DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/27/08

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001772 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/27/08 INDEX: (1) Nuclear programs, abduction, and peace (Part 1): Time of trial for abduction-and-nuclear issue dual policy (Mainichi) (2) Dispatch of GSDF personnel to Sudan in August or later as command center personnel (Sankei) (3) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear declaration -- Insufficient report unacceptable (Sankei) (4) Editorial: U.S. government should reconsider decision to delist North Korea (Nikkei) (5) Editorial: North Korea's declaration must lead to complete nuclear abandonment (Asahi) (6) Defense exchange isolated (Sankei) (7) Editorial: IWC plenary meeting; moves underway for normalization of organization (Tokyo Shimbun) ARTICLES: (1) Nuclear programs, abduction, and peace (Part 1): Time of trial for abduction-and-nuclear issue dual policy MAINICHI (Pages 1 and 2) (Abridged slightly) June 27, 2008 President George W. Bush in a press conference on June 26 announced that the United States would delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. The President also emphatically said: "The United States will never forget the abduction issue." The President detests tyrannies. He seemed so sympathetic to the abduction issue that the Japanese public had expected the United States would not delist the North unless there was progress on the abduction issue. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage once indicated that the abduction issue was a reason why the United States put North Korea on its terrorism blacklist. In reality, the U.S. government has not officially promised anything beyond "giving consideration." In April 2007, when then Prime Minister SHINZO ABE visited the United States, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said to him clearly that resolving the abduction issue was not a condition for delisting North Korea. President Bush started to use the phrase, "We will not forget the abduction issue," from around that time. He used the same expression when Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda visited the United States in November 2007. That can be taken as a U.S. announcement that though it harbors sympathy, Washington's decision on whether to delist the North would not be affected by the prime minister's preference for pressure or dialogue in dealing with Pyongyang. The turning points were the January-February 2007 U.S.-DPRK Berlin talks that reached an agreement on resolving the nuclear issue and the six-party Beijing agreement on first-phase steps. This was immediately followed by a series of visits to Japan by high-ranking U.S. officials. While in Japan, they all asked the definition of progress on the abduction issue. People began to fear that the TOKYO 00001772 002 OF 010 abduction issue might cause a split in the Japan-U.S. alliance. Former Prime Minister ABE once at the Diet defined progress as specific steps by North Korea for the resolution of the abduction issue. A Japan-DPRK normalization working group also began functioning under the six-party framework. Momentum was gathering even under the ABE administration to move the abduction issue forward in tandem with progress on the nuclear issue. Prime Minister ABE was replaced by Fukuda in September 2007. Fukuda soon made it clear that his administration would pursue the nuclear and abduction issues at the same time with the aim of resolving the abduction issue while he was office. The phrase "dialogue and pressure" has rarely been heard since. Japan-DPRK talks were held on June 11-12 and an agreement was reached for Pyongyang to reinvestigate the abduction issue and hand Japanese radicals who hijacked a Japan Airlines plane to North Korea in 1970 over to Tokyo and for Japan to partially lift its sanctions against the North. It is widely believed that behind this development, there was a nudge by Washington, which wants to proceed with the denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear disarmament. Although Prime Minister Fukuda has welcomed the series of developments, the North's declaration in not covering nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment, and other activities is clearly imperfect. Japan has lost the leverage of delisting the North, and the future of the implementation of the reinvestigation into the abduction issue remains unclear. There is a proverb that goes: "He who runs after two hares will catch neither." The Fukuda administration's North Korea policy is facing a testing time. On the night of June 13 at a Cabinet Office conference room, Foreign Ministry Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director-General Akitaka Saiki briefed abductees' families on the Japan-DPRK talks held in Beijing. In the session, Saiki said, "I did my very best, but I am ready to take any criticism." His explanation lasted an hour and 40 minutes. Some of the family members who were assembled together after receiving fax messages from the government the day before were hopeful that surviving abductees would be able to return to Japan. Family members fiercely criticized Pyongyang's plan to reinvestigate the abduction issue and Tokyo's plan to partially lift its sanctions. The abduction issue was reinvestigated in 2004 after the second Japan-North Korea summit, and Pyongyang did not change its previous claim that eight abductees had died. Family members had high hopes for Saiki, who headed the government's investigation team that visited North Korea immediately after the first Japan-North Korea summit that took place in September 2002. His expression was stony throughout the meeting with the family members. The Association of the Families of Victims of Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN),which regards abductions as an ongoing act of terrorism, has been waiting for the Untied States to identify "abduction" as a ground for keeping North Korea as its terrorism blacklist. Since its then representative Shigeru Yokota, 75, first visited the United States in February 2001, AFVKN members have often TOKYO 00001772 003 OF 010 visited Washington to lobby U.S. officials. In the spring of 2004, the abduction issue made the State Department's Annual Country Report on Terrorism. The AFVKN took this as Washington having recognized abductions an act of terrorism. In April 2006, Sakie Yokota, 72, visited the United States and met with President Bush in person. The AFVKN was convinced that unwavering ties were established with the United States. North Korea conducted a nuclear test six months later, in October 2006, promoting Washington to put high priority on Pyongyang's nuclear programs. AFVKN members visited the United States last fall and this spring to lobby against delisting the North in vain. At a regular AFVKN meeting in Minato Ward, Tokyo, on the night of June 25, Sakie Yokota bitterly criticized the government's decision to ease sanctions against the North. Her daughter Megumi Yokota, who was abducted at the age of 13, scratched so desperately at an iron door during the boat ride to the North that she lost all her fingernails, according to a former North Korean agent. What Sakie fears the most is the reopening of Japanese ports for the North Korean cargo-passenger ship Mangyongbong-92. The ship is used for Korean residents in Japan to visit their kin back in North Korea. It has also become clear through police investigations that the Mangyongbong has been used for activities by North Korean agents. Abductees' families, including Sakie, have been conducting a dive to keep the vessel out of Japanese ports. The government has imposed a ban on the ship's entry into Japan in the wake of the North's missile launches in July 2006. But based on the recent bilateral agreement, the vessel will be allowed to enter Japanese ports strictly for transporting humanitarian supplies. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura met on June 17 with family members with a letter opposing the government's decision to partially lift the sanctions. The government's spokesman said to them: "The reinvestigation must be based on the repatriation of (abductees). We are now at the stage of word for word, so we will not lift sanctions immediately." Representative Shigeo Iizuka, 70, did not conceal his mistrust in the government which keeps pace with the United States. The blog of Teruaki Masumoto, 52, the organization's secretary general, reads: "The United States has completely betrayed us. The Japanese government, too, has abandoned the victims of kidnapped by North Korea." On the night of June 26, Machimura discussed (the delisting of North Korea) with Stephen Hadley, assistant to the President for national security affairs. In the conversation, Machimura had to make a request to the U.S. government, saying: "The Japanese public is shocked (by the delisting),although it is a predetermined step. We would like to see the U.S. government handle the matter carefully." (2) Dispatch of GSDF personnel to Sudan in August or later as command center personnel SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) June 27, 2008 The government on June 26 decided to dispatch several Ground Self-Defense members to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),which is TOKYO 00001772 004 OF 010 operating in southern Sudan, as central command personnel. It will undergo coordination with the UN with the aim of dispatching them in August or later. This will be the first dispatch of SDF personnel to Africa since 1993-1995, when they were sent to join UN operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The government's aim is to play up Japan's international contributions in the run-up to the G-8 in July, where Africa assistance will top the agenda. SDF personnel will be dispatched to the UNMIS command center located in al-Khartum, the capital of Sudan. They will be serving as liaison and coordination officers dealing with troops taking part in peace-keeping operations (PKO) there. The government yesterday held a meeting of Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura, Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura and Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba. However, coordination has been still underway as no agreement was reached at that meeting over the posts they will assume. Regarding the dispatch of SDF personnel to Sudan, the government has considered dispatching GSDF personnel for the reconstruction of roads and the removal of land mines. However, only command center personnel will be dispatched at least for the present. The government is also looking into dispatching SDF personnel to PKO centers in Ghana, Kenya and Egypt for the first time as instructors. (3) Editorial: North Korea's nuclear declaration -- Insufficient report unacceptable SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) June 27, 2008 In the wake of North Korea handing over a declaration of its nuclear programs, U.S. President George W. Bush has notified Congress of his decision to delist Pyongyang as a state sponsor of terrorism. It is extremely regrettable that Pyongyang's declaration has excluded or forgone a list of its actual nuclear weapons, which is especially vital for Japan, even though it had been expected in the report. We have to wonder how effectively and completely verification can be done in the 45 days before delisting goes into effect. If North Korea is removed from the U.S. blacklist, it will be able to get