LDP LEADER YAMASAKI AND DIET GROUP SUPPORT LIFTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001675 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA SUBJECT: LDP LEADER YAMASAKI AND DIET GROUP SUPPORT LIFTING SANCTIONS ON DPRK REF: TOKYO 1641 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4(b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Japan should lift sanctions and provide immediate energy assistance in exchange for the DPRK reopening its inquiry into the abduction issue, senior LDP Lower House member Taku Yamasaki has told the Embassy. However, Yamasaki and his 40-member supra-partisan group of Diet members are increasingly in the minority, as opinion has hardened in recent days over making concessions to the DPRK without concrete progress on the abductions issue. On June 13, just before he was briefed by Japan's lead negotiator, Akitaka Saiki, on the results of working-level bilateral talks in Beijing June 11-12, Yamasaki provided the Embassy with a draft declaration calling for Japan to provide energy aid to the DPRK. Yamasaki revealed that the declaration had been drafted by a close associate of opposition DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa. Yamasaki acknowledged the need to settle the abductions issue, but worried that Japan could lose sight of the importance of denuclearization. He indicated plans to travel to Pyongyang with members of his supra-partisan Diet league after the completion of all phase two commitments to make the point that even if the officially acknowledged abductees are no longer alive, the DPRK still needs to return other Japanese not on the list, including the JAL Yodo-go hijackers. He was up front about expected resistance to his proposal from "hard-liners" such as former PM ABE and Kantei Abduction Advisor Nakayama, but suggested they consider withholding compensation instead. He expected his views, which he believes to be close to those of PM Fukuda, to eventually win out over those of conservative Diet members. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Chair of the supra-partisan Parliamentary League to Normalize Relations with the DPRK Taku Yamasaki told the Embassy on June 13 he supports lifting sanctions against the DPRK in exchange for a reinvestigation of the abduction issue, and would like to see Japan provide energy assistance immediately. Return of all surviving Japanese abductees is the only way to settle the abduction issue, but Japan should not lose sight of the importance of denuclearization, the 12-term Lower House member said. If there are no surviving abductees, then the DPRK should return the following: any Japanese abductees who are not on the official list of abductees, but who are believed to have been abducted; Japanese spouses who traveled to North Korea as part of past repatriation programs; and the four JAL Yodo-go hijackers. Yamasaki said he plans to travel to Pyongyang with members of his non-partisan Diet league to make that point, once the second phase of commitments under the Six-Party process is completed. He made clear, however, that discussions at this point are firmly in the hands of the two governments. ¶3. (C) Even before he was briefed by MOFA Asia DG Akitaka Saiki on the results of his June 11-12 talks in Beijing with North Korean Ambassador Song Il-ho, Yamasaki, a former Vice President of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), anticipated that the DPRK had probably agreed on the repatriation of the four Japanese Yodo-go hijackers and a re-investigation into the fate of Japanese abductees, in exchange for Japan's agreement to lift its unilateral sanctions and make a contribution to energy assistance. Based on what he had learned through other sources, he said he expected former Prime Minister SHINZO Abe, advisor to a rival supra-partisan league, to label Japanese moves a "concession" to the DPRK, absent any constructive progress on abductions. Yamasaki acknowledged that his group would need to overcome these objections. He suggested that ABE and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on Abductions Kyoko Nakayama would be better advised to withhold compensation, not energy assistance, should the talks fail to produce any tangible results on the abductee issue. ¶4. (C) Yamasaki claimed his own views were very close to those of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, although Fukuda is TOKYO 00001675 002 OF 003 constrained from expressing his thoughts by the fact that he served in the same Koizumi administration as ABE and is reluctant to distance himself publicly from Abe. Yamasaki believes that Saiki sees Yamasaki as an ally, particularly compared to "hard-liners" like Abe. ¶5. (C) Yamasaki noted the benefits of proceeding under the auspices of his supra-partisan group, which brings together lawmakers from six different parties and is co-chaired by Tetsundo Iwakuni, of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Collective support from both ruling and