Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TOKYO1745
2008-06-25 07:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

ASD SHINN PRESSES JAPAN ON REALIGNMENT, PLANNING

Tags:  PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA 
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OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #1745/01 1770748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250748Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5382
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4089
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2391
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0084
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8569
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0945
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2298
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9154
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUHPSAA/COMMARFORPAC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7077
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001745 

SIPDIS

DOD FOR OSD/APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 WEIR/KOSINSKI
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2023
TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA
SUBJECT: ASD SHINN PRESSES JAPAN ON REALIGNMENT, PLANNING
AND INFORMATION SECURITY

REF: TOKYO 1657

TOKYO 00001745 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001745 SIPDIS DOD FOR OSD/APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA JOINT STAFF FOR J5 WEIR/KOSINSKI PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2023 TAGS: PREL MARR PINR PGOV JA SUBJECT: ASD SHINN PRESSES JAPAN ON REALIGNMENT, PLANNING AND INFORMATION SECURITY REF: TOKYO 1657 TOKYO 00001745 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Shinn used June 16 meetings with Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) counterparts to register strong concerns about delays in base realignment, emphasize the importance of robust bilateral planning, and stress the need for continued progress on information security. MOD Administrative Vice Minister (AVM) Masuda gave assurances that Japan remains committed to completing the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) on schedule despite the delays in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Defense Policy Bureau Director General (DG) Takamizawa cautioned, however, that accelerating on-land construction at the FRF could endanger local cooperation. On bilateral planning, Operational Planning Bureau DG Tokuchi pressed for increased communication and cooperation but was unwilling to discuss hold-ups on finishing guidance to initiate a bilateral threat assessment. MOFA NORTH American Affairs DG Nishimiya suggested that misperceptions remain over the level of detail each side needs about the others' operational plans. AVM Masuda underscored the need for greater cooperation on information security, but noted that other ministries and agencies are not as sensitive to the problem. End summary. ¶2. (C) During June 16 meetings at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and MOFA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs James Shinn discussed possible Japanese deployment options to Afghanistan (reported separately in Reftel) and a range of other security issues, including the status of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF),bilateral defense planning, and information security with Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Kohei Masuda, MOD Director-General for Defense Policy Nobushige Takamizawa, MOD DG for Operations Policy Hideshi Tokuchi, and MOFA NORTH American Affairs DG Shinichi Nishimiya. Commander United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) Lt. Gen. Edward Rice also participated in the meetings. Realignment --------------
;¶3. (C) ASD Shinn registered strong concerns with AVM Masuda over the possible delay in implementing the Agreed Implementation Plan (AIP) for the construction of the FRF, saying Tokyo should accelerate work on those areas of the FRF not subject to the environmental impact assessment (EIA). Masuda assured ASD Shinn that Japan remains committed to the timely completion of the Realignment Roadmap despite the eight-month delay in the EIA. Demolition of existing facilities and EIA survey work have commenced and the United States should not be overly concerned by comments from the Japanese side stating the contrary, Masuda said. ¶4. (C) In an unusually heated outburst, DG Takamizawa argued that U.S. government pressure to speed up on-land construction at the FRF threatens to undermine Tokyo's efforts to secure cooperation from Okinawa. Accelerating construction before completion of the EIA could backfire on the U.S. and Japanese governments, leading to an unsatisfactory result to both sides. ""We may win some battles but will lose the war,"" DG Takamizawa warned, referring to securing the Governor's approval for landfill work. While Japan would welcome specific ideas from the U.S. side, general expressions of concern about Japan's execution strategy are counter-productive, DG Takamizawa asserted. ASD Shinn reiterated that the delay in the EIA is a serious concern, that the entire agreement is at risk due to the delay, and that both sides need to work together to compensate for the delay. Guam -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding construction of facilities on Guam, AVM Masuda said the Japanese government will request appropriate funds to finance the project for FY 2009 in September during the extraordinary Diet session. To prepare for the Diet deliberations, Japan seeks continued cooperation and information from the United States per Defense Minister Ishiba's recent conversation with Secretary of Defense Gates in Singapore. Bilateral Planning -------------- ¶6. (S) MOD Defense Operations DG Tokuchi underscored the need for improved communication and cooperation between the United States and Japan on bilateral planning for contingencies, noting four areas of bilateral planning that are essential. First, the plans must be workable. Second, the U.S. must avoid making plans and expecting to execute them unilaterally. Third, site surveys of seaports and airports must continue, but plans must acknowledge that other entities besides the U.S. military will need to use them in a contingency. Finally, bilateral understanding of each country,s decision making mechanisms in a crisis is imperative. ¶7. (S) ASD Shinn thanked Tokuchi for his insights and noted that Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Thomas Mahnken, the Defense Department's lead planner, will visit Japan in July to discuss an analytical review of Contingency Plan 5055 and updates directed under the next Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation bilateral planning framework guidance (currently in bilateral coordination). ASD Shinn and Lt. Gen. Rice underscored the importance in the bilateral planning process of having a shared threat assessment. DG Tokuchi responded that he was not ready to discuss the status of the draft guidance to initiate a threat assessment (so-called Common Security Assessment). (Note: Tokuchi approved the document within days, however.) ¶8. (S) Embassy Tokyo Pol-Mil Chief Greene said that the 2006 DPRK missile launch experience highlighted the shortcomings in the assumptions used to craft emergency legislation, such as the Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan Law. The legislation assumed an escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula and did not allow the Alliance to respond effectively to a sudden threat. Lt Gen Rice noted that the U.S. and Japan need to work to create a &robust8 series of contingency scenarios. Updating existing scenarios and developing new ones will allow the United States and Japan to better analyze their future operational needs. DG Tokuchi agreed with both points, noting that the reality of missile defense made older decision making mechanisms inadequate and that the United States and Japan both must be &circumspect8 on all assumptions and scenarios. Site Surveys -------------- ¶9. (S) Lt. Gen. Rice stressed the importance of bilateral defense planning with AVM Masuda and urged greater cooperation on surveys of airports and seaports for possible use in contingencies. Masuda responded that Japan needs specific information on how the facilities would be used by U.S. forces as this will help the Government of Japan to engage local governments on the nature of the site surveys. The information is also necessary for Japan to develop plans to de-conflict usage of the air and sea ports by the U.S. military, Japan Self Defense Forces and civilian Japanese entities, Masuda asserted. Information Security -------------- ¶10. (C) ASD Shinn and Lt. Gen. Rice urged continued cooperation on information security and the Bilateral Information Security Task Force (BISTF). Highlighting the recent leak of intelligence on Chinese missile launches to the Sankei newspaper, Lt. Gen. Rice underscored the need to work toward a secure system that provides comprehensive, government-wide safeguards for classified information. As both countries work more closely together on security initiatives, such as ballistic missile defense cooperation, the need for stronger information security measures is even greater. ASD Shinn stressed that there has been a considerable amount of bilateral discussions within the BISTF and now there is a need for action, including implementation of real safeguards and strengthening of law enforcement. ¶11. (C) Masuda acknowledged the need for greater cooperation but pointed out that both sides need to examine areas of information security that fall outside the BISTF's authority and to deal with ministries and agencies that are not sensitive to the problem. Lt. Gen. Rice responded that this is exactly why a comprehensive approach to information security is needed. ¶12. (U) ASD Shinn,s staff and Lt. Gen. Rice cleared this message. SCHIEFFER

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