DASD MAHNKEN MEETINGS IN JAPAN ON BILATERAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002097 SIPDIS DOD FOR OSD/APSA SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA/GEIS DOD FOR OSD/PLANNING MAHNKEN/YOUNG JOINT STAFF FOR J5 WEIR/KOSINSKI JOINT STAFF FOR J7 ROUNDS/MUTTY/NELSON PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J3/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2023 TAGS: PGOV JA MARR PARM PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: DASD MAHNKEN MEETINGS IN JAPAN ON BILATERAL PLANNING TOKYO 00002097 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James Zumwalt. Reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Dr. Thomas Mahnken met with Japanese counterparts from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs (MOD and MOFA),Cabinet Secretariat and the Japan Self Defense Forces Joint Staff Office (JSDF JSO) on July 17 to encourage continued progress on bilateral planning. During his meetings, DASD Mahnken highlighted the need for timely U.S. military access to Japanese civilian air and sea ports during a Korean Peninsula contingency. He also pressed for the quick completion of surveys of those facilities. DASD Mahnken stressed the need for timely decision-making by Japan to support a U.S. contingency response and urged Japan to include a decision matrix in the next cycle of bilateral planning for Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5055. He also emphasized the need for early activation of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM),and in particular the Bilateral Coordination Center (BCC) that facilitates military coordination, critical for effective contingency response. MOFA and MOD outlined the difficulties in conducting certain site surveys and reviewed the limits of the central government's authority over prefecture and privately-owned ports. The JSO briefed on JSDF military activities during contingencies in the area, including the use of civilian air and sea ports to support the evacuation of Japanese nationals from South Korea during a contingency. MOD, MOFA, and JSO representatives agreed with the need for early military coordination in a contingency and said they are moving toward a more ""flexible activation"" of the BCC. End summary. ¶2. (U) DASD for Policy Planning Dr. Thomas Mahnken led a July 17 meeting on bilateral contingency planning with MOD, MOFA and JSDF JSO counterparts. The lead Japanese representatives were MOD Deputy Director General (DDG) for Defense Policy Ryutaro Matsumoto, MOFA DDG for North American Affairs Koji Haneda, Cabinet Secretariat Counsellor Takai Kawashima, JSO Operations Division (J3) head COL Shigeki Muto, and JSO Defense and International Policy Division (J-5) head CAPT Tatsuhiko Takashima. Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Japan Desk and Policy Planning Office, U.S. Joint Staff, Pacific Command (PACOM),U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ),and the Embassy also participated in the day-long meeting. Briefing on U.S. Access to Japanese Air and Sea Ports -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) At Japan's request, representatives from PACOM briefed on the current concept of operations for strategic maneuver options and military deployments to Japan in a Korean Peninsula contingency. The presentation focused on air-to-air and air-to-sea transload options for passengers and cargo, as well as the anticipated U.S. military need for access to and logistics support at Japan's civilian airports and sea ports during a U.S. military contingency response. This PACOM ""transparency briefing"" followed a similar presentation by PACOM Deputy J-5 Brig Gen Sam Angelella on May 19, 2008, in Tokyo, in response to requests from Japan for information on U.S. contingency response plans to support the completion of site surveys of 23 Japanese civilian air and sea ports. ¶4. (S) The brief included the current estimated number of required parking places for aircraft, expected passenger throughput and tonnage, fuel requirements, and the planned aircraft bed down. PACOM stressed that one of the most significant risks to the current contingency plan is not having early access to Japan's air and sea ports. The United States will need 24-hour, seven-days-a-week access to Japan's air and seaports at least two days prior to the start of conflict and will need access to the facilities within 48 hours after making a request. ¶5. (S) Dr. Mahnken stressed that the results of the site surveys are necessary to clearly understand the current capacity and logistic support capabilities at Japan's civilian air and sea ports. This will allow the United States to validate its current plans and to be more flexible in determining which bases could be used in a crisis. (Note: Japan agreed to conduct these site surveys in the October 2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Joint Statement. End note.) ¶6. (S) MOFA DDG Haneda noted that the models for air and sea port usage should take into account the ownership of each facility, i.e. whether owned and controlled by the central government, prefecture, private entity or port authority. The models also need to take into account the specific authorities the central government has over the facilities in peacetime, during a ""situation in areas surrounding Japan"" (SIASJ),or after an attack on Japan. For instance, SIASJ only allows the central government to request action of prefecture and privately-owned ports, whereas during an armed attack against Japan the Prime Minister has the authority to move Japan civil/private planes and ships, MOFA and JSO representatives noted. Site Surveys of Civilian Airports and Seaports -------------- - ¶7. (S) DASD Mahnken thanked his counterparts for completing the site surveys of two airports and two seaports, while stating the importance of quickly completing the remaining site surveys and pressing Japan to provide a timeline for completion. While not providing a timeline, MOFA DDG Haneda indicated that the next survey would be at Shimonoseki seaport in August. MOD and MOFA representatives explained the difficulty of completing some of the remaining Phase 1 site surveys due to historical reasons (such as Nagasaki), areas that are opposition party strongholds, or the lack of central government ownership (Kansai International Airport). An additional constraint is that the government cannot reveal the purpose of the site surveys to the public. ¶8. (S) MOD asked whether using publicly available data, in lieu of visiting the facilities, could satisfy the survey requirements. U.S. representatives said the method for meeting the survey requirements is up to Japan, however, the data requested by U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is what is needed to understand the capacity of each facility. Some of the required data can only be obtained by doing physical inspections. DASD Mahnken suggested that Japan might start surveys on easier Phase 2 facilities while working out the issues over the more difficult Phase 1 facilities. JSDF Planning