opposition parties not only gives his position more substance, but allows both sides to share any credit or blame. He gave the Embassy the text of a declaration his group planned to unveil if the government did not seize the opportunity presented by the recent Japan-DPRK talks to lift sanctions in hopes of achieving denuclearization. He noted that the declaration was drafted by a close associate of DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa. ¶6. (C) Stressing the importance of denuclearization to Japan's security, Yamasaki defined denuclearization as re-integrating the DPRK into the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework and gaining access for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors on a permanent basis. He provided a draft declaration (unofficial translation see para 7.),that calls for Japan to provide energy assistance immediately, a position at odds with the government's position. He is convinced that his group will eventually win out over the hard-liners that have until now held sway in the Diet, led by Abe, Shoichi Nakagawa, Takeo Hiranuma, and Ichita Yamamoto. At the same time, he acknowledged the difficulties of gaining public support for any group that is willing to accept that the abductees may all be dead. Yamasaki and his group would appear to be increasingly in the minority, as recent statements by government officials and ruling and opposition party leaders have been considerably more cautious regarding the need to see concrete progress on abductions before Japan makes any concessions. DRAFT DECLARATION TO EXTEND SANCTIONS ON THE DPRK -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) Begin Text: The government called for extending the legal "Ban on the Entry of North Korean Vessels to Japanese Ports" and the "Ban on Import of All Items from the DPRK" for six months from April 13, 2008, and the Diet approved this. However, based on progress and the perspectives noted below, we call on the Fukuda administration to comprehensively settle nuclear, missile and abduction issues and aim at normalization of diplomatic ties with the DPRK in accordance with "The Pyongyang Declaration" of September 17, 2002. These government sanctions were implemented from October 14, 2006, for a six-month period on the basis of the DPRK,s July 2006 missile launch and the October 2006 nuclear test, and this was the third time for these sanctions to have been implemented. On the other hand, second-phase actions were agreed on at the second session in the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks (on October 2, 2007) held prior to the second extension (which was decided by the Cabinet on October 9, 2007). "Second-phase actions" specifically mean "a complete and correct declaration of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by the DPRK. In this regard, U.S.-DPRK talks were held on April 8, 2008, and we appreciate that both the U.S. and the DPRK were able to achieve certain results regarding declaration of nuclear programs. In addition, U.S. delegates visited Pyongyang on April 22 and made detailed discussions over the issue of declaration of nuclear programs. There are indications that the Six-Party Talks are expected to resume soon. TOKYO 00001675 003 OF 003 If the Six-Party Talks resume, it is anticipated that second-phase actions for the implementation of the joint statement of September 19, 2005, which was agreed and presented on February 13, 2007, and on October 3, will be completely implemented and third-phase (final-phase) actions towards nuclear dismantlement by the DPRK, the construction of a permanent framework for peace on the Korean Peninsula and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK diplomatic ties will be implemented on a full scale. If the Six-Party Talks enters the final phase, sanctions by Japan could be an impediment and there is concern that there could be a situation in which only Japan would not implement the Six-Party Talks pledges, such as providing economic and energy assistance. Moreover, if the conflict between Japan and the DPRK continues, positive progress towards the settlement of the abduction issue could be even less likely. In terms of measures taken this time, including "ban on the entry of North Korean vessels to Japanese ports," in case the DPRK takes concrete second-phase actions including "complete and correct declaration of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs," in order to create the environment of resuming Japan-DPRK government-to-government talks and negotiations on the abduction issue, comprehensively giving due consideration to the whole situation, we call on the government to end part of or all sanctions. Lastly, taking a position of "without dialogue, no agreement" and "without dialogue, no settlement of the abduction issue," we will actively promote diplomacy led by nonpartisan parliamentarians towards the DPRK. Parliamentarian League to Promote Japan-DPRK Normalization End Text. SCHIEFFER