international economic support. "No economic assistance to North Korea before resolution of the abduction issue" has become common public opinion of Japan. Therefore, the U.S. government's decision this time around may put the brakes on resolving the abduction issue, and it may also harm Japan's national interests. However, delisting has not yet been finalized. It is time for Japan to devote all its energies to prevent Japan from being left in the lurch. The declaration stipulates the amount of extracted plutonium, the reactor records, among other matters. A separate report should have itemized nuclear weapons that use highly-enriched uranium and indicate Pyongyang's cooperation to Syria's nuclear development. But the United States appears to have given in to North Korea's assertions. TOKYO 00001772 005 OF 010 Pyongyang has put off providing a list of its nuclear weapons to a later phase of the complex negotiations. The declaration this time around was made based on the joint statement by the Six Parties in September 2005. The joint statement stipulated that the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Therefore, it is evident that the declaration is a major backsliding. The United States put North Korea on its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1988 after its agents were found to have bombed a South Korean airliner the previous year. In order to remove a country from the list, the two points must be proved: 1) the country has not supported any terrorists for the past six months; and 2) the country is committed to not supporting terrorism in the future. What should be forgotten was that the U.S. government has clarified that it would add the issue of abductions to the conditions for its designation as terrorist-sponsoring state. This is the remark made by then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage after then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had visited Pyongyang. The issue of Japanese abduction of nationals by North Korea agents was first stipulated in the annual report on global terrorism in 2004. The phrase that the abduction issue is not resolved should be written into the annual report. We wonder how much the Japanese government made efforts to share such a view with the governments of the United States and other countries. In order for the U.S. Congress to reverse the Bush administration's decision to delist the North, new legislation is necessary. We want the Foreign Ministry and Diet members from the ruling and opposition forces to do their best to bring about a rollback by taking advantage of their channels to the U.S. Congress. (4) Editorial: U.S. government should reconsider decision to delist North Korea NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) June 27, 2008 Following North Korea's submission of a declaration of its nuclear development programs, the U.S. government notified Congress of its decision to delist the North as a state sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. came up with the decision in disregard of Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Akitaka Saiki's warning that a delisting decision may negatively affect the reliability of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Things are going as North Korea intended. The foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance could be undermined under the current serious situation. During the 45-day delisting process, if North Korea presents measures to verify the contents of its report effectively and if progress is made toward settlement of the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents, the situation will turn around. Otherwise, the Bush administration should retract the delisting decision. The delisting plan contains a number of problems. First, the deal between the U.S. and North Korea might make it more difficult to move negotiations on North Korea's denuclearization forward since it lacks rationality and balance. TOKYO 00001772 006 OF 010 North Korea's declaration is not linked to the U.S. removal of North Korea from its blacklist under U.S. domestic law. Moreover, North Korea had promised in an agreement reached in the six-party talks last October to produce a complete and accurate declaration of its nuclear programs and activities by the end of last year. The declaration came out six months later. An extravagant reward is given to a student for the homework the student turned in six months later. The spoiled student will continue to get around doing homework. According to this logic, it will become less hopeful for North Korea to denuclearize itself. Second, the nuclear report, though taken as a one step forward for form's sake, contains no information concerning the nuclear weapons Pyongyang has produced. Further, the report sets out no principle on how to verify its contents. A state of closed nature, like North Korea, can deport investigators from the nation at any time, as the North did in the past. As long as North Korea remains closed, the effective verification of the report will be difficult. Third, it is an open question that North Korea is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism. The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on Sept. 11 in 2001 and North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens are both challenges to the civilized world. North Korea has yet to launch the reinvestigation of the Japanese abductees based on its pledge to Japan. The perpetrators of the abductions, who can even be called state terrorists, are still in the hands of North Korean authorities. Fourth, the delisting policy of the U.S. will deal a serious blow to the Japan-U.S. alliance. The Bush administration is strict with Iran but is not so with North Korea. The delisting