DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS ON SE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000217 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018 TAGS: PREL EAID JA SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS ON SE ASIA Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Japanese government officials and Diet members discussed Japan's relations with Southeast Asia and told DAS Marciel that Japan and the United States need to continue to work closely together to coordinate on aid and other projects; Cambodia needs to take more of an "ownership role" when it comes to the Khmer Rouge trials and that it will be difficult for Japan to provide additional financial support for the trials since no one can say with any certainty when they will be completed; and, Japan is increasingly looking to Vietnam as a major partner in the region. On Burma, Japan has no plans to initiate new development projects, with the exception of humanitarian aid such as polio vaccines. MOFA agreed on the need to "encourage" Burma to let UN Special Envoy Gambari return to Burma at an earlier date but said Japan lacks the influence to persuade the regime. Pro-Burmese democracy members from the Japanese Diet told Marciel that they were frustrated with some Diet members who did not want to risk upsetting "stable Japan Burma relations" by sounding to critical of the regime, but said they are committed to maintaining momentum on passing a resolution on Burma in the Diet. End Summary. -------------- PHILIPPINES -------------- ¶2. (C) MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Deputy Director-General Junichi Ihara told DAS Marciel January 15 that the most recent coup attempt in Manila was a poorly planned "joke," and that President Arroyo's desire and willingness to maintain herself in power is very strong. One of Japan's major interests in the Philippines is the Mindanao peace process. During his most recent visit to Manila, Ihara met with a ministerial-level official who, while optimistic about the progress being made, left Ihara with many questions about just how this process will work. It seems to depend on a plebiscite, but if the people don't vote in favor of the proposed agreement, the government won't be able to force it. In addition, the Islamist elements seem to have their own ideas about the areas to be granted autonomy and also don't recognize the Philippines constitution. Ihara thinks it may be very difficult to overcome some of these differences and reach a compromise acceptable to all parties. The government's plan seems rather fragile, he concluded. ¶3. (C) Nevertheless, Japan supports the Filipino people and would like to see an agreement reached, Ihara continued. In Japan's view, the biggest problem is the lack of infrastructure and capacity in the areas to become self governed. As a result, said Ihara, nearly three-quarters of Japanese ODA to the Philippines goes to those areas and is focused on projects that will create jobs and provide services. Pointing to East Timor as a cautionary example, Ihara predicted it would be a disaster if the government of the Philippines were to grant autonomy before the people in the areas develop the capacity to adequately govern themselves. Ihara said he understands the U.S. and Japanese embassies in Manila are in close contact about these developments and expressed hope that we would coordinate our aid efforts to achieve the maximum benefit. -------------- VIETNAM -------------- ¶4. (C) Ihara described Japan's growing relationship with Vietnam, highlighting recent high-level visits in both directions. He said the recent agreement to embark upon a "strategic relationship" is really more of a general theme, rather than a well-defined way forward, but noted that the Japanese business community and influential politicians are very interested in expanding ties. On the commercial side, Japanese business concerns are worried about the sustainability of economic growth in China and have decided to embark upon a "China plus one" strategy. The "one" is Vietnam, and as a result, Japanese direct investment in Vietnam is increasing. At the same time, influential politicians are also very interested in Vietnam and are likely to support both political and economic initiatives to increase contacts. TOKYO 00000217 002 OF 005 ¶5. (C) The Vietnamese have asked Japan for help on three "huge" projects, said Ihara: a modern North-South highway, a 2,000-plus km high-speed rail system spanning the country, and a high-technology park. Ihara expressed skepticism about whether Vietnam needs or is ready for high-speed rail, noting that at present the country only has a single track diesel line. To make the leap to bullet-trains seems a bit much, he opined. However, Japan is studying the feasibility of such a system. In addition, Japan has already assisted Vietnam with the development of modern, basic commercial legislation. ¶6. (C) Ihara said he had been very impressed by how open and frank the Vietnamese were about concerns with China during recent political-military talks he attended. Noting that they seemed to hold nothing back, the Vietnamese were eager to compare notes with the Japanese on territorial claims China has been making in the South China Sea, which are similar to the ones China is pressing against Japan in the East China Sea. Ihara said Japan and Vietnam are not planning on ganging up on China, but pointed out these are issues they have in common and, accordingly, it is good to coordinate responses. Japan has suggested to Vietnam that it raise their concerns at the ASEAN Regional Forum to make it less of a bilateral issue. ¶7. (C) DAS Marciel told Ihara the Vietnamese have also come to us with their concerns about Chinese claims in the South China Sea, as have some of our own private companies which have been threatened by China with exclusion from Chinese markets if they engage in business with the Vietnamese