SHAPING JAPAN'S AFGHAN DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS

S E C R E T TOKYO 001657 SIPDIS NOFORN NSC FOR WILDER/KATZ; OSD/APSA FOR SHINN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5; PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5; JOINT STAFF FOR J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV IZ AF JA SUBJECT: SHAPING JAPAN'S AFGHAN DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS REF: A. TOKYO 1464 ¶B. TOKYO 1593 ¶C. SECDEF DTG 031932Z JUN 08 ¶D. TOKYO 1623 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Japanese government is struggling to find a strategy to terminate its C-130 mission to Iraq and start a new deployment to Afghanistan to ""off-set"" its decision to opt-out of the Iraq coalition. The U.S. political calendar appears to weigh heavily on Japanese deliberations -- the GOJ is expressing a desire to end its Iraq deployments by the end of the Bush Administration so that it can get credit for a new Afghan mission from the incoming U.S. administration. DOMESTIC political turmoil and disunity within the Fukuda Cabinet, however, are hampering efforts to formulate a coherent operational and legislative strategy or manage U.S. expectations. Japan will continue discussions after its survey team returns from Afghanistan on June 18 with an eye towards making a Cabinet-level decision by the end of the month. The G-8 Summit in Hokkaido likely increases the pressure on Japan to make a more robust Afghan contribution. End Summary. Mixed Messages -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) During June 16-17 meetings in Tokyo, ASD for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Shinn received a range of views on Japan's thinking regarding a possible new Afghan Self-Defense Force (SDF) dispatch. Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Chikao Kawai talked about the logic of moving up the termination of Japan's Iraqi operations and making a new contribution to Afghanistan (Refs A/B). Kawai underscored the importance of the American political calendar, noting that Japan would prefer to close out the Iraq mission before the next U.S. administration takes office in January. ¶3. (S/NF) Kawai asserted that there have been no formal discussions over which of the three main operations currently being studied by the survey team in Afghanistan -- C-130 logistical flights; Japanese participation in a PRT; and dispatch of CH-47s -- Japan might pursue. Nevertheless, ASD Shinn was treated to a variety of often conflicting opinions on specific missions, even from within the same agency. Ministry of Defense (MOD) Vice Minister Kohei Masuda, for example, listed the CH-47 dispatch as the ""most possible"" of the three options. MOD Defense Policy Bureau DG Nobushige Takamizawa dismissed such positive signals on the CH-47s from Masuda and Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba (Refs C/D), suggesting that the two MOD leaders ""had their heads in the clouds."" Takamizawa urged the U.S. government to forget about the CH-47s and ""concentrate instead on realistic missions such as fixed wing aircraft and PRTs."" ¶4. (S/NF) Joint Staff Office (JSO) Chairman Admiral Takashi Saito told USFJ Commander Lt. Gen. Rice on June 12 that a CH-47 dispatch is extremely difficult for a number of operational, legal, and political reasons. Lt. Gen. Rice responded that Minister Ishiba's message to the Secretary of Defense on the CH-47 mission had raised expectations at the highest levels of the U.S. government. MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau DDG Kazuyoshi Umemoto suggested that Japan has, in fact, altered its approach on the CH-47s based on Ishiba's meeting in Singapore. The government had been officially ""negative"" on the CH-47s before Ishiba's ""positive"" signal to Secretary Gates, Umemoto commented, but ""now the government is 'neutral'"" towards the option. Cabinet Disunity -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) There appear to be more fundamental differences among key Cabinet Ministers over whether any type of new mission is viable. Taku Yamasaki, head of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Project Team on Self-Defense Force (SDF) legislation, told ASD Shinn that Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his Chief Cabinet Secretary, Nobutaka Machimura, have held different views on Afghan strategy. It is Machimura, he added, who had been driving the government's policy to date, including the dispatch of the survey team to the region. PM Fukuda, he assessed, has been much less enthusiastic about taking on any new operation. Yamasaki said that Machimura seems to be stepping back from his previous stance in light of the political challenges. Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kyoji Yanagisawa suggested the same, telling ASD Shinn that Machimura has decided that it is too hard politically to do anything more than extend the current operation. Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura told the Ambassador that he, too, is deeply pessimistic about prospects for securing legislative authority for a major new operation in the current fragile political environment. Political Dynamics -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Other officials and politicians take a more optimistic view on Diet prospects. MOFA's Umemoto said that if Japan were to package a new Afghan deployment with a decision to terminate the unpopular Iraq mission, the government could solicit support from the normally recalcitrant opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). DPJ Vice President Katsuya Okada voiced a similar view, stating that ""the public would be much more willing to support a new Afghan deployment if it was coupled with a pullout from Iraq."" Okada suggested that the U.S. leverage the Afghan government and NATO partners in both the lead-up to the G-8 Summit in July and in the public arena to demonstrate the importance of Japan's participation in ground operations in Afghanistan. Afghan Ambassador to Tokyo Haron Amin, echoing an offer to ASD Shinn in Paris from Afghan National Security Advisor Zalmai Rassoul in Paris, said that he is prepared to spearhead public efforts to secure a new Japanese deployment on the ground. Tight Timelines -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Japanese officials acknowledge that time is running short to bridge internal divisions over a possible new Afghan operation. The survey team is scheduled to brief the Cabinet Office and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense immediately after their return on June 18. ACCS Yanagisawa told ASD Shinn that the three Ministers will meet during the week of June 23 to agree on a recommendation for the Prime Minister. Due to tight diplomatic and political calendars, the government will have to decide quickly on what type of operation to pursue and how to go about securing Diet approval for it. MOD's Takamizawa asserted that a U.S. decision to send experts to Tokyo to follow-up on the survey team visit ""should depend on whether the issue will be on the agenda"" for the G-8 in early July. The LDP's Yamasaki noted that the Fukuda government will need to set a policy direction soon in order to allow time to draft legislation to either enable the extension of the current Indian Ocean refueling operation or authorize a new mission in Afghanistan. The government is seeking to start an extraordinary Diet session in late August so that the Lower House can override an expected opposition veto of new legislation in the Upper House before the refueling operation expires in January. The opposition can delay an override vote for up to 60 days. Substance over Form -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) During his meetings, ASD Shinn emphasized that a token contribution in Afghanistan will not be helpful or appreciated by the international community. Afghanistan is truly a coalition effort and a symbolic presence like Japan maintains in Iraq would be considered counterproductive. Sending a dozen people to a PRT or a handful of C-130s will fall far short of the bar for being operationally significant. The Ambassador suggested to DVFM Kawai that in the U.S. DOMESTIC political context, public patience is wearing thin over the unwillingness of U.S. allies to make substantive contributions to achieve common objectives. ASD Shinn expressed appreciation for Defense Minister Ishiba's commitment to consider seriously the dispatch of CH-47s. In addition to this critical requirement, he urged Japan to take charge of a full PRT, including providing force protection, as well as to look at sending ""significant"" fixed-wing elements to assist with logistics and surveillance. Comment: Managing the Clock -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Interval disarray and political bickering are hampering the GOJ's ability to articulate a coherent strategy on a new contribution to Afghanistan. At the same time, the Japanese are becoming incresaingly concerned about having a ""successful"" summit as a result of diverging views with the U.S. on other issues like climate change. The chance for getting Japan to make a substantial rather than symbolic contribution to Afghanistan will be greatest in the lead up to the G-8. If the Secretary and the President could make such a request in their respective bilats with Japan, they may get results. Otherwise, we judge it will be very hard to get the Japanese to move in any substantial way. SCHIEFFER