decision exposed that Japan and the U.S. have different senses of menace toward North Korea. Sharing the same sense of menace should be a premise for the alliance. If Japan and the U.S. do not have common sense, their security treaty would be just a scrap of paper. A U.S. informed source said that the feeling or sense of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has not changed from that when he was serving as U.S. ambassador to South Korea in the days of the administration led by President Roh Moo Hyun. If Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda turns a blind eye to the cracks that are appearing between Japan and the U.S. and officially falls in step with the U.S. policy of reconciliation toward North Korea, Japan's cornerstone supporting the alliance would be undermined. North Korea is apparently taking into account the Bush administration's term of office drawing closer. We want to ask President Bush if he would like to go down in history as the president who made a decision that caused the U.S. to lose its most important alliance in the Pacific region. (5) Editorial: North Korea's declaration must lead to complete nuclear abandonment ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) June 27, 2008 At long last, North Korea came up with a declaration of its nuclear TOKYO 00001772 007 OF 010 programs. Its details have yet to be unveiled. This declaration, however, is an important step in line with an agreement reached at the six-party talks for North Korea's nuclear abandonment. Last year's six-party agreement anticipates three phases. The first phase is to freeze and seal North Korea's nuclear-related facilities. The second phase is to disable these facilities so they cannot be used and is to declare all nuclear programs. The third phase is to complete North Korea's nuclear abandonment. So far, the first phase is over. North Korea is currently in the process of disabling its nuclear-related facilities. The declaration is the last thing of what North Korea should do in the second phase. North Korea was to have come up with its nuclear declaration by the end of last year. However, it was six months overdue due to its protracted talks with the United States. In return, the United States is now in the process of delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. We would like to welcome the resumed process of translating the six-party agreement into action. However, we cannot say we totally welcome it. First of all, North Korea has yet to disable all of its nuclear facilities. North Korea will reportedly invite the six-party members' news media to see North Korea demolish one of its nuclear facilities today. This is probably aimed at visual effects. However, North Korea should disable its nuclear facilities through such substantive measures as removing spent nuclear fuel from the reactor. Second, we wonder if the submitted declaration really clarifies North Korea's nuclear development in its entirety. It reportedly is a far cry from being a "complete and correct declaration." That is because the declaration is said to contain no core information, such as how many nuclear weapons North Korea has and where they are stored. North Korea is said to have only declared its nuclear development using plutonium and reportedly does not touch on its uranium enrichment. It looks like the declaration fails to account for its suspected proliferation of nuclear-related technologies to Syria. All these doubts must not be left vague. Even so, the declaration itself should be viewed as progress. It will not ease North Korea's nuclear threat. However, North Korea will be disabled at least from making raw materials for nuclear weapons. More importantly, the third phase-which is for North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear programs-is finally in sight. What should be done from now is clear. The six-party talks should resume at once and decide on how to verify North Korea's declaration. North Korea should sincerely respond to on-the-spot inspections and hearings from its engineers. After that, we want the six-party talks to work out specific procedures for the third phase. We probably cannot say U.S. President Bush, whose term is to run out TOKYO 00001772 008 OF 010 shortly, is not impatient. If the declaration is found false, the United States could bring back the process. Bush stressed in his press remarks that he will not forget the abduction issue. For the sake of Japan's national security, we must prod North Korea to abandon its nuclear development. In that process, we should pave the way to resolve the abduction issue or tragic crime. We should make headway without losing sight of this starting point. (6) Defense exchange isolated SANKEI (Page 6) (Abridged) June 26, 2008 Toshu Noguchi ZHANJIANG, Guangdong, China-The Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Sazanami, now visiting China for the first time, went through main exchange events yesterday. China apparently tried to make an appeal to the international community on its stance of disclosing information, with the exchange this time as a symbol of confidence building between Japan and China in the military area. With an eye on anti-Japanese sentiment, the MSDF ship's visit to China was isolated from the Chinese public. This gives the impression that it is difficult to build confidence. The Sazanami had about 100 visitors from the naval forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army yesterday. On the deck, they were taking pictures and listening to an MSDF officer's briefing on the Sazanami's hardware. I asked them about historical issues that lie between Japan and China, and I also tried to ask them about the issue of marine interests in the East China Sea. "Please ask our