in disputed areas. He noted how far our relations with the Vietnamese have come and observed that the Vietnamese take our assistance projects very seriously and implement them very effectively. -------------- CAMBODIA -------------- ¶8. (C) Ihara noted that he had just returned from Cambodia, and said that his focus had been on the Khmer Rouge tribunals. Although the slow start had been worrisome, after the tribunal had agreed upon its internal rules, things had moved quickly, with judicial proceedings beginning last summer and the first five arrests proceeding peacefully shortly thereafter. The main problem now is money, he reported, with funding scheduled to dry up this summer. This is a major issue because, optimistically, the work of the tribunal will not be completed until at least until the first quarter of 2011. ¶9. (C) A second concern, said Ihara, is the government of Cambodia's attitude about the tribunal. While the government seems to have the strong political will to make the trials successful, it seems a bit complacent about how things are going and does not appear to accept responsibility for funding issues. Ihara termed this type of mentality as troubling, and said he was disappointed by his meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Sok An. ¶10. (C) In addition to having the government of Cambodia take on a greater sense of responsibility, Ihara said it is also necessary for the U.N. to exercise more appropriate stewardship of the process as well. While the U.N. staff is hard-working and conscientious, they are not adequately supported by U.N. headquarters. Japan believes the idea of appointing a Special Advisor is a good one, but Ihara noted that Sok An is reluctant to support this, fearing that such an individual would control or manage the entire process, somehow infringing upon Cambodian sovereignty. Ihara said he has suggested that the terms of reference for the position therefore make clear that the Special Advisor's mandate is to better coordinate between the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and headquarters so that the ECCC's interests are better represented in New York. ¶11. (C) DAS Marciel agreed with Ihara on this subject and said he would raise it during his visit to Phnom Penh. However, he also pointed out that one of our major concerns is the level of corruption associated with the tribunal, explaining that until this is resolved it will be very TOKYO 00000217 003 OF 005 difficult to convince Congress to appropriate funding to supports the tribunal's operations. We support the appointment of a Special Advisor but believe part of his/her role should be to help clean up the management of the court and address the corruption issue. ¶12. (C) By September, MOFA will need to go to the Ministry of Finance to explain why it is necessary to come up with additional funds for the tribunal, said Ihara, who lamented that it is difficult for him to be optimistic about his ability to get the needed money. Nevertheless, it is important, he said, for Japan, the U.N., and the government of Cambodia to all do their parts to keep the tribunal functioning. Japan would like very much to see the United States contribute funds as well, he concluded. DAS Marciel reiterated that addressing the corruption problem was critical. -------------- INDONESIA -------------- ¶13. (C) MOFA International Cooperation Division Deputy Director General Masato Watanabe told Marciel that Japan is particularly pleased by Indonesia's slow but steady economic development. Indonesia is the second largest recipient of Japanese ODA in the region, followed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Most of the monies are concessional loans that fund projects on health, infrastructure, and education, Watanabe explained. -------------- BURMA -------------- ¶14. (C) Ihara said that during his just-completed visit to Burma, he had been "haunted" by a sense of unease in the new capital Nay Pyi Taw. Ihara drove by the location where the Japanese journalist was slain and said everything seems totally peaceful and "normal" - traffic is flowing and people are going about their lives - but he had the feeling that it was all artificial and that beneath the surface something is very wrong. Ihara explained that the purpose of his visit was to attend an ASEAN Plus Three meeting on arts and culture and noted during a courtesy call with the Prime Minister, the PM delivered a 30-minute monologue on why the capital had been moved. There was no mention of culture or the arts, and Japan did not have a chance to say anything during the meeting, Ihara asserted. ¶15. (C) DAS Marciel replied it is evident the Burmese regime is not interested in talking either to its own people or to outsiders. It is very troublesome that the U.N. Secretary General's Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari has yet to be admitted and that current speculation is he may not get in until April. Progress must be made, and while we recognize it may be difficult to obtain UNSC action, it might be needed to move things along. ¶16. (C) Ihara confirmed that Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win is currently in Tokyo to attend the Mekong Country meetings (septel),but said that he feels isolated as all the important projects being discussed involve other countries, and that the very limited amount of ODA going to Burma is restricted to purely humanitarian projects. In a separate meeting, MOFA International Cooperation Division Deputy Director General Masato Watanabe also emphasized that Japan has reduced its ODA to Burma, and stressed its aid helps the Burmese people, but does not benefit the ruling junta. ¶17. (C) Responding to a question about the East-West Corridor project, Ihara said that while it theoretically includes Burma, in reality none of the project goes through Burmese territory. Ihara described FM Nyan Win as a good person, noting it is possible to