should not remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, "it is necessary for Japan, the United States, the ROK, and China to resolve the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues in a comprehensive manner." Furthermore, &imposing sanctions may not be the sole approach,8 the members believe, and they hope that the subcommittee will help to create a counterpoint to others, more hard-line approach to the DPRK. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On January 17, LDP Lower House Representative and head of the party,s Foreign Affairs Division Tsuyoshi Takagi briefed Embassy Tokyo political officer on the newly-established LDP Subcommittee on Korean Peninsula Issues, a group of leading Diet members whose stated goal is &to resolve the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues in a comprehensive fashion.8 (Bio Note: Takagi, a former MOD Parliamentary Vice-Minister, has impressive credentials when it comes to dealing with Korean issues. In addition to serving as the new subcommittee,s Chief Secretary, he is also Vice Secretary General of the Parliamentarian League for the Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea and is an executive member of the Lower House Special Committee on the North Korean Abduction Issue.) -------------- Fukuda Turns to Yamasaki -------------- ¶3. (C) Takagi said that the new subcommittee was formed at the behest of PM Fukuda. The most likely route, he surmised, was that the PM turned to LDP Research Commission on Foreign Affairs Chairman Taku Yamasaki who, with approval from LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman (and former Finance Minister) Sadakazu Tanigaki, formally established the new subcommittee in December 2007. "Since Yamasaki is dialogue-approach oriented, it makes sense that Fukuda would ask him to set up the subcommittee," Takagi stated. In a separate meeting on January 28, Representative Kazuo Aichi )- who is one of the subcommittee,s senior advisors -- confirmed to Embassy Tokyo political officer that establishing the subcommittee was PM Fukuda,s idea and added that the PM chose his close confidante, Representative Seishiro Eto, to be the subcommittee,s chairman. Yamasaki serves as Chief Advisor to the subcommittee, which includes about 20 members, including LDP Lower House member Katsuei Hirasawa, who, along with Yamasaki, arranged former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's 2004 visit to Pyongyang. -------------- Shift to Dialogue -------------- ¶5. (C) Takagi said that PM Fukuda, while calling for the use of dialogue and pressure on the DPRK, has nonetheless "shifted slightly to the dialogue approach." The subcommittee's creation reflects Fukuda's changing priorities, Takagi observed. Fukuda, Takagi continued, is prepared to "make slight compromises, such as lifting economic sanctions or providing humanitarian assistance" to North Korea, if Pyongyang makes progress on the abduction issue. Representative Aichi also noted that the subcommittee,s membership does not believe that sanctions are the &sole approach8 to the DPRK. The subcommittee,s members are &those who view it better to consider a different approach than that of the hardliners, such as Representatives Shoichi Nakagawa, former Prime Minister ABE TOKYO 00000232 002 OF 003 and Keiji Furuya,8 Aichi stated. ¶6. (C) Japan's approach to the abduction issue failed to achieve desired results, Takagi observed. Although he and others believe that the United States should not remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, "it is necessary for Japan, the United States, the ROK, and China to resolve the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues in a comprehensive manner," Takagi stated. Tokyo will therefore need to consider an approach different from the one used by former Prime Minister SHINZO Abe. ROK President-elect Lee Myung-bak's administration also offers an opportunity to adopt a new approach and the obtain progress, Takagi concluded. -------------- Policy Dilemma -------------- ¶7. (C) Takagi observed that policy positions held by members of the conservative Parliamentarian League and the more moderate subcommittee posed no dilemma for Fukuda's approach to the abduction issue. Though the Parliamentarian League is regarded as favoring the use of pressure and the subcommittee is viewed as preferring dialogue, "the two groups do not conflict with each other because they share the same goal - to resolve the abduction issue," Takagi maintained. He claimed to be unaware of how family abduction NGO's perceive the subcommittee's comprehensive approach, but in a telling remark, indicated that the view's of family groups "won't matter." (Note: Abduction NGO representatives tell Embassy Tokyo they do not trust the KPI subcommittee. Reftel) -------------- Progress or Resolution -------------- ¶8. (C) Takagi outlined the distinction between achieving progress vs. resolution on the abduction issue. Progress would require: -- DPRK retraction of its position that the abduction issue is resolved. -- Police investigation leading to information on victims identified by the Japanese government. -- A "sincere" stance on the issue. -- Return of abductees and/or remains "if there are any." ¶9. (C) DPRK efforts to resolve the problem would include, according to Takagi, a) handover of the North Korean officials who ordered or were involved in the kidnapping, and b) the return of not only the 13 officially-recognized missing persons, but the hundreds of individuals who may have been taken. (Note: One NGO believes as many as 460 persons disappeared under circumstances that require further investigation.) Takagi claims to have directly heard from returned abductees who lived in the same "detention center" with other victims who did not return. He admitted, however, that the sighting had not been recent. At the time of their release, returned abductees would have been separated from the non-returned persons for several months or years. -------------- Yamasaki to DPRK -------------- ¶10. (C) Takagi said he asked Yamasaki about the possibility that Yamasaki might make an unofficial trip to Pyongyang. Yamasaki reportedly replied, "unlike last year when I made a sudden and unofficial visit to Pyongyang, if I visit Pyongyang next time, I will let everyone know my visit in advance." Based on Yamasaki's statement, Takagi speculated that Yamasaki would be prepared to return to Pyongyang if TOKYO 00000232 003 OF 003 asked by Fukuda. SCHIEFFER