officer," one of them said. China stressed that the "military exchange" is based on the Japanese and Chinese leaders' common understanding" (in the words of China's South Sea Fleet Commander Su Shiliang). In November last year, the South Sea Fleet's missile destroyer Shenzhen made its first port call in Japan. This time around, an MSDF ship visited China. Japan and China are now set to go on with bilateral exchanges in the most delayed area of military affairs. "Looking back on history," one of the Sazanami's crew said, "it wouldn't be so easy to build a relationship of mutual trust in a real sense." This is also true, however. In Zhanjiang, China was wary of 'anti-Japanese' moves. The Sazanami remained berthed at the naval base, where the South Sea Fleet is headquartered. An MSDF band's downtown performance was canceled, and a joint concert planned to be held in the city was suddenly rescheduled to take place on base. Such measures were taken for "security reasons." Public security authorities were guarded against anti-Japanese demonstrations. Anyone suspicious was barred from the gate to the base. On the Internet were write-ins for demonstrations against the Sazanami's port call. There were no citizens at the base ceremony upon the Sazanami's arrival. The Sazanami's crew felt a welcome mood. In their eyes, however, the scene there looked somewhat bare. The Sazanami will be opened to the public on June 27. This event, however, is reportedly for only those permitted by Chinese authorities. TOKYO 00001772 009 OF 010 The Chinese media is friendly toward the Sazanami's visit, but their coverage of the MSDF ship's port call is not so prominent. Local residents voiced their mixed feelings. "History is history," a taxicab driver said. "It's important to promote exchange and friendship," he added. "A naval ship flying the Japanese flag is here," a restaurant manager said, "so I can't help but imagine the history of aggression." Japan and China have somehow started their defense exchanges. However, one of those concerned voiced misgivings: "It's also important to promote open exchanges like visiting each other's ships. However, I wonder if we can understand each other without exchanging views or holding discussions, including sensitive issues. The slogan of exchanges may take on a life of its own, and I fear that China may only use this exchange for their image strategy to make an appeal on what they call 'transparency.'" (7) Editorial: IWC plenary meeting; moves underway for normalization of organization TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full) June 27, 2008 The International Whaling Commission (IWC) at its 60th plenary meeting, now underway in Santiago, Chile, has decided to set up a working group joined by major member nations. Both whaling and antiwhaling countries need to seriously make efforts to normalize the organization. It has been more than 20 years since Japan withdrew from commercial whaling in late 1982, when the IWC imposed a 10-year moratorium on such at a plenary meeting. The outcome of the Santiago meeting has paved the way to put an end to an annual verbal battle between whaling and antiwhaling countries seen at IWC meetings. The IWC at its Santiago plenary meeting, which has started this week, agreed to establish a working group tasked with dealing with the future of the organization and key issues. The membership of the IWC is now 81, of which 24 major countries will join the envisaged working group -- 10 countries, such as Japan, China, South Korea, Norway, Iceland, etc., from the whaling countries' side, and 14 countries, including the U.S., Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentine, etc., from the antiwhaling countries' side. Main items the envisaged working group will take up include the resumption of small-scale coastal whaling, as sought strongly by Japan, and the completion of the revised management scheme (RMS) for the proper control of cetacean resources. Antiwhaling countries will bring up a total of 33 items, including the expansion of sanctuaries and the way Japan's whaling should be. The IWC says that the working group will aim at submitting a package of agreed proposals at the plenary meeting in Madeira, Portugal, following a first meeting this fall and a series of discussion sessions to be held with the IWC's interim meeting next March in between. In view of the fierce conflict in the past, the agreement reached this time is groundbreaking. It is praiseworthy that participants TOKYO 00001772 010 OF 010 vowed to find common ground through talks for the normalization of the stalemated organization. Japan, which has been calling for long-term whaling, once hinted at its intention to walk out of the IWC, after the Anchorage plenary session last year. It cast a ballot in favor of aboriginal subsistence whaling in the U.S. and Denmark. However, its proposal for resuming coastal whaling was voted down by antiwhaling countries. The IWC is an international agency established in 1948, based on the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Its objective is to preserve cetacean resources and develop the whaling industry in an orderly manner. Member nations are obligated to restore the original form of whaling. However, the future of whaling is far from reassuring. The key is to what extent whaling and antiwhaling countries will make concessions. Antiwhaling countries will probably seek the curtailment of or withdrawal from research whaling in the Southern Ocean, if Japan focuses on the resumption of coastal whaling. The barrier to the resumption of commercial whaling is even higher. Revising key items requires approval by a two-thirds majority or more at a plenary meeting. Making decisions from a broad perspective is indispensable. SCHIEFFER