frankly discuss contentious issues with him. By and large, this is also the case with many of the working-level Burmese diplomats the Japanese come into contact with. However, it is meaningless to have conversations with them or the FM if they have no power, or access, to communicate with the highest levels of their government. TOKYO 00000217 004 OF 005 ¶18. (C) Marciel explained to Ihara and Watanabe that it is our view that pressure must be applied on the Burmese government to encourage positive steps. He highlighted the recent editorial written by U/S Burns, in which the United States calls for dialogue and recognizes that the military has a role to play. However, the military must reach out to other political forces and ethnic minorities in the country and include them in the political process. If it does so, Burma should be welcomed back into the community of nations. Ihara concurred, noting that despite the fact the Burmese regime says it is preparing for democracy - and is constructing a new parliament building and presidential residence for when that day comes - it must take into account the existing opposition forces, a position that their own legal analysis says can't be done. It is important to find some way to work around this hurdle to bring those opposition forces into the process. He said Japan is working with the Burmese leadership to convince the military government to work more closely with the democratic forces, and believes that if the regime were to work with Gambari this would be a step showing its willingness to do so. Ihara concluded "this is the last chance for them; they must take it." ¶19. (C) Ihara wished to know whether the United States plans to continue to have a dialogue with the Burmese in Beijing. Marciel replied there are no plans to do so at this time, but noted that if we were to see progress in Burma and felt that such a course of action would produce positive results, such talks might be reconsidered. ¶20. (C) In a separate meeting, three Diet members from the nonpartisan Parliamentary League for the Democratization of Burma voiced their continued dissatisfaction with Burma's regime and called for increased international pressure during a dinner at the Charge's Residence on January 15. Ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) Lower House member Mayumi Moriyama and opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Upper and Lower members Shinkun Haku and Masaharu Nakagawa agreed that the killing of a Japanese journalist had heightened public interest in the Burma issue within Japan, as had subsequent efforts to publicize the issue by the journalist's former assistant, an ethnic Kachin. Haku urged the United States to issue a strong statement condemning the killing, in order to keep the Japanese public focused on the issue. Nakagawa noted that he and other Diet members had been denied visas to travel to Burma to seek the return of video equipment belonging to the journalist. ¶21. (C) While it is important for the entire international community to weigh in against the junta, Moriyama noted, neighbors such as China and India, along with regional partners in ASEAN, must play a greater role in both "encouraging" and "pressuring" the regime. Statements from those neighbors are probably more effective than those from more distant countries, such as the United States and Japan, she stressed. Seizing on DAS Marciel's point that the situation inside Burma has wider ramifications, they acknowledged the threat posed to other countries by refugee flows, narcotics, human trafficking, and rampant disease. China, in particular, needs to move away from its focus on political stability and energy policy and recognize that economic instability in Burma can filter across the border just as easily as refugees and disease, Moriyama posited. Indonesia also tends to be too soft on Burma's military dictators, Nakagawa noted, probably as a result of its own historical experiences. He said he is working to include lawmakers from Burma's neighbors in a wider parliamentary league. ¶22. (C) Opposition from Japanese lawmakers in the pro-Burma Diet league continues to stall efforts on a Diet resolution calling for democratic change, Haku lamented. Most pro-Burma Diet members date their ties with the country to pre-1988, Nakagawa added, and have been active on parliamentary exchanges and development assistance for some time. As a result, they tend to see the current regime as a temporary phenomenon. ¶23. (C) In addition to the continued focus on human rights and the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, the three Diet members urged greater attention to the plight of Burma's ethnic minorities, both within the country and in refugee camps in TOKYO 00000217 005 OF 005 Thailand. Nakagawa stressed a particularly urgent need to respond to refugee issues in Thailand, where he described camps for Burma's ethnic minority groups as more like forced labor camps. Up until now, he said, Japan has helped Burma's refugees through support for UNHCR. He and Moriyama hoped Japan could work more directly to assist refugees in the future, describing the current situation as "hopeless." Nakagawa also expressed concern that Japan is being left behind by China in developing relations with Burma's people. In trips to the border, he noted, China's influence is much more evident than is Japan's. ¶24. (C) Burma-related human rights and ethnic minority support organizations are planning to organize a conference in Tokyo in February, according to Nakagawa. He expressed hope that representatives from the conference might be able to testify at the Diet, or participate in some other Diet event. Several Diet members and Japanese journalists are also contemplating joining a trip organized by Human Rights Watch and other NGO's to interview ethnic minority groups on the Thai-Burma border, she said. ¶25. (U) This cable was cleared by EAP/DAS Scot Marciel. SCHIEFFER