TOKYO DECISION TO INCLUDE TAKESHIMA IN TEXTBOOKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001985 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA KN SUBJECT: TOKYO DECISION TO INCLUDE TAKESHIMA IN TEXTBOOKS MAY HAVE "EXPLOSIVE" IMPACT ON JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. James Zumwalt. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. ROK Embassy diplomats describe Japan's decision to mention the Liancourt Rocks in educational documents as "explosive." Officials in Seoul felt "betrayed" by the move, especially after ROK President Lee Myung-bak directly appealed to Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to "hold back" on the textbook issue at their summit on the margins of the Hokkaido Lake Toya G8 meeting. According to the Embassy, the textbook controversy could have a "serious impact" on the ROK's foreign policy with Tokyo, casting doubt on Seoul's participation in the Japan-ROK-PRC summit, and has the potential to affect South Korea's participation in the Six-Party Talks process. Media and academic contacts note conservative Diet politicians influenced PM Fukuda's position, which appears to have been crafted by Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura and based on complex internal party politics. End Summary. -------------- Explosive Situation -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 16, ROK Embassy First Secretary Kang Young-hoon told Embassy Tokyo political officer that Tokyo's July 14 decision to include its claim to the disputed Liancourt Rocks (named Takeshima by Japan and Dokto by South Korea) in an educational manual used by junior high school students was "very, very serious," "enormous," and "explosive." Following efforts made by new ROK President Lee Myung-bak to put aside the contentious historical differences that have plagued ROK-Japan relations, Kang said Seoul officials felt a sense of "betrayal," particularly after Lee directly appealed to PM Fukuda to "hold back" on the textbook issue at their bilateral summit on the margins of the Hokkaido Lake Toya G8 meeting. ¶3. (C) According to Kang, Tokyo's actions "undermine the partnership" both sides hope to establish, and as a result, the ROK-Japan relationship was now "frozen." During a 40-minute meeting on July 15, ROK Ambassador Kwon Chul-hyun warned Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka that Tokyo's decision would have a serious affect on the bilateral relationship. Kwon told Yabunaka Seoul was not sure public opinion would allow PM Fukuda to visit South Korea this fall - the next planned step in the so-called "shuttle diplomacy" which the two countries resumed following reciprocal leaders' visits in 2007-08. The textbook ruling, which Kang noted would have "serious impact" on the ROK's foreign policy with Tokyo, also cast doubt on Seoul's participation in the Japan-ROK-PRC summit, which Tokyo planned to host this fall. The Six-Party Talks process might also be affected, though Kang provided few specifics as to what steps South Korea might take. Seoul recalled Ambassador Kwon, who departed July 15 and plans to remain in Seoul indefinitely, Kang reported. -------------- Internal Party Dynamics -------------- ¶4. (U) MEXT controls educational content in Japanese schools via two documents: 1) a legally binding teaching guideline which is revised every ten years, and 2) a non-binding teacher's manual (the document promulgated July 14),issued in accordance with the guideline, which provides examples to textbook authors. Though there is no legal requirement to do so, government officials usually update the non-binding manual when the new guidelines are issued. The legally-binding guidelines were updated in March 2008, so MEXT officials took the opportunity to update the non-binding manual based on the new guidelines. ¶5. (C) PM Fukuda based his decision to include the controversial text in the manual on complex internal party politics, according to Keio University Professor Junya TOKYO 00001985 002 OF 002 Nishino and other Embassy Tokyo contacts. During a 2005 discussion of the guidelines, then MEXT minister and conservative LDP Diet member Nariaki Nakayama promised to include wording on Japan's territorial claims to the Liancourt Rocks in the next non-binding manual. Nishino assessed that Fukuda was forced to follow this advice, which had been backed by a powerful conservative education caucus led by LDP heavyweights CCS Machimura, former LDP PM Yoshiro Mori, and still-influential former PM SHINZO Abe. According to Noshino, FM Koumura participated in three-way consultations with Machimura and current MEXT minister Kisaburo Tokai, but exerted little influence on the decision. Fukuda delayed the announcement until after the Hokkaido Lake Toya G8 meeting, which included the meeting with President Lee. -------------- Fukuda Reacts to ROK Pressure -------------- ¶6. (C) PM Fukuda strongly supports the textbook changes and engineered the three-way exchanges between Machimura, Koumura, and Tokai, media contacts close to the Prime Minister's office (Kantei) assert. According to these reporters, Koumura argued that the timing of the announcement was not right but in the end, the conservative leanings of all three men led them to approve the revision. ¶7. (C) Fukuda feared the adverse public reaction resulting from the perception he had buckled under pressure from ROK officials, who were "adamant" about not including the reference to the Liancourt Rocks in the new manual, media sources tell Embassy Tokyo. In a bit of reverse logic, Fukuda may have sought to head off adverse public reaction to South Korea - the kind shown by right-wing activists during the controversy on Yasukuni Shrine - by refusing to be seen as bowing to Seoul's wishes. ZUMWALT