CABINET TO REVIEW AFGHAN OPTIONS BEFORE G-8

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001705

SIPDIS

DOD FOR OSD/APSA SHINN/SEDNEY/WILKES/HILL/BASALLA
NSC FOR WILDER/KATZ
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J3/J5
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV AF IZ JA
SUBJECT: CABINET TO REVIEW AFGHAN OPTIONS BEFORE G-8
MEETINGS

REF: A. TOKYO 1464 (NOTAL)

B. TOKYO 1657 (NOTAL)

C. TOKYO 1593 (NOTAL)

D. SECDEF DTG 031932Z JUN 08 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Key ministers will seek a consensus on a
possible new mission to Afghanistan before the June 26-27 G-8
Foreign Ministerial meeting in Kyoto, according to MOFA
National Security Division Director Takeo Mori. Mori said
that the survey team dispatched to Afghanistan and
neighboring countries encountered no negative "surprises"
that would change Japan's calculations over the contents of a
new Self-Defense Force (SDF) mission. Mori noted that
Cabinet discussions will initially focus on CH-47 helicopter
lift, adding that deep differences remain between the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and MOFA leadership over the issue.
If Tokyo decides against sending the CH-47s, Mori suggested
that the U.S. propose specific options for a PRT dispatch.
Mori noted that resolve to press ahead on a new mission
amongst Cabinet ministers has "gone a bit shaky" in recent
weeks due to negative feedback from senior coalition Diet
members. Nevertheless, Mori assessed that upcoming G-8
Ministerial and Summit discussions on the subject should help
restore confidence in the leadership's plan to initiate a new
ground operation in Afghanistan. End Summary.

No Surprises
--------------


2. (S/NF) MOFA National Security Division Director Mori
(protect) told the Embassy on June 20 that the inter-agency
Afghan survey team had a productive set of meetings in
Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Mori said that the
team encountered no new negative "surprises" that would lead
the government to change its basic assumptions on the
viability of an Afghan dispatch (Ref A). Director
General-level officials from MOFA and MOD will brief Chief
Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura on the survey mission
late on June 20. Machimura, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba,
and Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura will meet early in the
week of June 23 to decide on next steps.

CH-47s Alive, but Still a Challenge
--------------


3. (S/NF) Mori said that Cabinet-level discussions will focus
initially on a possible CH-47 dispatch. MOD leadership
remains positive on this option (Ref B),despite resistance
from MOFA and the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF),he
added. The GSDF has identified four technical challenges to
sending heavy-lift helicopters: 1) requirement to install
defensive counter-measures; 2) need for new engines for
high-altitude operations; 3) likely redesign of the fuselage
to accommodate a different type of engine 4) lack of
compatible communications systems to receive tactical
intelligence from ISAF forces. Regarding the final item,
Mori said that he suspects the GSDF is also concerned about
the foreign language issues involved in operating in a
coalition environment.


4. (S/NF) MOFA's objections to the CH-47 dispatch focus on
legal and political dynamics, Mori asserted. Unlike
fixed-wing operations, it is harder to make the case that
CH-47 operations can be limited to "non-combat zones." The
government's complex legal brief to defend its C-130
operations in Iraq is based on assurances that the air/ground
space for flight operations is fixed and has been vetted for
safety. By the nature of helicopter operations, it will be

TOKYO 00001705 002 OF 003


difficult to offer assurances in advance about conditions
where the CH-47s would be deployed. Both the Cabinet
Legislative Bureau and, more importantly, the junior
coalition partner Komeito would very likely reject any
attempt to expand the constitutional interpretation to allow
CH-47 operations in the current environment, Mori concluded.

PRTs: Perfect the Enemy of the Good?
--------------


5. (S/NF) Mori expressed concern that ASD for Asia and
Pacific Security Affairs Shinn's request for Japan to provide
a PRT with full force protection (Ref B) might scare the
Fukuda Cabinet away from considering such an option. Mori
acknowledged that the GSDF could potentially do some force
protection, such as perimeter security. If Japan were asked
to sustain a PRT without any third country force protection
assistance, however, this may take the option off the table
(Note: Per Ref C, the Cabinet Office maintains that the SDF
would be unable to respond to threats outside of the fence
line. End Note.) Mori stated that, if the U.S. is seriously
interested in a PRT deployment and has a particular operation
in mind, it should say so if/when Tokyo informs the U.S.
government that it will not be able to send CH-47s.


6. (S/NF) As for other potential operations, the Japanese
government understands ISAF's need for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support. While Japan
has the technical capability, Mori stated, the missions
briefed to the survey team in Kabul would violate Japan's
current legal limits on providing ISR support to offensive
operations. Mori did not rule out the dispatch of P-3Cs to
the Indian Ocean to conduct maritime ISR activities in
support of OEF MIO, but said that this would likely be
considered as a small part of a larger package focused on
ground operations.


7. (S/NF) Mori downplayed prospects for broad legislative
authority that would allow Japan to expand its operations if
the political situation changed for the better after the next
General Election. MOFA legal experts believe that if a new
Special Measures Law provided specific details for the
envisioned operations, a single Diet vote, subject to a Lower
House override, would suffice to begin a new mission. If
this interpretation can be upheld, Mori added, the opposition
would have no means of blocking the dispatch in the Upper
House.

Political/International Dynamics
--------------


8. (S/NF) Mori acknowledged that confidence among the three
National Security Cabinet members to pursue a new Afghan
operation has been somewhat shaken due to negative feedback
they have received in recent weeks from leading coalition
Diet members. Nevertheless, Mori said that upcoming G-8
meetings should help stiffen their resolve. Mori said he was
personally pleased that Defense Minister Ishiba went beyond
his script in his recent meeting with Secretary Gates in
Singapore (Ref D),since it has greatly raised the diplomatic
cost to the Fukuda Cabinet for reversing course in the face
of pressure from skittish Diet leaders. Mori said that
high-level U.S. diplomatic pressure will be extremely helpful
in this regard, but cautioned that discussions be kept out of
the public to allow Tokyo to publicly portray any new mission
as a positive contribution to international society rather
than a response to U.S. demands.


9. (S/NF) Mori predicted that Foreign Minister Koumura would
deliver a negative response on the CH-47s to Secretary Rice

TOKYO 00001705 003 OF 003


on the margins of the Kyoto G-8 ministerial, setting the
stage for Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to deliver a positive
offer on some other combination of operations at the
bilateral with the President in Hokkaido. If all goes
according to his calculations, Mori said, the new mission
would be announced to the public several weeks after the
Summit.
SCHIEFFER