for a Korean Contingency -------------- ¶9. (S) MOD and JSO representatives gave a presentation on JSDF activities in a Korean Peninsula contingency, including the use of air and sea ports during SIASJ and an armed attack against Japan, with a particular emphasis on operations to support the transport of Japanese nationals overseas (TJNO), equivalent to U.S. non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). Japan plans to send JSDF ships and aircraft to South Korea for TJNO during SIASJ, if necessary to augment Japan civil air and sea capacity. Japan would need to get Republic of Korea prior approval and MOD would need to be confident that transport by JSDF aircraft would be safe, i.e. they would not be transiting, entering or departing from hostilities. Significant JSDF activities would include convoy support and minesweeping, search and rescue operations, and ship inspections. JSO representatives noted that minesweeping activities by the JSDF is allowed under SIASJ against ""abandoned mines,"" i.e. floating mines or mines otherwise seemingly dumped off a ship and abandoned. JSO suggested that the ""abandoned mines"" concept would allow Japan the flexibility to conduct minesweeping operations but asked that the United States not press for further definition of an abandoned mine. Bilateral Planning Schedule for CONPLAN 5055 -------------- ¶10. (S) USFJ reviewed the agreed schedule for the next cycle of bilateral planning for Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5055. The current CONPLAN 5055-07 was bilaterally approved in September ¶2007. The recent bilateral agreement on the tasking for the Comprehensive Security Assessment (CSA) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Bilateral Planning Framework and Guidance will allow detailed planning work to begin on CONPLAN 5055-09 in September 2008. The CSA will be completed in March 2009 and the draft CONPLAN 5055-09 and associated annexes will be completed in July 2009. Following draft plan completion, a review and approval process will be conducted by both sides. The completed CONPLAN 5055-09 should be signed in September 2009. Risks and Assumptions in CONPLAN 5055 -------------- ¶11. (S) The United States led a discussion on the risks associated with our current assumptions in CONPLAN 5055. The focus of that discussion centered primarily on the need for timely decision-making and quick establishment of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM),particularly during the early phases of a contingency. Building on the earlier ""transparency briefing,"" U.S. participants stressed the need to better understand Japan's decision-making, particularly when moving from peacetime to SIASJ. ¶12. (S) MOFA stated that Japan does not ""declare"" SIASJ on its own behalf, but rather the implementation of SIASJ is a bilateral event that allows Japan to provide support to U.S. forces. The U.S. would inform Japan that a contingency around Japan is likely and to provide information on the U.S. requirements for Japan's support. MOFA would then forward the request to activate SIASJ measures to the Cabinet for a decision. U.S. participants noted that the United States sees the implementation of SIASJ as ultimately a unilateral decision by Japan. DASD Mahnken commented that the discussion on decision responsibilities and timing warrants the development of a decision-making matrix for CONPLAN 5055 that would track the sequencing of unilateral and bilateral decisions needed during a contingency. (Note: This is a USFJ initiative included in the SDC Bilateral Planning Guidance for 5055-09 that the Japanese Joint Staff had resisted at working levels. End note.) Both sides agreed to begin coordination on a decision matrix for 5055. Bilateral Coordination Needed Prior to a Contingency -------------- -------------- ¶13. (S) Discussions on the need for early activation of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) and the Bilateral Coordination Center (BCC) included a review of Japan's response to North Korea's July 2006 missile test. The Embassy Political Minister Counselor noted that coordination of operations and intelligence in the run-up to, and following the July 2006 North Korean missile launches, had been ad hoc. Many with a need-to-know in the Japanese government had not been informed of intelligence data and operational issues. MOFA representatives responded that Japan had not seen a need to stand up the BCM and BCC as there had not been any operational issues necessitating coordination. Embassy PolMinCouns responded that there had been a clear operational need at that time. For example U.S. and Japan Aegis ships were operating in the Sea of Japan and needed to share data and coordinate with one another. Japanese government officials also needed to be aware of our Navy and MSDF operations. The creation of the ad hoc Azabudai Group, consisting of senior Japanese policy-makers, Embassy officials, and USFJ representatives, to deal with the crisis at that time is evidence that added bilateral coordination mechanisms are necessary. ¶14. (S) U.S. participants said that political decisions, or the delay thereof, in the run-up to a contingency should not prevent military coordination between U.S. forces and the JSDF. USFJ Deputy Commander Major General Flock suggested the BCC, in some form, be active at all times and continually staffed at some minimal level so that it is ready to be fully stood-up at a moments notice. He also suggested that the BCM and BCC process needs to be exercised more, especially since most current bilateral exercises assume SIASJ or an armed attack against Japan has already occurred. ¶15. (S) Both MOFA and MOD DDGs indicated that the is moving toward a more ""flexible activation"" of the BCC, with DDG Matsumoto noting that this would allow BCC activation without the establishment of the BCM on the authority of the Japan JSO Chief of Staff and the SUFJ Commander. (NOTE: This is senior-level MOD confirmation of a proposal an MOD action officer presented to USFJ and Embassy representatives the previous week. The proposal is now under consideration at USFJ. End note.) ¶16. (S) The Japan JSO J-3 operations representative expressed support for having the BCC established during peacetime, especially since Japan now has ballistic missile interceptor capability. MOFA also noted that whether an entity called ""BCC"" exists or not during peacetime, the substantive actions of the BCC need to occur in peacetime before a contingency occurs. This statement drew agreeing nods from all on the Japan side. SIASJ Under Review -------------- ¶17. In subsequent office calls, Director General Takamizawa and Director General Tokuchi both mentioned that the current SIASJ law was insufficient and the MOD is currently reviewing the legal system for SIASJ and how the law could be improved to allow for greater flexibility and realism in a contingency. MOD has identified several areas for improvement and by August will choose specific areas for further study. ¶18. (U) DASD Mahnken cleared this cable. SCHIEFFER