TOKYO DECISION TO INCLUDE TAKESHIMA IN TEXTBOOKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001985

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA KN
SUBJECT: TOKYO DECISION TO INCLUDE TAKESHIMA IN TEXTBOOKS
MAY HAVE "EXPLOSIVE" IMPACT ON JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. James Zumwalt. Reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary. ROK Embassy diplomats describe Japan's
decision to mention the Liancourt Rocks in educational
documents as "explosive." Officials in Seoul felt "betrayed"
by the move, especially after ROK President Lee Myung-bak
directly appealed to Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to "hold
back" on the textbook issue at their summit on the margins of
the Hokkaido Lake Toya G8 meeting. According to the Embassy,
the textbook controversy could have a "serious impact" on the
ROK's foreign policy with Tokyo, casting doubt on Seoul's
participation in the Japan-ROK-PRC summit, and has the
potential to affect South Korea's participation in the
Six-Party Talks process. Media and academic contacts note
conservative Diet politicians influenced PM Fukuda's
position, which appears to have been crafted by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Machimura and based on complex internal party
politics. End Summary.

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Explosive Situation
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2. (C) On July 16, ROK Embassy First Secretary Kang
Young-hoon told Embassy Tokyo political officer that Tokyo's
July 14 decision to include its claim to the disputed
Liancourt Rocks (named Takeshima by Japan and Dokto by South
Korea) in an educational manual used by junior high school
students was "very, very serious," "enormous," and
"explosive." Following efforts made by new ROK President Lee
Myung-bak to put aside the contentious historical differences
that have plagued ROK-Japan relations, Kang said Seoul
officials felt a sense of "betrayal," particularly after Lee
directly appealed to PM Fukuda to "hold back" on the textbook
issue at their bilateral summit on the margins of the
Hokkaido Lake Toya G8 meeting.


3. (C) According to Kang, Tokyo's actions "undermine the
partnership" both sides hope to establish, and as a result,
the ROK-Japan relationship was now "frozen." During a
40-minute meeting on July 15, ROK Ambassador Kwon Chul-hyun
warned Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka that
Tokyo's decision would have a serious affect on the bilateral
relationship. Kwon told Yabunaka Seoul was not sure public
opinion would allow PM Fukuda to visit South Korea this fall
- the next planned step in the so-called "shuttle diplomacy"
which the two countries resumed following reciprocal leaders'
visits in 2007-08. The textbook ruling, which Kang noted
would have "serious impact" on the ROK's foreign policy with
Tokyo, also cast doubt on Seoul's participation in the
Japan-ROK-PRC summit, which Tokyo planned to host this fall.
The Six-Party Talks process might also be affected, though
Kang provided few specifics as to what steps South Korea
might take. Seoul recalled Ambassador Kwon, who departed
July 15 and plans to remain in Seoul indefinitely, Kang
reported.

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Internal Party Dynamics
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4. (U) MEXT controls educational content in Japanese schools
via two documents: 1) a legally binding teaching guideline
which is revised every ten years, and 2) a non-binding
teacher's manual (the document promulgated July 14),issued
in accordance with the guideline, which provides examples to
textbook authors. Though there is no legal requirement to do
so, government officials usually update the non-binding
manual when the new guidelines are issued. The
legally-binding guidelines were updated in March 2008, so
MEXT officials took the opportunity to update the non-binding
manual based on the new guidelines.


5. (C) PM Fukuda based his decision to include the
controversial text in the manual on complex internal party
politics, according to Keio University Professor Junya

TOKYO 00001985 002 OF 002


Nishino and other Embassy Tokyo contacts. During a 2005
discussion of the guidelines, then MEXT minister and
conservative LDP Diet member Nariaki Nakayama promised to
include wording on Japan's territorial claims to the
Liancourt Rocks in the next non-binding manual. Nishino
assessed that Fukuda was forced to follow this advice, which
had been backed by a powerful conservative education caucus
led by LDP heavyweights CCS Machimura, former LDP PM Yoshiro
Mori, and still-influential former PM Shinzo Abe. According
to Noshino, FM Koumura participated in three-way
consultations with Machimura and current MEXT minister
Kisaburo Tokai, but exerted little influence on the decision.
Fukuda delayed the announcement until after the Hokkaido
Lake Toya G8 meeting, which included the meeting with
President Lee.

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Fukuda Reacts to ROK Pressure
--------------


6. (C) PM Fukuda strongly supports the textbook changes and
engineered the three-way exchanges between Machimura,
Koumura, and Tokai, media contacts close to the Prime
Minister's office (Kantei) assert. According to these
reporters, Koumura argued that the timing of the announcement
was not right but in the end, the conservative leanings of
all three men led them to approve the revision.


7. (C) Fukuda feared the adverse public reaction resulting
from the perception he had buckled under pressure from ROK
officials, who were "adamant" about not including the
reference to the Liancourt Rocks in the new manual, media
sources tell Embassy Tokyo. In a bit of reverse logic,
Fukuda may have sought to head off adverse public reaction to
South Korea - the kind shown by right-wing activists during
the controversy on Yasukuni Shrine - by refusing to be seen
as bowing to Seoul's wishes.
ZUMWALT